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Insider threat has continued to be one of the most difficult cybersecurity threat vectors 
detectable by contemporary technologies. Most organizations apply standard technology-
based practices to detect unusual network activity. While there have been significant 
advances in intrusion detection systems (IDS) as well as security incident and event 
management solutions (SIEM), these technologies fail to take into consideration the 
human aspects of personality and emotion in computer use and network activity, since 
insider threats are human-initiated. External influencers impact how an end-user interacts 
with both colleagues and organizational resources. Taking into consideration external 
influencers, such as personality, changes in organizational polices and structure, along 
with unusual technical activity analysis, would be an improvement over contemporary 
detection tools used for identifying at-risk employees. This would allow upper 
management or other organizational units to intervene before a malicious cybersecurity 
insider threat event occurs, or mitigate it quickly, once initiated.  
The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and validate a proof-of-
concept prototype for a malicious cybersecurity insider threat alerting system that will 
assist in the rapid detection and prediction of human-centric precursors to malicious 
cybersecurity insider threat activity. Disgruntled employees or end-users wishing to cause 
harm to the organization may do so by abusing the trust given to them in their access to 
available network and organizational resources. Reports on malicious insider threat 
actions indicated that insider threat attacks make up roughly 23% of all cybercrime 
incidents, resulting in $2.9 trillion in employee fraud losses globally. The damage and 
negative impact that insider threats cause was reported to be higher than that of outsider 
or other types of cybercrime incidents. Consequently, this study utilized weighted 
indicators to measure and correlate simulated user activity to possible precursors to 
malicious cybersecurity insider threat attacks. This study consisted of a mixed method 
approach utilizing an expert panel, developmental research, and quantitative data analysis 
using the developed tool on simulated data set. To assure validity and reliability of the 
indicators, a panel of subject matter experts (SMEs) reviewed the indicators and indicator 
categorizations that were collected from prior literature following the Delphi technique. 
The SMEs’ responses were incorporated into the development of a proof-of-concept 
prototype. Once the proof-of-concept prototype was completed and fully tested, an 
empirical simulation research study was conducted utilizing simulated user activity 
within a 16-month time frame. The results of the empirical simulation study were 
analyzed and presented. Recommendations resulting from the study also be provided.
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Background 
 As society relies increasingly on information systems (IS), the threat of malicious 
insider activity continues to be of paramount concern in both the public and private 
sectors (Glasser & Lindauer, 2013). Recognizing insider threats has presented one of the 
most complex challenges in the information security field with even the definition of 
“insider threat” proving difficult (Costa et al., 2014). Due to the nature of the insider 
threat domain, malicious insiders can be expected to attempt to hide their actions utilizing 
techniques believed to evade detection, usually until their desired objective has been 
achieved (Young, Memory, Goldberg, & Senator, 2014). Schultz (2002) defined an 
insider attack as “the intentional misuse of computer systems by users who are authorized 
to access those systems and networks” (p. 526). Moreover, in numerous insider attacks, 
management and co-workers observed that offenders had exhibited signs of stress, 
disgruntlement, or had other issues, yet no one raised an alarm (Greitzer, Kangas, 
Noonan, & Dalton, 2010). This research aimed at developing a simulated, data-driven, 
proof-of-concept prototype that would assist in the evaluation and prediction of malicious 
insider threat activity. This was necessary because, as noted by Greitzer, Kangas, 
Noonan, Brown, and Ferryman (2014), if these human-centric as well as psychosocial 
precursors are evaluated properly and in a timely manner, they could alert an organization 
about a developing insider attack.  
 The remainder of this draft is organized as follows. First, a statement of the 
specific research problem this research study will address is presented. Second, the main 
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dissertation goal, research questions, as well the relevance and significance of this 
research will be discussed. In Chapter 2 a brief literature review of related research is 
presented regarding each of the relevant areas: cyber threat vectors, insider threat, 
incident response, system security baseline standards and guidelines, cybersecurity 
monitoring, as well as, data mining, data modeling, and simulation. Next, specific 
barriers and limitations will be discussed. Chapter 3 presents the methodology for this 
research study and will outline the specific data analysis that will be used to formulate 
user and indicator linear models. Furthermore, Chapter 3 will outline simulated model 
development, as well as, the specific model development steps.  
 
Problem Statement 
The research problem this study addressed was the imminent challenge to 
mitigating cybersecurity insider threats from employees or contractors who may bring 
harm to the organization by misusing information systems, computer networks, or data 
(Sood, Zeadally, Member, & Bansal, 2015). The threat posed by insiders to organizations 
and government agencies has continued to be of serious concern because it can expose 
the establishment and their sensitive information (Nurse et al., 2014). Nostro, Ceccarelli, 
Bondavalli, and Brancati (2014) stated that it is particularly challenging to identify 
insiders and the possible threats they pose to an information system. This is primarily due 
to the nature of the attackers, who are often company employees (or employees of an 
authorized contractor) motivated by social and economic gains. According to Lindauer, 
Glasser, Rosen, and Wallnau (2013), malicious acts carried out by these trusted insiders 
include, but are not limited to, theft of intellectual property or national security 
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information, fraud, and sabotage. Additionally, within certain critical infrastructures, such 
as power grids, communication networks, and transportation services, insider threats are 
even more dangerous because they potentially threaten human lives and national security 
(Punithavathani, Sujatha, & Jain, 2015). According to Cummings, Lewellen, Mcintire, 
Moore, and Trzeciak (2012), insiders they studied needed very little technical 
sophistication because they tended to exploit known or newly discovered design flaws. 
Cummings et al. (2012) noted that malicious activity was planned in advance, with 
organizations suffering financial losses ranging from hundreds, to hundreds of millions of 
dollars; these malicious acts were committed during working hours. Almehmadi and El-
khatib (2014) stated that “insiders are the trusted, authorized entities in an organization 
who are assigned privileges and know how to navigate through a facility or system and 
access valuable materials easily, compared to unauthorized entities” (p. 1). Insider threats 
commonly act by exploiting their own user accounts to the capacity of their assigned 
privileges and access rights, while abusing their job functions (Fuchs & Gunter, 2010).  
At the time of this study, insider threat responses, being largely reactive, 
attempted to identify malicious behavior after an event has occurred, therefore, it lacked a 
predictive analytic methodology (Greitzer, Frincke, & Zabriskie, 2010). According to 
Greitzer and Hohimer (2011), insider threats are manifested within socio-technical 
systems, which combine “social, behavioral, and technical factors that interact in 
complex ways” (p. 30). According to Greitzer et al. (2009), observations of user behavior 
are processed from cyber and psychosocial data that infer indicators, including excessive 
access attempts, the presence of automated scripts, registry entries, IDS/IPS events, and 
firewall logs. For the purposes of this study, these observations are referred to as “input 
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indicators.” By analyzing input indicators and their relationships in a timely manner, 
organizations can be alerted of a developing cyber-attack (Greitzer et al., 2010).  
Where no rational relationships to employee activities exist in security event and 
information management (SEIM) solutions, tools that monitor psychological indicators, 
can help identify employees who exhibit elevated insider threat risk, allowing the 
organization to provide assistance to these employees before these situations escalate 
(Greitzer et al., 2014). These employee activities and additional input indicators can be 
matched with physical security inputs to provide a more robust predictive platform. 
Moreover, according to Greitzer et al. (2009), “a benefit of a predictive approach is the 
potential for an attentive manager to speak with stressed employees and possibly avert a 
cyber incident by addressing underlying problems” (p. 4). Additionally, it has been 
observed that in many insider cyber-attacks, supervisors and co-workers recognized that 
suspects displayed signs of stress or disgruntlement, yet raised no alarms with senior 
management or human resources personnel (Greitzer, Dalton, Kangas, Noonan, & 
Hohimer, 2012). Warkentin and Willison (2009) acknowledged that the insider threat has 
been repeatedly called the greatest threat to information security, yet is often overlooked 
by organizations and the intelligence community, which focus primarily on protecting the 
network perimeter from external threats.  
Dissertation Goal 
The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and validate a proof-
of-concept prototype for a malicious cybersecurity insider threat alerting system that 
would assist in the detection and prediction of malicious insider threat activity using 
human-centric technical activities as well as individual employee psychometric rating 
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scales. A prototype is defined as an original model on which something is patterned 
(Levy, 2007). Figure 1 depicts an outline and initial design of the proposed Analytics-
based Identifying Insider Cybersecurity Threat in Real-time (AI-InCyThR) system. The 
AI-InCyThR system would assist in identifying behaviors, activities, and other inputs as 
identified by the expert panel, in an effort to identify at-risk employees and alerting of a 
possible cyber-attack before it has materialized.  
The need for this work has been demonstrated by the work of Bishop and Carrie 
(2008), Greitzer et al. (2008, 2009, 2010, & 2012), Greitzer and Hohimer (2011), Lawton 
(2008), as well as Magklaras and Furnell (2002). Greitzer et al. (2012) outlined that 
identifying the warning signs of insider threats ahead of a full-blown cyber-attack 
requires the communication and coordination of several factors. These include assessing 
the capabilities, opportunities, and motivations of an end-user, or the organizational 
ability to evaluate risk levels for employees. In addition, Schultz (2002) suggested that 
personality factors, particularly introversion, can be used in predicting insider attacks.  
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Figure 1. AI-InCyThR Proof-of-Concept Prototype Model 
Greitzer and Hohimer (2011) defined several technological sources representative 
of host/network cyber data to be monitored for insider threat analysis, which were 
integrated with psychometric indicators as presented by Greitzer et al. (2009). The AI-
InCyThR system aimed to address the problem of insider threat by focusing on both 
technical as well as behavioral aspects (Greitzer et al., 2008).  
Figure 1 depicts the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype. The proof-of-
concept prototype developed in this study will analyze indicators from two categories, 
those being the Five Factor Model (FFM) of personality, and collected simulated data 
sources / network resources. The categories can be further delineated into specific 
Proof-of-Concept PrototypeAnalytics-based Identifying Insider Cybersecurity Threat in Real-time (AI-InCyThR) System
End-User 
Big-5 Personality Factors
Psychometric Scale
Organizational Demographic 
Information 
Information Security 
Engineer
Cybersecurity 
Insider Risk 
Dashboard
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Category 2
Category 3
Human Resources and Management Decisions
 on Exhibited End-User Behavior
Cybersecurity 
Insider Threat 
Monitoring 
Database
(CyTiMon)
Openness
Conscientiousness
Extroversion
Agreableness
Neuroticism
End-User Role
Functional Unit
Department
Team
Supervisor
E-mail
HTTP Activity
Logon/Logoff
External  Device
File Access
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Word Content Filtering 
Analytics
(Email & HTTP Keywords)
Dictionary of 
Words for Flagging
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personality factors, user behavior, and electronic sources. Indicators aggregation and 
analysis occurred using the Cybersecurity Threat-Insider Monitoring Database 
(CyTiMon). Analyzed and processed data were reviewed by an information security 
professional through data visualization for correctness, while providing a real-time 
assessment of the network heartbeat for alerting management of unusually suspicious 
combination of indicators occurs.  
 This study aimed to specifically align with Department of Defense (DoD) 
Directive Number 5205.16; The DoD Insider Threat Program:  
This directive …Establishes policy and assigns responsibilities within DoD to 
develop and maintain an insider threat program to comply with the requirements 
and minimum standards to prevent, deter, detect, and mitigate actions by 
malicious insiders who represent a threat to national security or DoD personnel, 
facilities, operations, and resources. (Department of Defense, 2014, p. 1) 
This study built on the work of Greitzer et al. (2012) and intended to develop as 
well as validate an indicator instrument for the assessment of behaviors and technical 
actions related to the potential risk of cybersecurity insider threats. This research aimed to 
acquire improved data on the relative distribution, interrelationships, and weight (i.e. 
level of importance), with respect to cybersecurity insider threat risks of concerning 
behaviors and personal predispositions as noted by Band et al. (2006).  
The seven specific goals of this research study are as follows. The first specific 
goal of this study was to identify a set of cybersecurity input indicators as pinpointed by 
subject matter experts (SMEs), which can help in the identification of precursors to 
malicious cybersecurity insider threat activity. The second specific goal of this study was 
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to develop a set of cybersecurity events that can be categorized and linked to the SME-
identified set of cybersecurity input indicators. The third specific goal of this study was to 
identify expert-approved weights (i.e. level of importance) for the SME-identified 
cybersecurity input indicators. The fourth specific goal of this study was to establish the 
expert identified most significant correlations between cybersecurity input indicators. The 
fifth specific goal of this research was to determine which of the identified cybersecurity 
input indicators display a high rate of false positives or false negatives. The sixth specific 
goal of this research was to recognize which of the simulated user activity indicators were 
identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as significant input indicators 
to identify insider threat activity. Therefore, the seventh specific goal this research was to 
establish which simulated user activity correlations were identified by the SME’s 
different that those identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as 
significant to identify insider threat activity.  
 
Research Questions 
The main research question this study addressed was: What human-centric 
technical activity and psychometric indicators are precursors to malicious end-user 
activity, making those activities rise above a certain threshold to be identified as potential 
insider threats? The specific research questions (RQ) this study addressed, as seen in 
Figure 2, were:  
RQ1: What are the important cybersecurity indicators validated by the expert 
panel that can assist in the detection of insider threat activity?  
RQ2: What are the expert-validated cybersecurity indicator categories? 
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RQ3: What are the expert-approved weights for the identified cybersecurity 
indicators? 
RQ4: What are the expert-identified most significant correlations between 
cybersecurity indicators?  
RQ5a: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to 
have a high rate of false positives as measured by the AI-InCyThR 
prototype? 
RQ5b: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to 
have a high rate of false negatives as measured by the AI-InCyThR 
prototype? 
RQ6: What simulated user activity indicators were identified by the AI-InCyThR 
proof-of-concept prototype as significant indicators to identify insider 
threat activity?  
RQ7: How are the simulated user activity correlations that were identified by the 
SMEs different than those identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept 
prototype as significant to identify insider threat activity? 
 
 
Relevance and Significance 
Relevance 
This research study was relevant as it sought to gain a better understanding of 
how additional categorized cybersecurity indicators can assist in identifying potential 
malicious activity and motivating circumstances. Precise identification of malicious 
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activity can significantly affect the accuracy and validity of a SIEM solution, assisting in 
the mitigation of an insider threat incident through real-time alerts and visualization. This 
is supported in the literature on a study conducted by Greitzer et al. (2012), who 
determined that a model of insider threat risk can be developed to produce predictions 
that are highly correlated with expert judgments (p. 2400). This research is also supported 
by the work of Hashem, Takabi, Ghasemigol, and Dantu (2016), who demonstrated that it 
is “almost impossible to stop the insider threat attack at the gate” (p. 33), as well as, that a 
user-centric monitoring and detection framework is needed for the early detection of 
malicious insider threat activity. According to Bishop, Nance, and Claycomb (2017), 
“analyzing and detecting insider threats involve both technical and non-technical 
approaches across many different disciplines, including human-oriented ones” (p. 2637), 
this research aimed at analyzing both technical and psychometric indicators for the 
detection of potential malicious cybersecurity insider threat attacks. Various case studies 
using human-centric indicators must be considered to measure precursors to insider threat 
activity; specifically, in an environment where some tasks may be performed manually, 
while other may be computer based (Greitzer et al., 2012; Gritzalis, Stavrou, Kandias, & 
Stergiopoulos, 2014). 
Significance 
This research study was significant in that it advanced contemporary research in 
insider threat detection, as well as, facilitate an increase in the cybersecurity body of 
knowledge. In regard to how SIEM solutions integrate human-centric input feeds with 
technical input feeds, this study identified employee technical activity correlations, 
coupled with the employees psychometric rating, to assist in the detection of an insider 
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threat attack. As noted by Hazari, Hargrave, and Clenney (2008), there is a human 
element to information security that deals with psychology, motivation, education, and 
social aspects. According to West (2008), “understanding these principles on how users 
come to make decisions about security may suggest places where we can improve the 
outcome of the decisions” (p. 36). This research was significant in that it contributed to 
fulfilling the need for a more thorough validation of insider threat models and tools as 
expressed by Greitzer et al. (2010). Additionally, this research contributes to combating 
insider threats through the development of methods and models for analyzing suspicious 
computer activities that may predict insider attacks (Greitzer et al., 2010). 
 
Barriers and Issues 
One potential barrier for this research study was obtaining the permission 
necessary to survey cybersecurity industry experts for determining input indicators. 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval is required to survey study participants. 
Approval was obtained in advance to conduct the study with input from industry experts. 
This study required a minimum of 15 SMEs per round of data collection. Therefore, to 
minimize the feasibility of a low response rate, 336 SMEs were contacted for both Delphi 
1 and Delphi 2, during Phase 1 of this research study.   
The use of simulated data was another potential barrier. While simulated data 
gives researchers greater control over the simulation environment, Hill and Malone 
(2004) explained that the use of simulated data can have significant effects on the results. 
According to them, “models that are either too clean and well behaved or are unrealistic 
with respect to error and other real-world characteristics can provide misleading results” 
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(Hill & Malone, 2004, p. 972). This was mitigated by the use of benchmarking from 
similar studies, which provided a point of reference in the data analysis (Hill & Malone 
2004; Sekeran, 2003).  
Another issue that may have arisen was model validity. Validation has to do with 
determining whether or not a simulation model is an acceptable and accurate 
representation of reality (Giannasi, Lovett, & Godwin, 2001). According to Martis 
(2006), when working with simulation models, some things to consider include: 1) a 
model should be assessed for its usefulness, rather than its absolute validity 2) if a model 
cannot have absolute validity, however, it should be valid for purposes for which it was 
intended; and 3) as a model passes its various test assurances, validity in that model is 
heightened. As a result, using the proof-of-concept prototype, a series of tests performed 
on the simulation data compared with benchmarks outlined in similar studies and 
literature, progressed this study towards successful research level design and 
development. 
Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
Assumptions 
1. It was assumed that cybersecurity SMEs were ethical and honest in their 
responses. 
2. It was assumed that a significant majority of the cybersecurity SMEs would have 
participated in all three phases of SME-required data collection.  
3. It was assumed that the simulated user activity data set was sufficient for the 
necessary analysis and indicator correlation exercises.  
Limitations 
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 Since the Delphi technique is a multi-round study, much time is required, so 
some participants will, inevitably, not continue with the Delphi process, complicating 
data collection (Gordon, 2009). This may have served as a limitation. As an incentive for 
continued participation, Scheele (1975) suggested that researchers consider “in kind” 
gifts for participation, which the study sponsor can provide at moderate cost. According 
to Ellis and Levy (2010), another possible limitation is the expert opinions collected 
during the Delphi technique process, since these opinions are limited to the members 
recruited. To elaborate further, as explained by Linstone and Turoff (2002), expert 
opinions are “nearly always unconsciously biased” (p. 567). In order to mitigate this 
limitation, it was ensured that there was representation from all relevant groups within the 
specific field for the expert panel (Linstone & Turoff, 2002). Another potential limitation 
of this research study was assuring that the study remained within its accepted parameters 
and scope.  
Developmental research is distinguished from product development by a focus on 
complex, innovative solutions that have few, if any, accepted design and 
development principles; a comprehensive grounding in the literature and theory; 
empirical testing of a product’s practicality and effectiveness; as well as, thorough 
documentation, analysis, along with reflection on processes and outcomes. (Ellis 
& Levy, 2009, p. 328)  
As noted by Ellis and Levy (2008), while the research problem serves as the 
starting point, the literature review serves as the foundation from which the research is 
built. Incorporating the findings from the literature review, with expert panel 
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recommendations elicited through the Delphi technique, progressed this study towards a 
successful research level design and development effort.  
Measuring the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype analysis against simulated 
data may have been another possible limitation. Due to the nature of the simulated data, 
the rate of false positives and false negatives may threaten the validity and reliability of 
any malicious cybersecurity insider threat precursors detected. To mitigate this limitation, 
a longitudinal baseline was created where simulated user activities were broadcast over a 
period of time, and predictions of the model were compared to simulated observed events 
(Greitzer et al., 2012). Additionally, a continuous review of the data recorded along with 
its respective scoring and weighting ensured that participants’ responses as well as 
indicator weight assignments were correctly applied prior to conducting the empirical 
study. 
 
Delimitations 
A possible delimitation of this study is that it was limited to a single set of 
simulated data. Moreover, that many study’s Delphi participants were limited to a single, 
higher education institution. The responses of the participants may be a delimitation of 
the study, as institutional culture may have affected how participants answer questions 
and weigh activity indicators.  
 
Definition of Terms 
The following represents terms and definitions. 
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Biclustering – “a popular technique, which allows simultaneous clustering of the rows 
and columns of a matrix” (Reddy & Aziz, 2010, p. 4) 
Correlation Clustering – “a special type of clustering which defines the similarity 
between objects in terms of correlation between features, that is, it is a clustering 
approach which assigns two data points to the same cluster” (Reddy & Aziz, 2010, p. 4) 
Correlation Coefficient – a type of statistical measure that indicates the magnitude of 
relationship between two variables, while also showing how the two variables interact 
with each other (Ambusaidi et al., 2014) 
Data Matrix – “an organization of raw scores or data, where the rows represent subjects, 
or cases, and columns represent variables” (Mertler & Vanetta, 2010, p. 3)  
Data Mining – a process of discovering hidden patterns and information from the 
existing data, as well, cleaning the data so as to make it feasible for further processing 
(PhridviRaj & GuruRao, 2014)  
Data Visualization – “the use of images to represent information” (Few, 2007, p. 2)  
Delphi – “a method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is 
effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem” 
(Okoli & Pawlowski, 2004, p. 16)  
Holt-Winter Method – a method which allows data to be modeled by a local mean, a 
local trend and a local seasonal factor which are all updated by exponential smoothing 
(Chatfield & Yar, 1988)  
Incident Response – “is the reaction to an identified occurrence whereby responders 
classify an incident, (then) investigate and contain the incident” (Brennan & Jolo, 2015, 
p. 2)  
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Indicators – documented employee behaviors, intellectual property, employee activity 
on networks, information on organizational property networks, and information 
technology (IT) architecture (Costa et al., 2014, p. 1)  
Information Security Event – the identified occurrence of a system, service, or network 
state indicating a possible breach of information security, policy or failure or controls, or 
a previously unknown situation that may be security relevant (International Standards 
Organization, 2011) 
Information Security Incident – a single or series of unwanted or unexpected 
information security events that have a significant probability of compromising business 
operations and threatening security (International Standards Organization, 2011) 
Information Visualization – the transformation of data into a visual representation, so 
that users can better understand the data (Brunetti, Auer, García, Klímek, & Nečaský, 
2013)  
Insider Threat – “a trusted entity that is given the power to violate one or more rules in a 
given security policy… the insider threat occurs when a trusted entity abuses that power” 
(Bishop, 2005, p. 1) 
Malicious Insider Threat – “a current or former employee, contractor, or business 
partner who meets the following criteria: has or had authorized access to an 
organization’s network, system, or data; has intentionally exceeded or intentionally used 
that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or 
availability of the organization’s information or information systems” (Silowash et al., 
2012, p. 2)  
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Motivation – the key influencers on behavior though other options are available 
(Tolman, 1938) 
Multivariate data – “consists of more than one dimension/variable, where each axis 
represents a variable of the data set. The N-axis are drawn as vertical lines with equal 
spacing, and each data element displayed as is a series of connected points along the 
dimensions” (Steinparz, Abmair, Bauer, & Feiner, 2010, p. 2).  
Mutual Information – a generalized correlation analogous to a linear correlation 
coefficient, but sensitive to any relationship, including nonlinear correlations (Roulston, 
1999) 
Nonlinear Correlation Coefficient – “a method based on mutual information, which is a 
quantity measuring the relationship between two discreet random variables” (Ambusaidi 
et al., 2014, p. 80) 
Pearson’s Correlation Coefficient – “one of the basic linear correlation methods used to 
measure dependence between two variables” (Ambusaidi et al., 2014, p. 79) 
Precursor – “an activity that, when observed, flags the associated user as a potential 
malicious insider. Each precursor can be assigned a score, which reflects the extent to 
which the precursor identifies classifies someone as a malicious insider” (Marty, 2008, p. 
393). 
Proper Linear Model – “one in which the weights given to the predictor variables are 
chosen in such a way as to optimize the relationship between the prediction and the 
criterion” (Dawes, 1979, p. 571) 
Principle Curves – “nonlinear summarizations of multidimensional data points 
represented by a smooth, one-dimensional curve” (Reddy & Aziz, 2010, p. 4) 
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Risk Based IT Auditing – an institution’s ability to report and detect important risk 
factors in an approach that focuses on the response of the organization to the risks it faces 
in achieving its goals and objectives (Lovaas, 2009, p. 485) 
Synthetic Data – “data that are generated by simulated users in a simulated system, 
performing simulated actions; simulations may involve human actions to some extent or 
be an entirely automated process” (Barse, Kvarnstrom, & Johnson, 2003, p. 2) 
Summary 
 The research problem that this study addressed was the imminent challenge to 
mitigate cybersecurity insider threats from employees or contractors who may pose harm 
to the organization by misusing the information systems, computer networks, or data 
(Sood et al., 2015). To address this research problem, this study has set a main goal to 
design, develop, and validate, using SMEs, a proof-of-concept prototype for a malicious 
cybersecurity insider threat alerting system that would assist in the detection and 
prediction of malicious insider threat activity. For the purposes of this study, the SMEs 
were not the end-users of the prototype. The SMEs who participated in this study were 
validating both the technical and psychometric input indicators required for the detection 
of precursors to malicious cybersecurity insider threat activity.  
This developmental research study was conducted in three phases of data 
collection and analysis. During Phase 1, this developmental study conducted Delphi 
method data collection from SMEs to validate, as well as, assign, weights to technical 
activity and psychometric cybersecurity indicators for measuring malicious cybersecurity 
insider threat activity, as identified in the literature and NIST Special Publications. Thus, 
in Phase 2, this developmental study added the aforementioned developed and validated 
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technical activity and psychometric indicators into the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept 
prototype that was used to collect the simulated user activity data, refine the data 
identifying false positives and negatives, as well as, measure indicators, indicator 
correlations, and indicator weights on over several million simulated user activity logs, 
representing a span of over a year and a half of the simulated user activity on a private 
network. Therefore, in Phase 3 of this developmental study, an analysis was performed of 
the collected evidence and indicator relationships against a previously identified 
Minimum Security Baseline (MSB), as well as, establish an over detection of accuracy of 
predicted malicious cybersecurity events. Subsequently, a conclusive report with 
conclusions and recommendations was produced.   
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
Introduction 
To lay the theoretical foundation for this developmental research study, this 
chapter will provide a synopsis of the literature relevant to not only malicious 
cybersecurity insider threats, but also to data simulation considerations, high-level 
technical and psychosocial indicators, as well as, cyber threats. As noted by Pare, Trudel, 
Jaana, and Kitsiou (2015), “the literature review section helps the researcher understand 
the existing body of knowledge and provides a theoretical foundation for the proposed 
empirical study” (p. 183). Moreover, an effective literature review assists the researcher 
in identifying where new research is needed, as well as, justifies the study as one that 
contributes something new to the body of knowledge (Levy & Ellis, 2006).  
To ensure breadth, depth, and rigor in this study, a search of the Information 
Systems (IS) literature domain was conducted using several databases of interdisciplinary 
fields, including IS, business, and psychology. This literature review process revealed 
existing cybersecurity knowledge, technical, as well as, psychosocial indicators, and 
research gaps, along with the theoretical foundations for this research study of validating, 
developing, as well as empirically testing technical and psychosocial indicators as 
precursors to malicious cybersecurity insider threats. Furthermore, information on 
exercising the expert methodology is presented.  
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Cyber Threat Vectors 
Impact of Cyber Threats 
As reported by IBM Security (2016), in taking a holistic view of targeted 
industries, “it is clear that virtually no industry was immune to the exploits of today’s 
attackers” (p. 3). Most organizations are well aware of the dangers posed by cyber  
attacks; however, to date, the Federal Government has no well-developed, nor publicly 
known strategy for deterring these types of attacks (Kugler, 2009). Should attackers 
disrupt or destroy infrastructures – such as the energy grid, clean drinking water supply, 
communications, and public transportation – on which society heavily relies, the residual 
effects on the health and safety of citizens may be severe (Luiijf, 2012). As clarified by 
Luiijf (2012), these frameworks are considered Critical Infrastructures (CI) and their 
undisturbed functioning is highly dependent on the security of their underlying support 
systems, such as information assets, as well as, internal and external communication 
links. As suggested by Awan, Burnap, and Rana (2016), because of the sophistication of 
new and evolving attacks, network-level defenses alone do not suffice as an overall 
information security plan. Governments, organizations, and individuals may very easily 
become the victims of cyber crimes as well as, becoming unknowing assistants to cyber 
criminals (Awan et al., 2016), thus, contributing even more to the insider threat 
phenomenon.  
Relating to existing cybersecurity terminology, Verizon (2016) identified an 
incident as “a security event that compromises the integrity, confidentiality, or 
availability of an information asset” (p. 5). Similarly, Verizon (2016) identified a breach 
as “an incident that results in the confirmed disclosure (not just potential exposure) of 
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data to an unauthorized party” (p. 5). While there are many different types of cyber 
attacks and adversaries, the 2016 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report (VDBIR) 
issued by Verizon identified “nine reoccurring combinations of the, who (actors), what 
(assets), how (actions), and why (motives) among other incident characteristics” (p. 22), 
not including miscellaneous errors. The items in these reocurring combinations are noted 
as 1) privilege misuse, 2) physical theft/loss, 3) denialofservice, 4) everything else, 5) 
crimeware, 6) web application attacks, 7) POS intrusions/payment card skimmers, 8) 
cyberespionage, 9) miscellaneous errors.  
Table 1 
Literature Summary of Impact of Cyber Threats 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Awan et al., 
2015 
Empirical 
study 
462,787 
network traffic 
instances, 278 
unique threats, 
6 categories 
Network 
analysis  
Development of a 
risk assessment 
framework for 
managing network 
security risk 
IBM Security, 
2015 
Empirical 
observations 
8000 client 
devices, from 
100 countries 
Security 
awareness 
Cyber strategy, 
prioritizing 
security objectives,  
Kugler, 2009 Case study Compilation of 
U.S. 
cybersecurity 
guidelines 
Analytical 
methods and 
metrics used in 
decision 
making for 
cyber-attack 
deterrence 
Ascertained the 
need for an 
extended cyber 
deterrence strategy 
for the U.S. and its 
allies  
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Table 1  
Literature Summary of Impact of Cyber Threats (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Luijff, 2012 Literature 
review 
 Critical 
infrastructure 
information 
(CII) 
Taxonomy of 
threats, attack 
actors, and motives 
in reference to CII 
Verizon, 2016 Case study 100,000 
incidents, of 
which 3,141, 
were 
confirmed data 
breeches 
68 contributing 
organizations  
9 attack vectors 
identified in 2014 
remain prevalent in 
cyber-attacks, 
actions taken by an 
adversary are not 
exclusive to any 
single pattern 
 
Major Types of Cyber Threats 
 According to Randazzo, Keeney, Kowalski, Cappelli, and Moore (2005), statistics 
vary on the frequency of cyber attacks carried out by insiders, compared with those cyber 
attacks carried out by actors external to the target organization. To defend against 
external cyber attacks, organizations can implement physical and technical security 
measures, such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and authentication 
mechanisms (Andersen et al., 2004). As noted by Carlin (2016), “knowing which specific 
computer or network caused the malicious activity doesn’t necessarily tell you which 
person or organization ordered, carried out, or supported the hack” (p. 387). This study 
followed the example of Greitzer el al. (2009) in developing a proof-of-concept prototype 
that utilizes a predictive modeling approach by analyzing psychosocial and cyber 
indicators. Accurately identified cyber indicators can be utilized to correctly assess not 
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only cyber activity on a network, but also an employee’s behavior and possible malicious 
actions.  
Table 2 
Literature Summary of Major Types of Cyber Threats 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding 
or Contribution 
Anderson et 
al., 2004 
Case study Six insider 
threat cases 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
detection 
Systemic 
approach to 
cybersecurity: 
polices and 
procedures to 
mitigate insider 
threat attack 
Carlin, 2016 Conceptual 
paper 
U.S. federal 
cybersecurity 
guidelines 
Cyber-attack 
deterrence 
Presented a 
whole-of-
government 
approach to 
cyber threats 
Randazzo et 
al., 2005 
Aggregated 
case-study 
analysis 
23 incidents 
carried out by 
26 insiders in 
the banking 
and financial 
sector 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
detection 
Information 
development of 
commonalities 
within the cases 
studied 
 
External Attacks 
 Christ (2007) illustrated how computer based cyber attacks have evolved over 
time, where network-based attacks have been replaced by more sophisticated Web 
applications or by externally based attacks. One of the most common external attacks 
floods a target system with data requests, overloading the resource and rendering it 
inaccessible, this is known as a Denial of Service (DoS) (Meyers, Powers, & Faissol, 
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2009). The DoS attack is intended to compromise the availability of networks and 
systems, to include both network resources and applications (Verizon, 2016). By 
overwhelming a system, the DoS attack degrades service or causes a complete service 
interruption. However, Werlinger, Muldner, Hawkey, and Beznosov (2010) mentioned 
that diagnosing a DoS was undemanding because it could be achieved by the inspection 
of specific network activity, since DoS is sending the same data packets or requests over 
and over again. In comparison, a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) “is a coordinated 
attack on the availability of services of a given target system or network that is launched 
indirectly through many compromised computing systems” (Specht & Lee, 2004, p. 543). 
According to Carlin (2016), in March of 2016, the U.S. Government had identified and 
publicly charged a group of Iranian hackers with carrying out a DDoS directed at the U.S. 
financial sector, which affected 46 financial institutions over the course of 176 days. The 
attack disrupted the financial institutions’ online services for hundreds of thousands of 
Americans, who in turn were unable to process any online banking transactions (Carlin, 
2016).  
 Other Web-based attacks include the SQL injection (SQLi), where the 
vulnerability in lack of input validation allows malicious actors to issue SQL commands 
via the Web application interface or Website, to issue illicit commands to the database 
(IBM Security, 2016; Verizon, 2016). According to Symantec’s 2016 Internet Security 
Threat Report, at the time of this study, Website owners were still not patching or 
updating their servers accordingly, leaving vulnerabilities for malicious actors to exploit 
(Symantec, 2016). The report also indicated that more than three-quarters of the Websites 
scanned had unpatched vulnerabilities, where one in seven, or 15%, were categorized as 
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“critical” in 2015 (Symantec, 2016). These Web-based and external vulnerabilities allow 
for a host of other threats to impact an organization’s information systems assets.  
Table 3 
Literature Summary of External Attacks 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding 
or Contribution 
Carlin, 2016 Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Cybersecurity 
threats and 
vulnerabilities 
Development a 
strategy to 
disrupt 
national cyber 
threats 
Christ, 2016 Conceptual 
paper 
 Web-based 
attack 
mitigation 
Defense-in- 
depth approach 
using 
technology and 
user awareness 
IBM 
Security, 
2016 
Case study Compilation of 
8000 client 
devices in over 
100 countries 
Cybersecurity 
threats and 
vulnerabilities 
Prioritization of 
business 
objectives and 
risk tolerance 
needed to face 
cyber risks 
Myers et al., 
2009 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Cyber threats 
and 
vulnerabilities 
Taxonomy of 
cyber 
adversaries, 
corresponding 
methods, and 
skill level 
Table 3 
Literature Summary of External Attacks (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding 
or Contribution 
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Specht & 
Lee, 2004 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 DDoS attacks Taxonomies to 
characterize the 
scope of DDoS 
attacks 
Symantec, 
2016 
Case study 74,180 
vulnerabilities, 
from 23,908 
vendors, and 
71,470 
products 
Cyber threats Provided a 
series of best 
practice 
guidelines for 
consumers 
Verizon, 
2016 
Case study Culmination of 
Fortune 500 
companies 
Cyber 
breaches 
Introduced 
Vocabulary for 
Event 
Recording and 
Incident Sharing 
(VERIS) 
framework  
Werlinger et 
al., 2010 
Empirical 
study 
16 participant 
organizations 
Cybersecurity 
incident 
response and 
mitigation 
Illustrated the 
importance of 
the preparation, 
detection, and 
analysis phases 
participation 
 
Malware, Spyware, Worms, Bots, and Viruses 
 Malicious software, known as malware, “has consistently been ranked as one of 
the key cyber threats to businesses, governments, and individuals” (Choo, 2011, p. 721). 
By definition, the term malware describes a classification of malicious code which 
changes the behavior of the operating system kernel, without user consent and in such a 
way that those changes cannot be detected without using the documentation feature of the 
operating system or other security applications (Rutkowska, 2006). Choo (2011) 
explained that malware can be categorized into two classifications, generic malware 
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intended toward the general public, and malware that has been coded for information 
stealing, pointed at specific organizations.  
According to Meyers et al. (2009), a computer virus is a malicious program that 
has the ability to copy itself without the knowledge of the end-user. As Meyers et al. 
(2009) explained, “viruses are transferred when their host is connected with the target 
system, either via a computer network, the Internet, or a form of removable media” (p. 
14). Similarly, a worm is described as autonomous malicious code that has the ability to 
propagate on its own, contains different payloads, and has no need to attach itself to 
existing files or programs (HPE Security Research, 2016; Meyers et al., 2009).  
In comparison, a bot, originating from the word “robot,” is a specific application that can 
perform certain tasks faster than humans can; when many bots are dispersed to several 
computers across the Internet and connect with each other, they form a botnet (Eslahi, 
Salleh, & Anuar, 2013). The term botnet is used to describe a framework of hosts 
infected with malicious code “that are under the control of a human operator commonly 
known as the botmaster” (Abu Rajab, Zarfoss, Monrose, & Terzis, 2006, p. 1). In regards 
to botnets as global threats, Pilling (2013) illustrated how Cutwail, one of the largest 
botnets, is used to impersonate very well-known online retailers, mobile service 
providers, social networking sites (SNS), and financial institutions (p. 14). According to 
Pilling (2013), Cutwail is one of the primary methods for the deployment of malware 
downloaders, with anywhere from “175,000 to 500,000 active bots on any given day” 
(Pilling, 2013, p. 14). Pilling (2013) further elaborated on Cutwail’s popularity being due 
to malicious actors with easy access to Cutwail’s spam-as-a-service infrastructure. 
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Table 4 
Literature Summary of Malware, Spyware, Worms, Bots, and Viruses 
Study  Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Abu Rajab et 
al., 2006 
Empirical 
study and 
longitudinal 
tracking of IRC 
botnets 
3-month 
examination of 
800,000 DNS 
domains  
Malicious 
botnet 
infection 
Botnets are an 
overall 
contributor to 
unwanted traffic 
on the Internet 
Choo, 2011 Theoretical  Cyber threat 
landscape 
Applied routine 
activity theory 
can be 
implemented to 
reduce the 
opportunities for 
cyber crime  
Eslahi, 2013 Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Cybersecurity 
threat 
protection 
Overview of 
botnet 
characteristics as 
well as, their 
malicious 
activities 
HPE Security 
Research, 2016 
Case study Data collected 
by HPE 
Security, open 
source 
intelligence, 
ReversingLabs, 
and Sonatype 
Cyber threat 
landscape 
Overview of 
threat landscape 
encompassing 
several types of 
attacks as well 
as, legislative 
burdening on 
mitigation and 
research 
Table 4 
Literature Summary of Malware, Spyware, Worms, Bots, and Viruses (Cont.) 
Study  Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
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Meyers, 2009 Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Cyber 
adversaries and 
attacks 
Proposed cyber-
adversary 
taxonomy 
Pilling, 2013 Theoretical  Cybersecurity 
threat 
protection 
Global cyber 
threats 
Rutkowska, 
2006 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Cyber 
adversaries and 
attacks 
Proposed 
taxonomy to 
categorize stealth 
malware 
 
Social Engineering (Phishing, Vishing, & Impersonation) 
It has been well documented both in research and among organizations that their 
employees are the weakest link in information security (Bulgurcu, Cavusoglu, & 
Benbasat, 2010). Malicious actors exploit the weakness in end-users or employees by 
obtaining information from them under false pretenses and manipulation; this process is 
called social engineering. As reported by AT&T Security (2015), cybercriminals are 
becoming more sophisticated by exploiting an individual’s information published on 
social media. This information can be used by malicious actors to appear to be the user’s 
friend. As such, masquerading as a known and trusted person is an attempt to gain an 
employee’s password or obtain other access through trickery or exploitation of the trusted 
relationship (Silowash et al., 2012).  
Sood et al. (2015) explained how indirect attacks, such as social engineering, use 
other techniques like phishing, which “force users to visit the embedded links in phishing 
emails” (p. 8). In these type of social attacks, a victim is sent a spoofed email modeled 
after a real email, claiming to be from a coworker, bank, social network, or even an entity 
offering a “needed” software upgrade (Bowen, Devarajan, & Stolfo, 2011). Bowen et al. 
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(2011) elaborated on this technique, saying, “when the victim takes the bait, they are 
often greeted with some form of malicious software that attempts to install itself on the 
victim’s machine” (p. 2). According to Verizon (2016), “the main perpetrators for 
phishing attacks are organized crime syndicates and state-affiliated actors” (p. 18). The 
Verizon 2016 DBIR indicated that in 2015, there were 9,576 incidents reported, with 916 
of these incidents confirming data disclosure. Verizon (2016) concluded that the main 
cause of these type of breaches is a failure of communication between the victim and the 
organizational staff, noting the need for much more effective communication between the 
victim and the IT staff.  
Vishing, derived from “voice” and “phishing,” is where a “phone call is received 
with the attacker luring the receiver into providing personal information with the 
intention to cause harm” (Yeboah-Boateng & Amanor, 2014, p. 297). Due to the nature 
of telephony, the technology, be it land, mobile, or Internet Protocol (IP)-based, is 
susceptible to malicious vishing attacks, specifically because of its social and 
technological reach (Ollmann, 2007). Maggi (2010) emphasized that Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP) is not a secure protocol, and illustrated how criminals can take advantage 
of these vulnerabilities by spoofing and impersonating call identifiers. Cyber attacks are 
carried out in a sophisticated manner, in which malicious actors use social engineering to 
bypass traditional two-factor authentication. In one such attack, as reported by Symantec 
(2016), malicious actors impersonated tax officials in an attempt to get individuals to 
download malicious email attachments. Malicious actors not only have the ability to 
impersonate outside entities, they also aim at assuming the identity of legitimate parties 
in a system, or by using trusted communication protocols. In the impersonation attack, 
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the adversary successfully assumes the identity of the target to carry out malicious 
activity (Adams, 2011). This research study focused on deliberate attacks, rather than 
accidental ones, and defined the malicious insider as noted by Cummings, Lewellen, 
Mcintire, Moore, and Trzeciak (2012): 
A current or former employee, contractor, or other business partner who has or 
had authorized access to an organization’s network, system, or data and 
intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected 
the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information or 
information systems. (p. vii)  
This study took into consideration the concerns of Kugler (2009), Luiijf (2012), and 
Awan et al. (2016) in creating a prototype that can be used to assist in the detection of 
malicious activities by those individuals with trusted access to organizational information 
resources.  
Table 5 
Literature Summary of Social Engineering (Phishing, Vishing, & Impersonation) 
Study  Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Adams, 2011 Literature 
review 
 Security 
literacy 
Clarified the term 
“identification” 
within the 
cybersecurity 
scope 
AT&T 
Security 
Conceptual 
paper 
Visibility into 10 
petabytes of 
traffic daily 
Social 
engineering 
Identified 
phishing as a 
precursor to social 
engineering 
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Awan et al., 
2016 
Empirical 
study 
462,787 instances 
representing 
threats over 144 
hours 
Computer 
network risk 
Proposed a risk 
assessment 
framework that 
allows for high 
level view of 
network security 
Bowen et al., 
2011 
Empirical 
study  
500 phishing 
emails sent to 
4,000 users 
Social 
engineering 
Identified that 
users can be 
trained using 
bogus phishing 
emails 
Bulgurku et 
al., 2010 
Empirical 
study 
11 graduate 
students 
Cybersecurity 
compliance 
Demonstrated 
rationality based 
factors that drive 
employees to 
information 
security policy 
compliance 
Cummings et 
al., 2012 
Empirical 
study 
Interviews with 
law enforcement 
and banking 
investigators 
involved in 80 
insider fraud 
cases 
Social 
engineering 
Presented insider 
fraud models to 
establish 
countermeasures 
in. insider IT 
sabotage, insider 
theft of IP, and 
national security 
espionage 
Table 5 
Literature Summary of Social Engineering (Phishing, Vishing, & Impersonation) (Cont.) 
Study  Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Kugler, 2009 Conceptual 
paper 
 Cyber threat 
deterrence 
Identified the 
need for a 
national cyber 
deterrence 
strategy 
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Maggi, 2010 Empirical 
study 
PhonePhising.info 
data set 
Vishing (voice 
phising) 
Analysis of 
vishing reports 
submitted by 
victims 
Ollman, 2007 Conceptual 
paper 
 Vishing (voice 
phising) 
Identified IP 
telephony and 
vishing as the 
next cyber-attack 
platform 
Silowash et 
al., 2012 
Best practices 
guide 
Several industry, 
federal, and 
international 
standards 
Insider threat Describes 19 
practices to 
prevent and 
detect insider 
threats 
Sood et al., 
2015 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Attacks 
through 
socioware and 
insider threat 
Taxonomy of 
malware 
infestations and 
the use of socio 
ware by insider 
threats 
Symantec, 
2016 
Best practices 
guide 
23,980 vendors 
representing over 
71,470 products 
Cybersecurity 
threats 
Presents best 
practices 
guidelines 
against Internet 
threats 
Table 5 
Literature Summary of Social Engineering (Phishing, Vishing, & Impersonation) (Cont.) 
Study  Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
 
Verizon, 
2016 
Case study 100,000 incidents, 
of which 3,141, 
were confirmed 
data breeches 
68 
contributing 
organizations  
9 attack vectors 
remain prevalent 
in cyber-attacks, 
adversary actions 
not exclusive to 
any single pattern 
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Yeboah-
Boateng & 
Amanor, 
2014 
Empirical 
study 
Investigation of 
various types of 
attacks on mobile 
devices 
SMishing and 
vishing attacks 
Taxonomy of 
alluring and 
decoying words 
used in phishing 
attacks 
 
Insider Threat 
Malicious Insiders  
According to Theoharidou, Kokolakis, Karyda, and Kiountouzis (2005), an 
insider threat is one that “originating from people who have been given access rights to 
an information system (IS) and misuse their privileges, thus violating the IS security 
policy of the organization” (p. 473). Carnegie Mellon University's Software Engineering 
Institute (SEI) identified the malicious insider “as a current or former employee, 
contractor, or business partner that has or had authorized access to an organizations 
network, system or data” (Silowash et al., 2012). Silowash et al. (2012) further explained 
that malicious insiders have “intentionally exceeded or intentionally used that access in a 
manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability (CIA) of the 
organizations information or information systems” (p. 8). At the time of this study,  
insider threats have been minimally addressed by standard security practices, yet the 
insider poses one of the most serious threats to organizations through any number of 
malicious activities (Punithavathani et al., 2015). Nurse et al. (2014) noted, “it is widely 
accepted that there are a myriad of insider incidents that will go unreported (for fear of 
organizational reputation), or will go unnoticed as the attacks avoid detection” (p. 214). 
Due to the nature of insider threats, malicious insiders are expected to hide their actions 
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with techniques they believe will avoid detection, until they have accomplished their 
goals (Young et al., 2014).  
What contributes most to malicious insiders’ exigency is that they have in-depth 
knowledge of the inner workings of their organization, and have the necessary privileges 
to access sensitive information (Agrafiotis, Legg, Goldsmith, & Creese, 2014). This 
understanding of the insider threat vector is further supported in the literature by Ho et al. 
(2015) who acknowledged, “a malicious insider has the distinct advantage of 
understanding the corporation’s information assets, processes, and infrastructure” (p. 
102). Claycomb, Legg, and Gollmann (2013) noted, “consequences of insider attacks 
include compromised organizational security, financial loss, and risk to human health and 
safety” (p. 1). Malicious insiders are capable of stealing intellectual property, disrupting 
organizational IT systems operations, or using organizational IT systems for financial 
fraud operations (Claycomb et al., 2013).  
Table 6 
Literature Summary of Malicious Insiders  
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Agrafiotis et 
al., 2014 
Empirical 
study 
CMU 
simulated 
data set 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
Proposed a 
sequential analysis 
approach for insider 
threat detection 
Claycomb et 
al., 2013 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
Identified gaps in 
research regarding 
the relationship 
between anomalous 
and malicious 
behavior 
Ho et al., Empirical Online Language Identified the use of 
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2015 study gaming 
environment 
used in group 
dynamics 
language cues in 
group dynamics after 
insider threat 
compromise 
Nurse et al., 
2014 
Case study 
and literature 
review 
Grounded 
theory 
approach 
based on the 
review of 80 
insider threat 
cases 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
detection 
Developed a 
framework that 
identifies 
elements within 
the insider threat 
problem to 
include 
motivation behind 
malicious threats 
Punithavathani, 
2015 
Empirical 
study 
Real time 
values 
comprised of 
simulated 
systems 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
detection 
Developed a two-
phased 
surveillance 
mechanism for 
insider threat 
detection 
Randazzo et 
al., 2005 
Aggregated 
case-study 
analysis 
23 incidents 
carried out by 
26 insiders in 
the financial 
sector 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
detection 
Information 
development of 
commonalities 
within the cases 
studied 
Table 6 
Literature Summary of Malicious Insiders (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
 
Silowash, et 
al., 2012 
Empirical 
study 
700 insider 
threat cases 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
prevention 
Introduced 6 key 
groups necessary 
for a successful 
insider threat 
program 
Theoharidou et 
al., 2005 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
Criminology 
theories and 
their relation 
to ISO 17799 
Cyber threats Identified 
incorporating 
criminology 
theories into 
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cybersecurity 
management 
Young et al., 
2014 
Empirical 
study 
Test database 
of 5,500 users 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
detection 
Developed an 
ensemble-based, 
unsupervised 
technique for 
detecting 
potential insider 
threat instances 
 
Observable Behavior 
It has also been noted in the literature that an insider attack is often preceded by 
observable behaviors consisting of indicators to current or future malicious behavior 
(Claycomb et al., 2013; Greitzer et al., 2012). In the work of Greitzer and Frincke (2010), 
incoming data is processed to infer observations; observations are processed to infer 
indicators; and indicators are assessed to gauge threat (p. 8). An example of a technical 
observation is data that represents the activities of an employee’s network account, such 
as outgoing or incoming Web traffic, or data connections through a firewall per IP 
mapped back to the user’s network account (Greitzer & Frincke, 2010). On the other 
hand, while more fragmented, human resources data provides a multitude of contextual, 
behavioral, and psychosocial information regarding employees (Costa et al., 2014). This 
data as outlined by Costa et al. (2014) included organizational charts, employee 
performance reviews, employee personnel files, employee behavior records, information 
from anonymous insider reporting channels, and results from background checks. The 
combination of several of these factors, “if properly evaluated in a timely manner, could 
alert an organization about a developing insider crime” (Greitzer et al., 2014, p. 109). In 
the work of Greitzer et al. (2012), a psychosocial model was developed to assess an 
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employee’s increased susceptibility to becoming an inside abuser. According to Greitzer 
et al. (2012), in many insider threat cases, managers and coworkers observed that the 
offender had exhibited signs of stress, disgruntlement, or other issues, yet no one 
questioned the behavior or raised an alarm. This research aimed at filling that gap by 
introducing a mechanism within the AI-InCyThR system proof-of-concept prototype, 
where a combination of an employee’s FFM and technical activity were input as 
indicators to the system. The data captured was analyzed within the proof-of-concept 
prototype for correlation to validate the expert panel identified indicators.  
Table 7 
Literature Summary of Observable Behavior 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Costa et al., 
2014 
Empirical 
study 
800 insider 
threat cases 
Cyber threat 
indicators 
Developed an 
ontology for 
insider threat 
indicators 
Greitzer et 
al., 2010 
Empirical 
study 
HR experts 
and managers 
Cyber threat 
indicators 
Developed a 
predictive 
modeling 
approach using 
threat indicators 
preceding an 
insider threat 
attack 
Greitzer et 
al., 2014 
Empirical 
study 
Expert 
judgements 
Psychosocial 
indicators 
Developed a 
prototype 
psychosocial 
model that assess 
behavioral 
indicators 
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Insiders as Adversaries and Cyber Adversarial Thinking 
Randazzo et al., (2005) concluded that most insiders were motivated by financial 
gain, and not a desire to cause harm to the organization. According to Randazzo et al. 
(2005), 27% of the insiders studied were experiencing financial difficulties. They also 
noted that “other motives included revenge, dissatisfaction with company management, 
culture, or policies, and a desire for respect” (Randazzo et al., 2005, p. 14). Former 
employees are familiar with organizational culture, policies, and procedures, which can 
be exploited in an insider attack (Andersen et al., 2004). For this research study, 
adversarial thinking was one of the indicator categorizations. Band et al. (2006) argued 
that the “needs” of an individual often manifest as personal disposition in the workplace 
and have been related to maladaptive reactions to stress, financial problems, and personal 
needs, leading to personal conflicts, concealment of rule violations, chronic 
disgruntlement, strong reaction to organizational sanctions, and a propensity for 
escalation in work-related issues (p. 15). While Band et al. (2006), observed personal 
predispositions were grouped into five categories: serious mental health disorders, 
personality problems, social skills and decision-making biases, as well as, a history of 
conflicts, these constructs are outside the scope of this study and will be incorporated into 
future research. Furthermore, personal predispositions appeared to play a role in both 
sabotage and espionage risks (Band et al., 2006). 
Table 8 
Literature Summary of Insiders as Adversaries and Cyber Adversarial Thinking 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Anderson et Case study six insider Cybersecurity Approach to 
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al., 2004 threat cases insider threat 
detection 
cybersecurity for 
organizations 
policies and 
practices 
Band et al., 
2006 
Empirical 
study 
49 insider 
threat 
sabotage 
cases 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
sabotage 
detection 
Developed three 
models that 
describe the 
relationships 
between insider 
threat sabotage and 
espionage 
Randazzo et 
al., 2005 
Aggregated 
case-study 
analysis 
23 incidents 
carried out by 
26 insiders in 
the financial 
sector 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
detection 
Information 
development of 
commonalities 
within the cases 
studied 
Insider Threat Cases Overview 
According to Moore, Collins, Mundie, Ruefle, and Mcintire (2014), analysis of 
insider threat cases regarding IT sabotage involved remote access outside of the insiders’ 
normal working hours. Moreover, analysis of insider threat cases show that 57% of insider 
threat sabotage cases involved an attack within 60 days of the insider’s termination from 
employment with the organization (Moore et al., 2014).  
At the time of this study, one of the most recent high-profile insider threat cases 
was that of Edward Snowden. Snowden, a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
employee, and later a Booz Allen Hamilton federal government consultant, had held a 
position that required a top secret security clearance (Kont, Pihelgas, Wojtkowiak, 
Trinberg, & Osula, 2015). In June, 2013, Snowden spent several months working as a 
high-level systems administrator before contacting Glenn Greenwald, a lawyer and 
journalist, to disclose an unknown number of digital documents (Kont at al., 2015). 
Snowden’s motivation for disclosure and security breach was his concern over how much 
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personal data the National Security Agency (NSA) was collecting about ordinary 
Americans, and he believed much more was being collected than was actually necessary 
(Landau, 2013). The implications of Snowden’s disclosures of sensitive and classified 
information were of great concern to not only the U.S. government, but also its allies 
(Young, 2014).  
Intelligence Community Standard (ICS) Number 500-27, Collecting and Sharing 
of Audit Data, provides a comprehensive list of auditable events that “support lawful and 
appropriate information assurance, business analytics, personnel security, and other 
security community audit needs” (Committee on National Security Systems, 2013).  
ICS Number 700-2, The Use of Audit Data for Insider Threat Detection, contains 
information about the types of enterprise audit data that should be used as potential 
indicators for individuals holding a Department of Defense (DoD) security clearance 
(Guido & Brooks, 2013). This data can be analyzed in conjunction with other available 
data in support of the detection, mitigation, or assessment of insider threats. Expanding 
the amount and type of simulated data analyzed allowed for better insight into the 
individuals and situations that may lead to insider threat activity.  
Table 9                 
Literature Summary of Insider Threat Cases Overview 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Findings or 
Contribution 
Committee 
on National 
Security 
Systems, 
2013 
Operational 
guidance 
NIST SPs 
executive 
orders, and 
intelligence 
community 
standards 
Information 
systems 
auditing 
Annex of user / pc 
auditable events 
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Table 9 
Literature Summary of Insider Threat Cases Overview (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Findings 
or Contribution 
Guido & 
Brooks, 2013 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
Various 
organizations 
with 
successful 
insider threat 
programs 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
Development of a 
straw man insider 
threat program 
model 
Kont et al., 
2015 
Case study and 
literature 
review & 
synthesis 
Reviews of 
existing 
insider 
research, and 
case studies 
Insider threat 
detection and 
mitigation 
Technical and 
nontechnical 
indicators used in 
the detection of 
insider threats  
Landau, 2013 Case study and 
literature 
review 
Recent 
insider threat 
attack 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
Complications 
within U.S. 
federal agencies 
and information 
disclosure 
Moore et al., 
2014 
Empirical 
study 
800 cases of 
malicious 
insider crime, 
120 cases of 
espionage 
Enterprise 
architecture 
patterns 
Presentation of 
insider threat 
mitigation 
language 
Young, 2014 Case study Insider threat 
attack 
Cybersecurity 
insider threat 
Aftermath of  
insider attack 
 
Cybersecurity Indicators and Categories 
The Committee on National Security System Instruction (CNSSI) has outlined the 
minimum requirements for deploying the Enterprise Audit Management (EAM) as 
required by ICS-500-27, these are as shown in Table 10 (Committee on National Security 
Systems Instruction, 2013, p. B-1): 
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Table 10 
Auditable Attributable Events or Activities  
Auditable Events (ICS-500-27) 
Authentication Events Logons (Success/Failure) 
Logoffs (Success/Failure) 
File and Object Events 
 
Create (Success/Failure) 
Access (Success/Failure) 
Delete (Success/Failure) 
Modify (Success/Failure) 
Permission Modification (Success/Failure) 
Ownership Modification (Success/Failure) 
Writes/downloads to external 
device/media (e.g., A-Drive, 
CD/DVD, devices/printers) 
(Success/Failure) 
 
Uploads from external devices 
(e.g., (CD/DVD drives) 
(Success/Failure) 
User and Group Management 
events 
 
User add, delete, modify, suspend, lock 
(Success/Failure) 
Group/Role add, delete, modify 
(Success/Failure) 
Use of Privileged/Special Rights 
events 
 
Security or audit policy changes 
(Success/Failure) 
Configuration changes (Success/Failure) 
Admin or root-level access (Success/Failure) 
Privilege/Role escalation (Success/Failure) 
Audit and log data accesses (Success/Failure) 
System reboot, restart and 
shutdown 
(Success/Failure) 
Print to a device (Success/Failure) 
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Table 10 
Auditable Attributable Events or Activities (Cont.) 
Print to a file (e.g., pdf format) (Success/Failure) 
Auditable Events (ICS-500-27) 
Application (e.g., Firefox, IE, MS 
Office, etc.) initialization 
(Success/Failure) 
Export of information (e.g., to 
CDRW, thumb drives, or remote 
systems) 
(Success/Failure) 
Import or information including 
(e.g., to CDRW, thumb drives, or 
remote systems)   
(Success/Failure) 
Auditable Event Details Information Events (Splunk, 2014, p. 5) 
Date and time of the event using 
common network time (Network 
Time Protocol (NTP) Protocol) 
Type of event (e.g., login, print, 
etc.) 
Identifier indicating the source 
system of the event activity 
Identifier indicating the identity of 
the subject or actor (e.g., UserID, 
ProcessID, etc.) 
 
Details identifying any object or 
resources accessed or involved (aka 
Resource list, e.g., files (including 
location), document ID, 
peripherals, storage devices etc.) 
 
(Success/Failure) 
Attributable Events Indicating Violations of System/Target (events of concern 
requiring further analysis or review.) (CNSS, 2013, p. B-2) 
Malicious code detection 
Unauthorized local device access 
Unauthorized executable 
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Table 10 
Auditable Attributable Events or Activities (Cont.) 
Attributable Events Indicating Violations of System/Target (events of concern 
requiring further analysis or review.) (CNSS, 2013, p. B-2) 
Unauthorized privileged access 
System reset/reboot 
Disabling the audit mechanism 
Downloading to local devices 
 
 
 These requirements are a culmination of several federal directives, executive 
orders, other standards, and NIST guidelines. These lists and guidelines are important as 
they are recommended actions and operational guides to users, IT staff, security staff, and 
others, when specific standards won’t apply (Harris, 2013). At the time of this study, 
developments in cloud technologies have allowed employees and organizations to have 
more flexibilities in how they work, allowing for working remotely to become more 
accepted. That being said, the 2015 American Time Use Survey issued by the U.S. 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (U.S. Department of Labor, 2016), 
showed that telecommuting is approximately 24% of employee’s telework with some 
frequency. That being said, about 82% of employees are working within the 
organizational boundary. This study focused on the activity of the majority of employees, 
as noted by report above, that are behind the firewall and within the organizational 
boundary.   
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Table 11 
Literature Summary of Cyber Threat Indicators and Categories 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Findings 
or Contribution 
Committee on 
National 
Security 
Systems, 
2013 
Operational 
guidance 
NIST, 
executive 
orders, and 
intelligence 
community 
standards 
Information 
systems 
auditing 
Annex of user / 
pc auditable 
events 
 
Harris, 2013 Instructional  Industry 
standards 
Instruction for 
CISSP 
certification 
Splunk, 2014 Situational 
awareness 
 Industry 
standards 
ICS 700-2 and 
indicators for 
insider threat 
U.S. 
Department 
of Labor, 
2016 
Operational 
guidance 
10,099 
individuals 
interviewed 
Industry 
practices  
How individuals 
over 15 spent 
their time 
 
Incident Response 
Tondel, Line, and Jaatun (2014) explained that, based on International Standards 
Organization (ISO) and National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
guidelines, an information security event can be described as an occurrence within a 
system, service, or network state, that indicates a possible breach of security, outlined 
policy, or failure of implemented controls, as well as, a previously unknown situation that 
may be relevant to main security. As noted by Grispos, Bradley, and Storer (2015), 
“researchers and industrial analysts contend that there are fundamental problems with the 
existing security incident response process solutions” (p. 1). Ruefle et al. (2014) 
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demonstrated that organized incident management involves organizationally defined, 
repeatable processes with the ability to learn from the identified incidents that threaten 
organizational computer systems and data. In most organizations, computer incidents are 
managed by a computer security incident response team (CSIRT). Metzger, Hommel, and 
Reiser (2011) reasoned that the CSIRT is enabled to correlate IT-related security events 
across various communications channels and classify incidents in a consistent manner. 
Therefore, depending on the incident classification, either manual or automated reaction 
steps can be taken, either by an automated notification email to network and security 
administrators, or a full segregation of a compromised system or network (Metzger et al., 
2011). 
Recommendations by NIST researchers Cichonski, Millar, Grance, and Scarfone 
(2012) outlined in their computer security incident handling guide four key phases in the 
computer incident response cycle:  
1. “Preparation 
2. Detection and analysis 
3. Containment/eradication 
4. Recovery, and post-incident activity.” (p. 21)  
As seen in Figure 2, the incident response phases relate to each other in a cyclical 
manner, supplementing continuous monitoring and improvement. Further requirements as 
outline by NIST include: 
1. “Creating an incident response policy and plan 
2. Developing procedures for performing incident handling reporting 
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3. Setting guidelines for communicating with outside parties regarding 
incidents 
4. Selecting a team structure and staffing model 
5. Establishing relationships and lines of communication between the 
incident response team and other groups, both internal (e.g., legal 
department) and external (e.g., law enforcement agencies) 
6. Determining what services the incident response team should provide 
7. Staffing and training the incident response team.” (Cichonski et al, 2012, 
p. 21)   
 
Figure 2. Incident Response Life Cycle (Cichonski et al., 2012) 
According to Grispos et al. (2011), in the event of an incident, the CSIRT gathers 
forensic data from multiple sources, which can include logs, emails, hard drive images, and 
physical memory dumps. Once specific tool designed to support information security 
professionals, is known as intrusion detection system (IDS) (Werlinger, Muldner, Hawkey, 
& Beznosov, 2010). The incident diagnostic process begins with a preparation phase, 
which includes knowledge-gathering about vulnerabilities and risks through the use of 
tools such as the IDS (Werlinger et al., 2010). 
Preparation Detection
Contain,	
Eradicate,	
Recover
Post-
Incident	
Activity
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Table 12 
Literature Summary of Incident Response 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Findings or 
Contribution 
Cichonski et 
al., 2012 
Guidelines  Computer 
security 
incident 
response 
Guidelines to 
assist in 
establishing 
computer security 
incident response 
capabilities 
Grispos, 2015 Literature 
review and 
empirical 
study 
15 
individuals 
surveyed in 
semi-
structured 
interviews 
Cybersecurity 
incident 
response 
Organizations can 
benefit from an 
alternative 
approach to 
incident handling 
and managing 
security incidents 
Metzger et 
al., 2011 
Empirical 
study 
Munich 
scientific 
network, 
120,000 
users, 80,000 
devices 
Cybersecurity 
incident 
response 
Various reporting 
capabilities can be 
leveraged for 
effective, efficient, 
and integrated 
incident response 
Ruefle et al., 
2014 
Theoretical  Computer 
security 
incident 
response team 
(CSIRT) 
development 
Defined incident 
response 
management via 
CSIRT ensure 
focused incident 
response efforts 
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Table 12 
Literature Summary of Incident Response (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Findings or 
Contribution 
Tondel et al., 
2014 
Empirical 
study 
6 individuals 
surveyed in 
semi-
structured 
interviews  
Information 
security 
incident 
response 
Incident planning 
and preparation 
differ for IT and 
industrial control 
systems a unified 
approach for 
critical 
infrastructure 
 
Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS) 
The IDPS is defined a software application that has the ability to monitor network 
and system activities for unauthorized users and activities, as well as, alert organizational 
personnel of such activities, including suspicious inbound and outbound traffic (Vaidya, 
Mirza, & Mali, 2010). According to Scarfone and Mell (2007), “intrusion prevention is 
the process of performing the process of intrusion detection and attempting to stop 
possible incidents” (p. ES-1). Patrick (2001) illustrated how IDPS helps information 
systems prepare for and deal with attacks, by noting that “this is accomplished by 
collecting information from a variety of systems and network sources, and then analyzing 
the information for possible security problems” (p. 3). Patrick (2001) further elaborated 
on the benefits that IDPS provide, including: monitoring and analysis, auditing of 
systems, configurations and vulnerabilities, system integrity, analysis of activity patterns 
based on the matching to known attacks, abnormal activity analysis, and operating system 
audits.  
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 One of the main points of this study was to identify abnormal or anomalous user 
activity in an attempt to discover precursor activities to insider threat behavior. 
According to Brown, Suckow, and Wang (2002), anomaly detection is concerned with 
identifying events that appear to be anomalous with respect to normal user behavior on 
the system. This research and proof-of-concept development aimed to identify anomalous 
user behavior through linear and non-linear models of username and expert panel-defined 
input indicators, through the analysis of input indicator associations or clustering.  
Table 13 
Literature Summary of Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 
Study  Methodology Sample Instrument of 
Construct  
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Broan et 
al., 2002 
Literature review 
and analysis 
 Intrusion 
detection 
systems 
Identified IDS 
characteristics and 
training 
behavioral models 
Patrick, 
2001 
Literature review 
and analysis 
 Successful IDS 
implementation 
Identified best 
practices to 
successfully 
implement an ISD 
within an 
organization 
Scarfone & 
Mell, 2007 
Recommendations 
and standards 
 Intrusion 
detection and 
prevention 
systems  
Recommendations 
for designing, 
implementing, 
configuring, 
securing, 
monitoring, and 
maintaining IDPS 
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Table 13 
Literature Summary of Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (Cont.) 
Study  Methodology Sample Instrument of 
Construct  
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Li & 
Datardina, 
2010 
Literature review  Intrusion 
detection 
systems 
Provided 
information on 
intrusion 
detection 
approaches and 
technologies 
 
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) Solutions 
Cyber attacks have become increasingly more sophisticated, making traditional 
log management and monitoring tools insufficient for the detection, prevention, and 
mitigation of cyber attacks. This elicits a need for more efficient and effective event 
intelligence, as well as, deeper analysis and understanding of environments with the use 
of security information and event management (SIEM) platforms (Thakur, Kopecky, 
Nuseir, Ali, & Qiu, 2016). One of the benefits of SIEM technology is its ability to 
analyze security event data in real time, and its ability to collect, store, analyze, and 
report on logged data for regulatory compliance along with forensics (Montesino, Fenz, 
& Baluja, 2012, p. 249). Montesino, Fenz, and Baluja (2012) outlined the major functions 
of the SIEM technologies: 
 Security information management (SIM): Log management and compliance 
 reporting. The SIM service provides the collection, reporting, and analysis of 
  various log source data, primarily from host systems and applications, and 
 secondarily from network and security devices in support of regulatory 
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 compliance reporting, threat management, and organizational resource monitoring 
  (Montesino et al., 2012, p. 253).  
 Security event management (SEM): Real-time monitoring and incident 
 management for security-related events. The SEM service processes logs and 
 event data from security devices, network devices, systems, as well as, 
 applications in real-time to security monitoring, activity correlation and incident 
  responses (Montesino et al., 2012, p. 253).  
IDPS and SIEM tools merely scratch the surface in detecting cyber threats to an 
organization’s infrastructure, simply because the number and sophistication of attacks 
keep rising, making even the security tools themselves vulnerable to attacks (Thakur et 
al., 2016).  
Table 14 
Literature Summary of Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) Solutions 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding 
or Contribution 
Montesino et 
al., 2012 
Empirical 
study 
NIST 800-53 
and ISO.IEC 
27001 security 
controls 
Cybersecurity 
automation 
Finds that 30% 
of NIST 800-53 
security controls 
can be 
automated 
Thakur, 2016 Conceptual 
study 
HP ArcSight 
SIEM 
application 
Security event 
and log 
management 
Best practices in 
enterprise 
security 
management 
 
System Security Baseline Standards and Guidelines 
Aim and Scope of a Security Policy 
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According to Backhouse, Hsu, and Silva (2006), when considering information 
systems security, “standards are fundamental compatibility specifications that shape the 
configuration of information systems” (p. 413). The scope of a standard depends on the 
immediate needs of the organization, and will specify a standard for installing, hardening, 
and placing systems into production (Livingston, 2000). Livingston (2000) further 
explained that a Minimum Security Baseline Standard (MSB) allows organizations to 
deploy systems in more controlled, efficient, and standardized manner (p. 1). In IT and 
security, the use of baselines has far-reaching effects, as they provide a measuring point 
from which a comparative analysis can be derived, both before and after any changes or 
incidents to a systems occurred (Fuller & Atlasis, 2012). NIST SP 800-53 (2013) 
explained that one of the most significant challenges for organizations is in determining 
the most cost-effective and appropriate set of security controls, which, if implemented 
properly, would mitigate risk while helping to comply with federal laws, standards, and 
other directives. To further expand on NIST SP 800-53 in order to assist organizations in 
making the appropriate security control selection for their IT, the concept of “baseline 
controls” was introduced (NIST, 2013). These controls act as a starting point for security 
implementation, based on system criticality and associated risk, along with impact level.  
In response to Presidential Executive Order 13636, “Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” NIST developed the Cybersecurity Framework (2014) 
through a collaboration between the Federal Government and private industry, while it is 
intended to complement an organization’s risk management and cybersecurity program 
using common language in a cost-effective manner, without placing regulatory 
 56 
 
 
requirements on businesses (NIST, 2014). As outlined by AT&T Security (2015), 
information security is not just a top executive or IT issue.  
Table 15 
Literature Summary of Aim and Scope of a Security Policy 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding 
or Contribution 
AT&T 
Security, 2015 
Conceptual 
paper  
 Industry best 
practices 
Security must be 
viewed with 
many lenses  
Backhouse et 
al., 2006 
Case study 11 structured 
interviews with 
email follow 
up 
Perceived 
power 
Theoretical 
framework 
revealing levels 
of jurisdiction in 
which actors 
operate 
Fuller & 
Atlasis, 2012 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 IT professional 
competence 
Specific 
IT/cybersecurity 
system 
baselining 
procedures 
Livingston, 
2000  
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 IT professional 
competence  
Specific 
IT/cybersecurity 
minimum 
security 
baselining 
procedures 
 
Cybersecurity Monitoring 
Insider Technical Event Indicators 
 Creasy and Glover (2015) of the Council of Registered Ethical Security Testers 
(CREST), an international certification and accreditation body for the technical 
information security industry, identified four types of technical event logs that can be 
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useful for cybersecurity monitoring, and assist with the detection of potential 
cybersecurity incidents (p. 18). Table 16 outlines the recommended log types and 
examples for technical cybersecurity indicators. As noted by Verizon (2010), while it is 
never a good thing to have large amounts of data leave a network at any given time, this 
can indicate malicious activity. Looking for the correct indicators in the correct locations 
can help mitigate a situation before it escalates into an event or a cyber-attack. By 
applying different analytical techniques, cybersecurity analysts can validate the quality of 
the information collected to identify indicators of actualized threats (Young, 2014).  
Table 16 
Technical Cybersecurity Indicators 
Types of Logs Examples 
System logs 
System activity logs (Administrator), including storage 
Endpoint and agent based logs 
Logs from standard and customized applications 
Authentication logs 
Physical security logs 
Network logs Email, firewall, VPN, and Netflow logs 
Technical logs 
HTTP proxy logs 
DNS, DHCP, and FTP logs 
Web and SQL logs 
Appflow logs 
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Table 16 
Technical Cybersecurity Indicators (Cont.) 
Types of Logs Examples 
Logs from 
cybersecurity 
monitoring and logging 
tools 
Malware protection (anti-virus) logs 
Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) logs 
Data loss protection (DLP) logs 
Tools that employ potential malware isolation and 
investigation (sandbox or virtual execution engines) 
Other relevant security management appliances or tools. 
 
According to Creasy and Glover (2015), event logs and tools should be 
configured to enable event logging, use standard formats such as syslog, be parsed with 
the necessary attributes (IP, user name, time & date, protocol, & port), and use a 
consistent, trusted date and time source, such as Network Time Protocol (NTP) (p. 18). 
Table 17 
A Summary of Insider Technical Event Indicators 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Creasy & 
Glover, 2015 
Industry best 
practices to 
help capture 
important 
cybersecurity 
events 
Consumer 
organizations, 
government 
bodies, and 
academia 
Cybersecurity 
threat 
identification 
Details on how to 
monitor and log 
cybersecurity 
events 
Verizon, 2010 Cybersecurity 
breach 
investigation 
and analysis 
141confirmed 
breaches  
Cybersecurity 
threat 
identification 
Identification of 
preventive 
measures divided 
into categories 
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Table 17 
A Summary of Insider Technical Event Indicators (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Young, 2014 Case study Insider threat 
attack 
Cybersecurity 
threat 
identification 
Techniques to 
validate threat 
information  
 
Insider Personality and Human-Centric Indicators 
Greitzer et al. (2010) discussed several demographic, behavioral, or psychosocial 
data, which, if used in various combinations, could provide warning signs of malicious 
insider threats (p. 13). According to Barrick and Mount (1993), “it has long been argued 
that the relationship between personality characteristics and behavior is moderated by the 
strength (or demands) of the situation” (p. 112). They further explained this to mean that 
the extent to which individuals’ personality characteristics predict behavior differs 
“depending on the degree to which the external environment inhibits a person’s freedom 
to behave in idiosyncratic ways” (p. 112). As noted by DeYoung (2015), researchers in 
the psychology field often refer to “personality” as the “array of constructs that identify 
variables in which individuals differ” (p. 33). In addition, personality refers to the 
“specific mental organization and processes that produce an individual’s characteristic 
patterns of behavior and experience” (DeYoung, 2015, p. 33). McAdams and Pals (2006) 
explained that the mission of personality research is “to provide an integrative framework 
for understanding the whole person” (p. 204). DeYoung (2015) described personality 
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traits as “probabilistic descriptions of relatively stable patterns of emotion, motivation, 
cognition, and behavior in response to classes of stimuli” (p. 35). In insider threat 
research it is important to understand to the whole person because as noted by Greitzer et 
al. (2014), “findings from research and case studies of insider crime suggests the 
presence of personality predispositions in perpetrators” (p. 121). 
The Five Factor Model of Personality 
McCrae and Costa (2008) explained that the FFM of personality is the empirical 
generalization about the covariance of personality traits (p. 159). Also referred to as the 
Big Five, FFM “organizes broad individual differences in social and emotional life into 
five factor-analytically-derived categories” (McAdams & Pals, 2006, p. 204). According 
to Pytlik Zillig, Hemenover, and Dienstbier (2002), the FFM of personality: Openness, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism (OCEAN), have emerged 
from decades of research and are notable for their ability to simplify the vast number of 
traits, and ability to predict certain outcomes (p. 847). According to McCrae and Costa 
(1991), the FFM is comprehensive and provides a basis for a systemic study of 
personality and affect (p. 227). Therefore, the FFM constructs and general descriptions 
listed in Table 18, were used in this research study as indicators to determine the strength 
of relationships between personality factors and malicious technical activity. 
Table 18 
Human-centric Indicators - Five Factor Model of Personality 
Indicator Description Author(s) 
Openness Imaginative, artistically sensitive, intellectual; creative, thoughtful 
Barrick & Mount,  
2010; Judge & 
Bono, 2000 
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Table 18 
Human-centric Indicators - Five Factor Model of Personality (Cont.) 
Indicator Description Author(s) 
Conscientiousness Responsible, dependable, persistent, achievement oriented 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & 
Bono, 2000 
Extraversion Outgoing, active, sociable, talkative, assertiveness 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & 
Bono, 2000 
Agreeableness Good-natured, cooperative, kind, gentle, trusting 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & 
Bono, 2000 
Neuroticism 
Tense, insecure, nervous; anxious, fearful, 
depressed, moody 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & 
Bono, 2000 
 
 As noted earlier, the FFM is a hierarchical model of personality traits 
encompassing five factors representing personality at the broadest level, and is 
considered the dominant approach for representing the human trait structure (Gosling, 
Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003; Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo, 2002). As explained by 
McAdams and Pals (2006), when “taken together, the five principles assert that 
dispositional traits articulate broad variations in human functioning that are recognizable, 
speaking directly to how human beings respond to situated social tasks” (p. 205).  
In addition to the Human-centric psychometric indicators outlined, time working 
at an organization has also been studied within the private and public sectors (Ramim & 
Levy, 2006; Hoffman, Meyer, Schwarz, & Duncan, 1990). As noted by Mullen (1981), 
the largest percentage of insider threat incidents, 38%, occurred during the six to 10-year 
period of employment, this is followed by 27% in the three to five-year time period, with 
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19% of insider threat incidents occurring within the first two years of employment. 
Hoffman, Meyer, Schwarz, and Duncan (1990) determined that long term employment at 
an organization does not guarantee that employees will not be tempted to malicious 
activity. In their study, Hoffman et al., (1990) discovered that four out of the 62 insider 
threat cases reviewed, had been at their place of employment for over 10 years. 
Table 19 
Literature Summary of Insider Personality and Human-Centric Indicators 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Findings or 
Contribution 
Barrick & 
Mount, 1993 
Empirical 
study 
154 
participants 
Personality 
scales from 
several 
personality 
inventories 
Mean, standard 
deviations, 
reliabilities, 
correlations for job 
level measures 
DeYoung, 
2015 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Cybernetics 
and FFM in 
goal directed 
systems 
Introduction of 
Cybernetic Big-Five 
theory 
Gosling et 
al., 2003 
Empirical 
study 
1704 
undergrad 
student 
participants 
External 
correlates of a 
new Ten Item 
Personality 
Inventory 
(TIPI) 
Introduction of 
TIPI as a short 
measure for FFM 
psychometrics 
Greitzer & 
Ferryman, 
2013 
Empirical 
study 
Word analysis 
representing 
167 senders, 
and 5.25 
million words 
Insider threat 
mitigation 
Analytic 
approaches and 
metrics in 
evaluating tools to 
identify insider 
threats 
 
 
Table 19 
Literature Summary of Insider Personality and Human-Centric Indicators (Cont.) 
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Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Findings or 
Contribution 
Greitzer et 
al., 2010 
Empirical 
study  
10 staff 
members 
recommended 
by HR, 
reviewed 24 
insider threat 
cases  
Insider threat 
prediction 
Validation using 
twelve indicators 
and a good model, 
insider threat risk 
can be correlated 
with HR 
judgements 
Hoffman et 
al., 1990 
Empirical 
study 
62 insider 
threat cases 
Insider threat 
prediction 
Impact of insiders 
working with 
outsiders to bring 
harm to nuclear 
facilities.  
Judge & 
Bone, 2000 
Empirical 
study 
316 
participants 
enrolled in a 
community 
program 
Linking FFM to 
transformational 
leadership 
Agreeableness as 
strong predictor of 
leadership 
behavior 
McAdams 
& Pals, 
2006 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 FFM, individual 
traits and 
characteristics  
Principles for 
integrating the 
science of 
personality 
McCrae & 
Costa, 1991 
Empirical 
study 
429 
participants in 
a longitudinal 
study 
FFM and 
wellbeing 
Effects of 
personality on 
psychological 
wellbeing 
McCrae & 
Costa, 2008 
Theoretical  FFM and Trait 
Theory 
Dimensions of 
FFM personality 
traits and human 
nature 
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Table 19 
Literature Summary of Insider Personality and Human-Centric Indicators (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Findings or 
Contribution 
Lytlik Zillig 
et al., 2002 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Personality 
inventory 
samples 
New perspectives 
on FFM and the 
nature of 
personality traits 
Ramim & 
Levy, 2006 
Case study Small 
university 
setting 
Insider cyber 
attack 
Insider cyber 
attack was 
successful do to 
novice IT 
management and 
lack of policies 
and governance 
Mullen, 
1981 
Empirical 
study 
650 articles, 
studies, and 
books 
Insider threat 
characteristics  
Provided a set of 
insider threat 
characteristics and 
potential threats to 
nuclear facilities 
Roccas et 
al., 2002 
Empirical 
study 
246 
introductory 
psychology 
students 
FFM and 
personal values 
Relating FFM and 
basic personal 
values 
 
Delphi Technique 
According to Straub (1989), content validity is established by literature reviews, a 
pretest phase, and use of expert panels. Lichvar (2011), noted that an expert is a specialist 
in his or her particular field or domain. Furthermore, as explained by Sekaran and Bougie 
(2013), an expert panel can verify that the measures being employed truly include “an 
adequate and representative set of items that tap the concept” (Sekaran & Bougie, 2013, 
p. 226). Okoli and Pawlowski (2004) indicated that when judgmental information is 
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essential, researchers should employ the Delphi technique. The Delphi technique 
“involves the repeated individual questioning of the experts (by interview or 
questionnaire) and avoids direct confrontation of the experts with one another” (Dalkey 
& Helmer, 1963, p. 458). Linstone and Turnoff (2002) characterized the Delphi technique 
as “a method for structuring a group communication process so that the process is 
effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with a complex problem” 
(p. 3). Prior research, e.g. Ramim and Lichvar (2014), Tracey and Richey (2007), as well 
as Schmidt, Lyytinen, Keil, and Cule (2001) applied the Delphi technique for issue 
identification, model forecasting, and the development of the conceptual framework. 
According to Schmidt et al. (2001), the Delphi technique ensures “a reliable and 
validated data collection process” (p. 10) by compiling often contradictory opinions, 
while pursuing a consolidation of the experts’ responses. This research study identified 
the expert opinions of malicious cybersecurity insider threat indicators through the use of 
the Delphi technique.  
Table 20 
Literature Summary of Delphi Technique 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Dalkey & 
Helmer, 1963 
Theoretical  Delphi 
techniques 
and 
application 
Determined 
Delphi is 
conductive in 
producing 
insights into the 
subject matter 
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Table 20 
Literature Summary of Delphi Technique (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Lichvar, 
2011 
Empirical 
study 
256 
respondents 
7-part survey 
instrument 
Validate the 
effects of 
knowledge 
sharing  
Linstone & 
Turnoff, 
(2002) 
Theoretical  Delphi 
techniques 
and 
application 
Delphi method 
for group 
communication 
process 
Okoli & 
Pawlowski, 
(2004) 
Theoretical  Delphi 
techniques 
and 
application 
Uses of the 
Delphi technique 
for theory 
building 
Ramim & 
Lichavar, 
2014 
Theoretical  Delphi 
techniques 
and 
application 
Uses of Delphi 
technique in 
project 
management 
Schmidt et 
al., (2001) 
Empirical 
study 
6616 
respondents 
Delphi survey Improving risk 
management 
practices 
Straub, 
(1989) 
Theoretical  Instrument 
validation 
Overview of the 
basic principles of 
instrument 
validation 
Tracey & 
Richey, 
(2007) 
Empirical 
study 
 Model 
construction 
and validation 
Decision-making 
processes and 
procedures in 
model 
development 
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Data Mining 
Data mining enables researchers to find information that was not expected to be 
revealed in databases (Clifton & Marks, 1996). According to Hearst (1999), “the goal of 
data mining is to discover or derive new information from data, finding patterns across 
datasets, and/or separating signal from noise” (p. 3). Additionally, data mining is often 
referred to as “knowledge discovery” in databases, meaning “the process of nontrivial 
extraction of implicit, unknown, and potentially useful information from data” (Chen, 
Han, & Yu, 1996, p. 1041). Chen et al. (1996) elaborated on data mining, in that 
discovered knowledge can be applied to inform management and assist in the decision 
making process, as well as, many other applications. An objective of data mining, or data 
exploration, is to find correlations in the data and uncover hidden patterns within the data 
distribution to provide more insight into the data (Reddy & Aziz, 2010).  
Table 21 
Literature Summary of Data Mining 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Chen et al., 
1996 
Literature 
review and 
analysis 
 Cybersecurity 
and Privacy 
issues in 
critical 
infrastructure 
Methodology for 
data analysis and 
research on 
vulnerabilities in 
smart grid and 
critical 
infrastructure  
Clifton & 
Marks, 1996 
Theoretical   Data mining 
techniques to 
summarize 
data 
The use of public 
and sensitive 
information in 
search of 
inference paths 
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Table 21 
Literature Summary of Data Mining (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Hearst, 1999 Theoretical  Data mining 
for text 
exploration 
Text 
exploration 
strategies 
Reddy & 
Aziz, 2009 
Theoretical Several real-
world 
datasets 
Nonlinear data 
correlations 
Method for 
computing 
subspace 
principal curve 
models 
 
Pattern Recognition 
As explained by Raj, Swaminarayan, Saini, and Parmar (2015), “a pattern can 
have a perceptual feature, a way of operation or behavior, something regarded as a 
normative example, or a model considered worthy of imitation” (p. 2496). According to 
Bishop (2006), pattern recognition pertains to “the automatic discovery of regularities in 
data through the use of computer algorithms, and with the use of these regularities to take 
action, such as classifying the data into different categories” (p. 1). The concept behind 
pattern recognition is to assign labels to objects, allowing a set of measurements, also 
called attributes or features, to describe the object (Kuncheva, 2004). Jain, Duin, and 
Mao (2000) explained that pattern recognition pertains to both supervised and 
unsupervised classification.  
When considering the “unsupervised” category, which is also called unsupervised 
learning, the interest is in discovering any structure in the data, such as groups, or any 
shared characteristics, making the objects similar or different across the groups 
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(Kuncheva, 2004). According to Sathya and Abraham (2013), “unsupervised” refers to 
the ability to learn and organize information without providing an error signal to evaluate 
the potential solution” (p. 3). One advantage of unsupervised learning is that the lack of 
direction in the learning algorithm allows researchers to look backwards for patterns that 
may have not previously been considered (Kohonen, Oja, Simula, Visa, & Kangas, 
1996).  
Another consideration in pattern recognition is the “supervised” category, also 
called supervised learning. In supervised learning, each object in the data set has a 
preassigned class label. The task here is to “train a classifier to do the labeling sensibly; 
we supply the machine with learning skills and present the labeled data to it” (Kuncheva, 
2004, p. 3). Supervised learning is efficient in that it is based on training a data sample 
from a data source with the correct classification already assigned; helping to find 
solutions to “several linear and non-linear problems such as classification, control, 
forecasting, and prediction” (Sathya & Abraham, 2013, p. 34). 
Table 22 
Literature Summary of Pattern Recognition 
 
 
 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct  
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Bishop, 2006 Theoretical  Pattern 
recognition  
Overview of 
linear models 
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Table 22 
Literature Summary of Pattern Recognition (Cont.) 
 
Trend Analysis 
According to Alexandrov, Bianconcini, Dagum, Maass, and McElroy (2012), 
there is often a need to determine if a trend exists within a given time series. This is 
referred to as trend detection and is typically solved through the use of statistical tests, 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct  
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Jain, 2000 Theoretical  Statistical 
pattern 
recognition 
Overview of 
supervised and 
unsupervised 
classification 
Kohonen et 
al., 1996 
Literature 
review 
 Data 
visualization 
Introduced self-
organizing map 
as a tool for data 
visualization 
Kuncheva, 
2004 
Theoretical  Pattern 
recognition 
Overview of the 
pattern 
recognition cycle 
Raj, 2015 Literature 
review 
 Pattern 
recognition 
algorithms 
Pattern 
recognition 
algorithms can 
be applied in the 
agricultural 
domain 
Sathaya, 
2013 
Empirical 
study 
Dataset with 
300 students 
Unsupervised 
and 
supervised 
machine 
learning 
models 
Presented a 
conceptual 
framework of 
pattern 
classification in 
the education 
industry 
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which often require the use of trend models (Alexandrov et al., 2012). As explained by 
Kivikunnas (1993), trends have meaning to human experts, and are patterned or 
structured in one-dimensional data (p. 1).  
Trend analysis builds an integrated model using the following four major 
components or movements to characterize time-series data:  
1.  Trend or long-term movements: These indicate the general direction in 
which a time-series graph is moving over time. 
2. Cyclical movements: These are long-term oscillations about a trend line or 
curve. 
3. Seasonal variations: These are nearly identical patterns that a time series 
appears to follow during corresponding seasons of successive years. 
4. Random movements: These characterize sporadic changes due to chance 
events (Han, Kamber, & Pei, 2012). 
Trend analysis assists in providing context and value to either stored or real-time 
data. As noted by Streibel (2008), the more meaningful the stored information, the more 
powerful the knowledge retrieved becomes. This research study utilized pattern 
recognition and trend analysis techniques to identify correlations between user activity 
and precursors to malicious cybersecurity insider threat attacks.  
Table 23 
Literature Summary of Trend Analysis 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Alexandrov 
et al., 2012 
Literature 
review 
 Trend 
extraction 
Approaches to 
trend extraction 
for time series 
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Table 23 
Literature Summary of Trend Analysis 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Han et al., 
2012 
Conceptual 
instruction 
 Data mining Presented data 
mining techniques 
and algorithms 
Kivikunnas, 
1993 
Literature 
review 
 Trend analysis Identified trend 
analysis methods 
and applications 
Streibel, 
2008 
Conceptual 
instruction 
 Data mining 
text  
Presented data 
mining by 
analyzing text 
streams 
 
Data Modeling and Simulation 
By definition, “a data model is a conceptual representation of the data structures 
that are required by a data” (Mamcenko, 2004, p. 5). According to Navathe (1992), “a 
data model is a set of concepts that can be used to describe the structure of and operations 
on a database, meaning, data types, relationships, and other constraints within the 
database” (p. 113). In their seminal work, Greitzer and Frinke (2010) proposed that 
research should focus on: combining traditionally monitored information security data 
(e.g. workstation & Internet activity) with other kinds of organizational and social data to 
infer the motivations of individuals and predict the actions that they are undertaking, 
which may allow early identification of high-risk individuals (p. 2).  
According to Riley (2010), one of the ways that data modeling can assist in the 
development of cybersecurity tools, such as the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype, 
uses existing computational capability to test continually security assumptions on existing 
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systems (p. 6). Furthermore, when dealing with cybersecurity tool development, the use 
of simulations or virtual machines provides a well-defined testing environment to 
explore, in a controlled manner, the behavior of computational and security systems in 
the presence of well-defined attacks (Riley, 2010, p. 6). In the work of Yan, Chen, 
Eidenbenz, and Li (2007), a simulation was used to study trace-oriented malware 
propagation using real world data.  
Table 24 
Literature Summary of Data Modeling and Simulation 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding 
or Contribution 
Mamcenko, 
2004 
Presentation of 
database 
management 
technology 
 IT 
professional 
competence 
Specific IT 
database 
management 
skills  
Myers et al., 
2009 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 Intrusion 
detection 
system and 
algorithm, 
heuristics, and 
signatures 
Best practices 
correlated with 
IDS algorithms 
for detecting 
malicious 
activity  
Navathe, 
1992 
Literature 
review and 
synthesis 
 IT 
professional 
competence 
and database 
management 
systems 
(DBMS) 
Proposed the 
classification of 
data models and 
identified 
specific features 
Riley, 2010 Case study and 
game theory 
Guidance 
from other 
sciences 
IT and 
cybersecurity 
professional 
competence 
Several sub-
fields of 
computer 
science that are 
relevant in 
cybersecurity 
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Table 24 
Literature Summary of Data Modeling and Simulation (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument 
or Construct 
Main Finding 
or Contribution 
Yan et al., 
2007 
Empirical 
research 
Dataset of 
65,770 social 
media users 
Trace driven 
simulation to 
study malware 
propagation 
Trace driven 
simulation to 
study the impact 
of initial 
infection, user 
click probability, 
and user activity 
patterns on 
malware in 
social networks 
 
Cross-Validation, the Bootstrap, and the Jackknife 
According to Efron and Gong (1983), “cross-validation is a way of obtaining nearly 
unbiased estimators of prediction error in complicated situations” (p. 37). As explained by 
Efron and Gong (1983), the method consists of a four-step computational process which 
consists of:  
 “(a) deleting the points xi from the data set one at a time;  
(b) recalculating the prediction rule on the basis of the remaining n – 1points;  
(c) seeing how well the recalculated rule predicts the deleted point; and  
(d) averaging these predictions over all n deletions of an xi.” ( p. 37)  
The major advantage of cross-validation is that is can be applied arbitrarily to 
complicated prediction rules (Efron & Gong, 1983).  
As noted by Efron, Halloran, and Holmes (1996), the bootstrap “is a computer-
based technique for assessing the accuracy of almost any statistical estimate” (p. 13429-
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13434). Orloff and Bloom (2014) further explained that the bootstrap would not be 
possible without current-day computing power, where the “key is to perform computation 
on the data itself to estimate the variation of statistics that are themselves computed from 
the same data” (p. 1). Additionally, according to Kleijnen and Deflandre (2005), 
“bootstrapping implies resampling with replacements of a given sample” (p. 123). 
Furthermore, bootstrapping is considered a fast analytical technique which requires an 
extremely short period of time to derive statistical conclusions (Kleijnen & Deflandre, 
2005). 
Equally important, the jackknife is a “technique for reducing the bias of a serial 
correlation estimator based on splitting the sample into two half-samples” (Miller, 1974) 
(p. 1). According to Efron (1979), “the jackknife is a nonparametric method for 
estimating the bias and variance of a statistic of interest, and also for testing the null 
hypothesis that the distribution of a statistic is centered on some pre-specified point” (p. 
1). Efron and Gong (1983) illustrated that, similarly to the bootstrap, “the jackknife can 
be applied to any statistic that is a function of n independent and identically distributed 
variables” (p. 39). According to Stone (1974), jackknifing is differentiated cross-
validation in that jackknifing “manufactures pseudovalues for the reduction of bias” (p. 
112). However, it has been noted by Gong (1986) that, in comparing the performance of 
all three methods, cross-validation and jackknifing do not seem to offer any significant 
improvements over the apparent error rate, “whereas the improvement given by the 
bootstrap is substantial” (p. 108).  
Table 25 
Literature Summary of Cross-Validation, the Bootstrap, and the Jackknife 
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Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
Efron, 1979 Theoretical  Jackknife as a 
linear 
expansion 
method 
Jackknife and 
bootstrap 
methods for 
estimating the 
variance the 
sample  
Efron & Gong, 
1983 
Theoretical  Parametric 
analysis 
Expository 
review of 
nonparametric 
estimation of 
statistical error 
Efron et al., 
1996 
Theoretical  Statistical 
inference 
As few as 50 or 
100 bootstrap 
replications can 
give useful 
estimates.  
Gong, 1986 Empirical 
study 
Simulations 
and real data 
Cross-
validation and 
prediction rules 
Comparison of 
cross-validation, 
jackknife, and 
bootstrap, show 
substantial gains 
and improvement 
in prediction. 
Kleijnen & 
Deflandre, 
2005 
Experimental 
design 
 Monte Carlo 
simulations 
Identified that 
bootstrapping 
validation 
statistics yielded 
distribution free 
confident 
intervals 
Miller, 1974  Theoretical  Multi-sample 
jackknives 
Two jackknife 
methods tested 
prove to be 
equally valid 
asymptotically 
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Table 25 
Literature Summary of Cross-Validation, the Bootstrap, and the Jackknife (Cont.) 
Study Methodology Sample Instrument or 
Construct 
Main Finding or 
Contribution 
 
Orloff & 
Bloom, 2014 
Conceptual 
paper 
 Empirical 
bootstrap 
methods 
Outlined a set of 
competencies 
useful in 
statistical testing 
methods 
Stone, 1974 Theoretical  General 
framework 
Illustrated the 
application of a 
cross-validation 
criterion to the 
choice and 
assessment of 
statistical 
predictions 
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A Summary of What was Known and Unknown in Research Literature 
A review of the literature was performed to provide an overview of the various 
aspects of cybersecurity, technical and human centric indicators, data simulations, and 
insider threats. Through this literature review, various indicators and identification 
models for the insider threat problem were determined, leading to the discovery of what 
was known and unknown in insider threat precursor identification at the time of this 
study. The literature has shown that, in many insider threat attacks, managers and other 
co-workers had observed that the individual committing the insider threat attack had 
exhibited signs of stress as well as disgruntlement, or other observable, unfavorable 
behavior, yet no one raised an alarm (Greitzer et al., 2012). These psychosocial or 
behavioral indicators that might be observed before an insider commits an attack can be 
leveraged to assist in the identification of precursors to malicious cybersecurity insider 
threat attack. 
In the work of Greitzer et al. (2010), a model focusing on behavioral observables 
that could be recorded and audited was developed, helping in “making inferences about 
the possible psychological/personality/social state of employee” (p. 4.9). For the purposes 
of this study, these psychosocial indicators were not only be correlated with technical 
indicators and simulated user activity, but also weighted and validated by industry 
experts. A tool that can aggregate, in real-time, these psychosocial indicators, and 
correlate them with technical indicators, as well as user network activity, appeared to be 
absent from the literature. Thus, this study designed, developed, and empirically tested a 
tool that will correlate weighted and validated psychosocial behaviors/indicators with 
technical indicators that include network activity.
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
Overview of Research Design 
This study was a developmental research study. As outlined by Ellis and Levy 
(2009) developmental research aims at answering how the construction of a “thing,” or an 
artifact, will address a given problem. Klein (2014) explained that design and 
development research is “a type of inquiry unique to the instructional design and 
technology field dedicated to the creation of new knowledge and the validation of 
existing practice” (p. 1). Ellis and Levy (2009) summarized developmental research as 
comprising three major elements: 1) that the product criteria must be established and 
validated, 2) that the product development follows formalized and accepted processes, 
and 3) validation of the product criteria is met through formalized, accepted processes. 
 Tracey and Richey (2007) used a systematic process to develop an instructional 
design model that was validated using the Delphi technique, where a panel of experts 
both analyzed and offered feedback on the researchers’ proposed design. Once the initial 
model was constructed, it was then reviewed and validated by industry experts through a 
multi-round Delphi technique (Tracey, 2009).  
To meet the specific goals that address the main research question, this study 
conducted three phases of research as shown in Figure 3. In Phase 1, Delphi 1 and Delphi 
2 were performed using instances of the Delphi technique, where SMEs validate 
indicators and indicator categories as well as assign indicator weights and correlations. 
Phase 2 of this research study consisted of in depth data analysis of the simulated 
employee activity data set to determine false positives and negatives, as well as, identify 
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significant indicators to identify insider threat activity. Phase 3 of this research study 
analyzed the evidence collected, and detected the accuracy of the proof-of-concept 
prototype predicted malicious events. 
 
Figure 3. Proposed Overview of the Research Design Process 
Instrument Development 
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Greitzer et al. (2014) recognized the lack of research involving malicious 
cybersecurity insider threat development of behavioral indicators, as well as, the need for 
the development of methods to assess the associated insider threat risks (p. 107). 
Moreover, Greitzer et al. (2010) cautioned, “Predictive approaches cannot be validated a 
priori; false accusations may harm the career of the accused; and collection/monitoring of 
certain types of data may adversely affect the employee morale” (p. 1100).  
Claycomb et al. (2013) elucidated, when observing human behavior, often only 
two types of activities are considered: behavioral (i.e., interpersonal human-to-human), 
and technical (i.e., human interactions with IT). This leaves room for researchers to 
identify the correlations between both types of behaviors. Greitzer and Hohimer (2011) 
reiterated, “defining triggers in terms of observable cyber and psychosocial indicators and 
higher-level aggregated patterns of these behaviors is a major challenge, but also a 
critical ingredient of a predictive methodology” (p. 43). Early and Stott III (2015) argued 
the need to identify intelligently, as well as, autonomously, in addition to pinpointing 
innocuous or unnoticed security event attributes to allow security personnel to remediate 
preemptively physical, as well as, informational, risks before a security event occurs (p. 
1). The White House (2010) issued the National Insider Threat Policy and Minimum 
Standards for Executive Branch Insider Threat Programs, and one of its main objectives 
is described as:  
General Responsibilities of Departments and Agencies: #2. “Establish an 
integrated capability to monitor and audit information for insider threat detection 
and mitigation. Critical program requirements include but are not limited to: (1) 
monitoring user activity on classified computer networks controlled by the 
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Federal Government; (2) evaluation of personnel security information; (3) 
employee awareness training of the insider threat and employees’ reporting 
responsibilities; and (4) gathering information for a centralized analysis, reporting 
and response capability.” (The White House, 2010, p. 2) 
Many insider threat programs in both the Federal Government and in the private 
sector focus on technological tools that monitor network traffic and online activity, 
paying attention only to specific individuals who exhibit suspicious behavior (INSA, 
2013). The ease in which end-users are able to transition from personal online accounts to 
professional networks exacerbates the need to ensure such measures are not tied to 
malicious cybersecurity insider threat activity.  
This study evaluated simulated user activity against a set of indicators which were 
identified from previously validated research (Oceja, Ambrona, Lopez-Perez, Salgado, & 
Villegas, 2010). This identified set of both technical and psychometric indicators was 
then validated by the Delphi technique expert panel selection, with a Web-based survey 
tool as provided in Appendices C and D. Indicators and indicator groupings validated in 
the first round then go through a second round of Delphi technique for the expert panel 
weight assignment of the indicators and expert validated correlations. Once the expert 
panel validated, grouped, correlated, and assigned weights to the indicators, the final list 
of indicators was applied to the proof-of-concept prototype, and initial testing began. 
Table 26 outlines the indicator categories and descriptions that were presented to SMEs 
through the online survey tool. 
SME Data Collection 
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For Phase 1, this study was conducted using the Delphi technique to collect data 
from the expert panel. The expert panel consisted of SMEs that are experts in the field of 
cybersecurity monitoring and response. According to Skulmoski, Hartman, and  Krahn 
(2007), the Delphi technique expert panel can range anywhere from 11 to 345 
participants. Skinner, Nelson, Chin, and Land (2015) noted that typical expert panel sizes 
range anywhere from 10 to 30 SMEs. This research study intended to select 30 SMEs for 
the expert panel and attempted to have the same SMEs participate in both Delphi 1 and 
Delphi 2 during Phase 1. This research study accepted cybersecurity certifications and 
academic degrees as credentials for expert panelists, and intended to solicit the expert 
advice of SMEs from industry, academia, and the federal government for each iteration 
of the survey and subsequent rounds if necessary. SMEs that possessed the required 
credentials were contacted through either direct email or the use of LinkedIn social media 
Website. SMEs recommended by the Dissertation committee, who possess the required 
credentials were also accepted. The SMEs expert opinion was collected, as well as, the 
SMEs demographic information identifying gender, age group, education level, role 
within the organization, and industry worked in.  
Phase 1 – Expert Panel Elicitation 
To establish Phase 1, an Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval letter was 
obtained, as seen in Appendix A. Therefore, Phase 1 of this developmental research 
elicited industry experts’ opinions using the Delphi technique to identify technical and 
psychometric cybersecurity indicators for measuring malicious cybersecurity insider 
threat activity (Ramim & Lichvar, 2014). As seen in Figure 3, Phase 1 consisted of two 
iterations of the Delphi technique, namely, Delphi 1 and Delphi 2, with each Delphi 
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iteration consisting of multiple rounds. Quantitative and qualitative data for Phase 1 were 
collected using SurveyMonkey electronic surveys to gather the expert opinions of 30 
SMEs.  
During Phase 1, Step 1, the SMEs were emailed the Delphi 1, SurveyMonkey 
electronic survey seen in Appendix C. For each survey item/indicator, the SMEs were 
asked to rank the survey item/indicator’s order of importance for the detection of 
malicious cybersecurity insider threat attack; using a seven-point Likert scale ranging 
from (1) “not at all important” to (7) as “extremely important”. Once the SMEs 
consensus was achieved, meaning all the SME’s were in agreement, in regard to the SME 
validated cybersecurity indicators, from all proposed important cybersecurity indicators, 
the first specific goal was met and RQ1 was addressed.  
For Phase 1, Step 2, using the same SurveyMonkey electronic survey, the SMEs 
were presented with cybersecurity indicator categories as seen in Table 26, and asked to 
rate the cybersecurity indicator categories by the cybersecurity indicator categories 
importance in detecting insider threats; this was accomplished using a seven-point Likert 
scale ranging from (1) “not at all important” to (7) as “extremely important”.  Once the 
SMEs consensus was achieved in regard to the cybersecurity indicator categories, the 
second specific goal was met and RQ2 was addressed. Table 26 outlines the proposed 
technical and psychometric indicators and indicator categories of the Phase 1, Delphi 1 
tentative survey instrument which require SME’s input for validation.  
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Table 26 
Indicators Used in Phase 1 Tentative Survey Instrument 
 
Indicator Category Indicator 
Number 
Description  Author(s) 
Technical: 
Unauthorized Logon 
Activity 
LG1 Employee logs on to different PC’s 
without proper authorization 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 LG2 Employee logs on after-hours without 
proper authorization 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 LG3 Employee logs on after-hours more 
than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) without proper authorization 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
Technical:     
Removable Media 
Device Connection 
Activity 
MC1 Employee connects a removable 
media device to an organizational PC 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 
MC2 Employee disconnects a removable 
media device from an organizational 
PC 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 
Technical:     
Removable Media 
Device Connection 
Activity 
MC3 Employee disconnects a removable 
media device after a PC shutdown 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 MC4 Employee uses (connect/disconnect) 
a removable media device more than 
3 times in one day 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
Technical:     
Removable Media 
Device File Activity 
(Open, Write, Copy, 
Delete) Activity 
MF1 Employee opens a file from a 
removable media device on an 
organizational PC 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
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Table 26 
Indicators Used in Phase 1 Tentative Survey Instrument (Cont.) 
Indicator Category Indicator 
Number 
Description  Author(s) 
Technical:     
Removable Media 
Device File Activity 
(Open, Write, Copy, 
Delete) Activity 
MF2 Employee writes a file to a removable 
media device 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 MF3 Employee copies a file to a 
removable media device  
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 MF4 Employee copies a file more than 3 
times in one day to a removable 
media device 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 MF5 Employee deletes a file from a 
removable media device 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
Technical: 
HTTP/Online Activity                           
HT1 Employee visits an external HTTP 
site 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 HT2 Employee uploads a file to an 
external HTTP site 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 HT3 Employee uploads a file to an 
external HTTP site more than 3 times 
in one day 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 
HT4 Employee downloads a file from an 
external HTTP site  
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 HT5 Employee downloads a file from an 
external HTTP site more than 3 times 
in one day 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 HT6 Employee visits an eternal HTTP site 
with risky words identified in the 
organizational word content filtering 
technology 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
Technical:             
Email Activity 
EM1 Employee sends an email with an 
attachment to an external domain 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 EM2 Employee sends more than 5 emails 
with an attachment to an external 
domain 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
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Table 26 
Indicators Used in Phase 1 Tentative Survey Instrument (Cont.) 
Indicator Category Indicator 
Number 
Description  Author(s) 
 EM3 Employee receives an email with an 
attachment from an external domain 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 EM4  Employee receives more than 5 
emails with an attachment, from an 
external domain in one day 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 EM5 Employee sends an internal email 
with risky words identified in the 
organizational word content filtering 
technology 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 EM6 Employee receives an internal email 
with risky words identified in the 
organizational word content filtering 
technology 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 
 
EM7 Employee receives an external email 
with risky word identified in the 
organizational word content filtering 
technology 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 
EM8  Employee sends an external email 
with risky words identified in the 
organizational word content filtering 
technology 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
Technical: 
Unauthorized File 
(Decoy/Honeypot) 
Access  
DF1 Employee accesses a decoy file or 
honeypot without proper 
authorization 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
 DF2 A PC accesses a decoy file or 
honeypot without proper 
authorization 
Creasy & Glover, 
2015; Verizon, 2010 
Psychometric: 
Openness 
PS1 Openness - Personality Traits: 
Imagination, feelings, actions, ideas 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
 PS1A Low score on Openness: The 
employee practical conventional, 
prefers routine, pragmatic, data driven 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
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Table 26 
Indicators Used in Phase 1 Tentative Survey Instrument (Cont.) 
Indicator Category Indicator 
Number 
Description  Author(s) 
 PS1B High Score on Openness: The 
employee is curious, independent, 
creative, receptive 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
Psychometric: 
Conscientiousness 
PS2 Conscientiousness – Personality 
Traits: Competence, self-discipline, 
thoughtfulness, goal driven 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
Psychometric: 
Conscientiousness 
PS2A Low score on conscientiousness: The 
employee is impulsive, careless, 
disorganized 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
Psychometric: 
Conscientiousness 
PS2B High score on conscientiousness: The 
employee is persistent, driven, 
hardworking, dependable, organized 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
Psychometric: 
Extroversion 
PS3 Extroversion – Personality Traits: 
Sociability, assertiveness, emotional 
expression 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
 
PS3A Low score on Extroversion: The 
employee is quiet, reserved, 
withdrawn, reflective 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
 PS3B High score on Extroversion: The 
employee is outgoing, warm, seeks 
adventure 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
Psychometric: 
Extroversion 
PS3 Extroversion – Personality Traits: 
Sociability, assertiveness, emotional 
expression 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
 
PS3A Low score on Extroversion: The 
employee is quiet, reserved, 
withdrawn, reflective 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
 PS3B High score on Extroversion: The 
employee is outgoing, warm, seeks 
adventure 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
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Table 26 
Indicators Used in Phase 1 Tentative Survey Instrument (Cont.) 
Indicator Category Indicator 
Number 
Description  Author(s) 
Psychometric: 
Agreeableness 
PS4 Agreeableness -  Personality Traits: 
The employee is cooperative, 
trustworthy, good-natured 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
 PS4A Low score on Agreeableness: The 
employee is critical, uncooperative, 
suspicious, competitive, challenging 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
 PS4B High score on Agreeableness: The 
employee is helpful, trusting, 
empathetic, cooperative 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
Psychometric: 
Neuroticism 
PS5 Neuroticism – Personality Traits: The 
employee has a tendency towards 
negative emotions 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
 PS5A Low score on Neuroticism: The 
employee is calm, even-tempered, 
secure 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
 PS5B High score on Neuroticism: The 
employee is anxious, unhappy, prone 
to negative emotions 
Barrick & Mount, 
2010; Judge & Bono, 
2000 
 
Once Phase 1, Steps 1 and 2 were completed, processing of the data collected 
occurred, identifying the SME selected top 10 cybersecurity indicators and indicator 
categories. During Phase 1, Step 3, the SMEs were emailed the Delphi 2, SurveyMonkey 
electronic survey as seen in Appendix D, prepopulated with data collected during Phase 
1, Steps 1 and 2. Using the Delphi 2 electronic survey, the SMEs were asked to assign 
weights to the top 10 cybersecurity indicators, using a sliding scale from 1 to 100.  When 
the SMEs reached a consensus on the validated indicator weights, the third specific goal 
was met and RQ3 was addressed. 
 90 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Proposed Indicator Correlation Matrix 
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Phase 1, Step 4, asked the SMEs to identify the most significant indicator 
relationships using Figure 4 and a series of dropdown menus as seen in Appendix D. 
When a consensus was reached for the SME identified significant relationships between 
indicators, the fourth specific goal was met and RQ4 was addressed.  
An analysis of the SMEs opinions was performed to identify the SME agreed 
upon responses for Phase 1, for the purposes of this research study a consensus was 
achieved when 70% of expert panel were in agreement, as recommended by Sumsion 
(1998). When the Delphi technique is used, each round of each phase builds on the 
previously administered survey instrument, until a consensus of SMEs opinions is 
achieved. The SurveyMonkey electronic surveys were administered to SMEs from 
academia, government, and industry, for each Delphi iteration and subsequent rounds if 
necessary. 
Due to the nature of the Delphi method building on the previous round and 
iteration, the SurveyMonkey survey instruments for Delphi 1 and Delphi 2, were subject 
to change based on the SMEs recommendations and opinions. This study attempted to 
gather expert opinion from the same SMEs for the duration of the data collection. When a 
consensus was achieved for all SME identified indicator validation, indicator categories, 
indicators weights and indicator correlations, the specific goals and RQs addressed, Phase 
1 was complete and the study initiated Phase 2.  
Phase 2 – Proof-of-Concept Prototype Development 
Phase 2, Step 1, of this research study exercised the aforementioned developed 
and validated technical, as well as, psychometric indicators into the AI-InCyThR proof-
of-concept prototype that was used to collect the simulated user activity data. 
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Additionally, the simulated data were refined to include the identification of false 
positives and negatives, together with measure indicators.  
As previously mentioned, a Minimum Security Baseline (MSB) allows 
organizations to deploy systems in a more controlled, efficient, and standardized manner 
(Livingston, 2000). Fuller and Atlasis (2012) explained that:  
“In general, a baseline is a well-defined, well-documented version of the solution 
at some point in its life cycle, and is used as a foundation to support other 
activities, including measurement.” (p. 2)  
From a technical perspective, Santos (2007) identified that the “initial learning mode and 
anomaly detection within Cisco IDS/IPS devices is performed over a period of 24 hours 
by default” (p. 137). However, as noted by Spears and Barki (2010), “in the context of 
compliance, a control must be implemented for two months (60 days) before its 
performance can be audited” (p. 515).  
The thresholds outlined were representative of an organizational security policy 
which would capture a baseline as the first 60 days of an employee’s activity. Activity 
that significantly differentiates from the organizational established baselines are flagged 
and categorized as a potential policy violation. Grouping several violations per user will 
rate the user as having a higher tendency towards malicious activity. Per each behavior, 
two time periods were established, (1) the baseline time period (normal behavior, i.e. 60 
days), and (2) the at-risk time period or period of interest (behavior over the employee’s 
tenure). From these two time periods, three intermediate continuous variables were 
created: the at-risk variable, the change variable, and the baseline variable. For each 
behavior, two final dichotomous variables were created, one for the at-risk variable, and 
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one for the change variable. There were two final binary logistic regression models, one 
that included only the at-risk dichotomous variables, and the other will include only the 
change variables. 
Operationalization of Risky Behavior Indicators 
Phase 2, Step 2, of this developmental research study was the operationalization 
of the variables into indicators for analysis, and perform data investigation using the AI-
InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype on simulated user activity data available from 
CERT/SEI/CMU. The readily available data set simulates an “aggregated collection of 
logs from host based sensors distributed across all the computer workstations within a 
large business or government organization over a 500-day period” (Lindauer et al., 2013, 
p. 81). The simulated data set represents the logon, external media, HTTP, email, and file 
access activity of over 4100 simulated users. This simulated data set also presents a 
simulated users demographic within the organization, as well as a static set of personality 
traits based on the Five Factor Model of personality.  
This research study aimed at defining and measuring the relationships between 
the following indicators for the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threat: 
Logon – Malicious activity will be defined as the number of days in the time period of 
interest that a user logs in after hours.    
1. Create three continuous variables called “Days_AH_Login_B”(After-Hours; 
baseline), “Days_AH_Login_C” (% change from baseline), and 
“Days_AH_Login_R” (at-risk) and will run descriptives to aid in the 
dichotimization of these variables, including mean, median, skewness, kurtosis, 
and the frequency distribution.  
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2. From these descriptive analysis results provide the at-risk and change variable 
will be dichotomized based on a predetermined cut off. The variables will be 
called, “AH_Login_R”, and “AH_Login_C”. The cut-off will be chosen such that 
there is a sufficient number of users in each group. Prior to examining the 
descriptive data, a reasonable cut off for “AH_Login_R” is at least 30% of the 
days login after hours (or nine out of 30 days). A reasonable cut off for 
“AH_Login_C” is at least 30% above baseline use.  
External Device – The number of days in the period of interest of which a user connects 
an external device three or more times in one day. 
1. Create three continuous variables called “Days_ED_B”(External Device; 
baseline), “Days_ED_C” (% change from baseline), “Days_ED_R” (at-risk) and 
will run full descriptive analysis.  
2. From these descriptive analysis results provide the at-risk and change variables 
will be dichotomized based on a chosen cut off. The variables will be called, 
“ED_R” and “ED_C”. The cut-off will be chosen such that there is a sufficient 
number of users in each group. Prior to examining the descriptive data a 
reasonable cut off for “ED_R” is at least one day where the user used an external 
device more than three times in the day. A reasonable cut-off for the change 
variable is having at least one more day external device usage above baseline.  
HTTP – Two types of variables will be created, (1) the number of days in the period of 
interest that the user exceeding either three uploads or three downloads to an external 
HTTP site per day; (2) the number of days in the period of interest that the user visited an 
HTTP landing page that contained a “risky” word. The risky word will be identified 
 95 
 
 
using word content filtering, and compared to the identified words listed in the keyword 
dictionary as outlined in Table 27, and will be flagged, as well as, categorized as a policy 
violation per the individual employee.  
1. Created three continuous variables called “Days_HTTP_B” (http; baseline), 
“Days_HTTP_C” (% change from baseline), “Days_HTTP_R” (at-risk) and ran 
full descriptive analysis.  
2. From these descriptive analysis results, the at-risk and change variables were 
dichotomized based on a chosen cut off. The variables were called, “HTTP_R”, 
“HTTP_C”. The cut-off was chosen such that there was a sufficient number of 
users in each group. Prior to examining the descriptive data, a reasonable cut off 
for “HTTP_R” was at least one day where the user used an external device more 
than three times in the day. A reasonable cut-off for the change variable was 
having at least one more day of questionable HTTP activity above baseline.  
3. For word content filtering a dichotomous variable were created, called 
“HTTP_RW” (HTTP; Risky Word).  
4. A composite four level categorical variable was created to capture both the 
dichotomous HTTP_R variable and the HTTP_RW variables.  
a. (0) = Neither HTTP_R or HTTP_RW 
b. (1) = HTTP_R Positive and HTTP_RW Negative 
c. (2) = HTT_R Negative and HTTP_RW Positive 
d. (3) = Both HTTP_R and HTTP_RW are Positive 
Email – Two types of variables were created, (1) the number of days in the period of 
interest in which user exceeded sending 5 emails with attachments to an external email 
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address per day (not in the simulated *@dtaa.com domain); (2) the number of days in the 
period of interest in which the user sent or received an email that contained a “risky” 
word. The risky word was identified using word content filtering, compared to the 
identified words listed in the keyword dictionary, and was flagged as well as categorized 
as a policy violation per the individual user. 
1. Created three continuous variables called “Days_Email_B”(email; baseline) , 
“Days_Email_C” (% change from baseline), “Days_Email_R” (at-risk) and ran 
full descriptive analysis.  
2. From these descriptive analysis results, the at-risk and change variables were 
dichotomized based on a chosen cut off. The variables were called, “Email_R” , 
“Email_C”. The cut-off was chosen such that there was a sufficient number of 
users in each group. Prior to examining the descriptive data a reasonable cut off 
for “Email_R” was at least one day where the user sent an email with attachment 
to an external domain more than five times in the day. A reasonable cut-off for the 
change variable was having at least one more day of questionable email activity 
above baseline.  
3. For word content filtering a dichotomous variable was created, called 
“Email_RW” (Email; Risky Word).  
4. A composite four level categorical variable was created to capture both the 
dichotomous Email_R variable and the Email_RW variables.  
a. (0) = Neither Email_R or Email_RW 
b. (1) = Email_R Positive and Email_RW Negative 
c. (2) = Email_R Negative and Email_RW Positive 
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d. (3) = Both Email_R and Email_RW are Positive 
File Access – The number of days in the period of interest of which a user copies a file to 
an external device three or more times in the day.  
1. Created three continuous variables called “Days_FA_B”(File Access; baseline) , 
“Days_FA_C” (% change from baseline), “Days_FA_R” (at-risk) and ran full 
descriptive analysis.  
2. From these descriptive analysis results, the at-risk and change variables were 
dichotomized based on a chosen cut off. The variables were called, “FA_R”, 
“FA_C”. The cut-off was chosen such that there was a sufficient number of users 
in each group. Prior to examining the descriptive data a reasonable cut off for 
“FA_R” was at least one day where the user copied a file to an external device 
more than three times in the day. A reasonable cut-off for the change variable was 
having at least one more day file copy to external device above baseline. 
Demographic – This table contains an employee demographics across the organization. 
This information may be useful for later data exploration and for determining if user role 
may influence tendency towards malicious actors. This information can be weighted and 
correlated with user actions in determining a user propensity towards malicious activity. 
Specifically, does the users role (e.g. IT Staffer, Engineer, etc.) moderate the relationship 
between the risky behaviors (the predictors) and the malicious use (the dependent 
variable).  
Decoy File – The total number of decoy files that a user access’s and performs and 
activity (HTTP, Email, Copy) during the period of interest.  
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1. Created one continuous variable “Number_Decoy_R”, and ran full descriptive 
analysis.  
2. From these descriptive analysis results, the at-risk variable were dichotomized 
based on a chosen cut off. The variable was called “Decoy_R”. Prior to 
examining the descriptive data a reasonable cut off for “Decoy_R” was at least 
one file, where the user accessed a decoy file.  
This table includes a list of files that can be used as decoys/honeypot to determine 
which computer accessed the file. Employee and pc relationships can be used in the 
weighting of a user’s propensity towards malicious activity.  
Psychometric – These are five continuous indicators which were used as predictors for 
malicious use. The psychometric scale rates employees on a numerical scale. Depending 
on where an employee lands on the scale, per personality trait being assessed, Openness, 
Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, or Neuroticism. This information was 
included in a regression model to predict a user’s propensity towards malicious activity.  
1. The dataset includes five continuous indictors for each user: “Psychometric_O”, 
“Psychometric_C” , “Psychometric_E” , “Psychometric_A” , “Psychometric_N.” 
For each indicator, full descriptives were run, including the mean, median, mode, 
and standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis, and frequency distribution 
2. From these descriptives, each variable may have been dichotomized based on a 
median split.  
Total Risk Score – A total risk score was created which encompasses the total count 
of risky technical and psychometric indicators per user using bivariate logistic 
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regression to predict a malicious user, creating a baseline and change in total risk 
score.  
1. Created two continuous indictors “Total_B”, “Total_C”, and ran full 
descriptive analysis.  
2. From these descriptive analysis results, each indictor may have been 
dichotomized based on a median split per each employee.  
In continuation, Step 3, of Phase 2 of this developmental research study 
operationalized these modeling approaches throughout the data analysis process, refining 
the collected data to identify possible false positives or false negatives. In addressing 
RQ5a, the result provided for each predictor the prevalence of false positive. A crosstab 
was produced of each bivariate technical predictor and the dichotomous malicious user 
outcome variable. A false positive was defined as when the technical predictor is not 
risky and the malicious user indictor indicated a malicious user.  
In addressing RQ5b, the result was for each predictor the prevalence of false 
negatives. A crosstab was produced of each bivariate technical predictor and the 
dichotomous malicious user outcome indictor. A false negative was defined as when the 
technical predictor is risky and the malicious user indictors indicated a non-malicious 
user. Once this analysis has been achieved with the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept 
prototype, the fifth specific goal was met and RQ5a and RQ5b was addressed.  
According to Carson (1986), “one of the main problems facing the simulation 
modeler is gaining the user’s or client’s acceptance of model accuracy” (p. 74). To assist 
with model verification, validation, and credibility, Caron (1986) identified the 
distinction between verification, validation, and credibility, which are needed in building 
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an accurate model that is convincing to the end-users, and an accurate representation of 
the real system and be used in the decision-making process (p. 74).  
• Verification: The process in identifying whether the model is performing 
as it was designed 
• Validation: The process where both the modeler and end-user determine 
how accurately the model represents reality. 
• Credibility: A model which is accepted by the client and is used as an aid 
in the decision-making process (Carson, 1986) 
This developmental research study incorporated these techniques throughout the 
prototype development process, in order to maintain model accuracy for the particular 
objectives of this research study (Law, 2009).  
Phase 2, Step 4, of this developmental research study measures “both the 
correlation function and the mutual information measure correlations within one 
sequence known as ‘autocorrelations,’ or between two sequences known as ‘cross-
correlations,’ within the data” (Herzel & Große, 1995, p. 519), allowing for the detection 
of all dependences. This assisted in addressing RQ6, and identifying which activity 
indicators were identified the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as significant 
indicators to identify insider threat activity. The results of this analysis was a bivariate 
and multivariate logistic regression to identify the relationship (odds ratio) between an 
indicator and a malicious user. For example, the bivariate logistic regression will give an 
odds ratio that indicates how much more likely the risky group is likely to be a malicious 
user, compared to the non-risky group. The multi-variate logistic regression gives the 
odds ratio for each predictor adjusting for other predictors in the model. 
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In the course of Phase 1, the expert panel completed a two-stage Delphi technique 
to identify the significant indicators, indicator relationships, and indicator weights which 
were measured to identify “the strength of association between a pair of data vectors” 
(Shimodaira, 2016, p. 126). Linear regression models were run on the data to determine 
indicator correlations. Once this stage was completed, a set of evidence and/or 
correlations as precursors to malicious cybersecurity insider threat events were produced 
and the sixth specific goal was met, as well as, RQ6 was addressed.   
Phase 3 – Analysis of Evidence Against MSB 
 During Phase 3 of this developmental research study an analysis of the collected 
evidence and/or correlations against the previously identified MSB was performed. One 
of the main objectives of this research study was to develop logistic regression models of 
malicious cybersecurity insider threat as a function of risky behavior predictors. This was 
accomplished by first identifying and analyzing bivariate associations among the 
predictors as well as bivariate association between the predictors and the insider threat 
outcome. The latter was performed for three reasons, 1) in the event that there was a 
strong relationship between two predictors (multi-collinearity) the indictor with the 
stronger bivariate association with insider threat outcome was selected, and the other 
indictor dropped from the logistic regression model. 2) This provided an association 
(unadjusted) in which to compare whether the addition of other covariates in the logistic 
regression model affect the bivariate association of interest. 3) This allowed for the 
validation of the accuracy of the SME’s predicted association between each risky 
behavior and insider threat outcome.  
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 The approach for determining bivariate association depends on the scale of the 
particular predictor and outcome. For bivariate associations with two dichotomous 
indictors a tetrachoric correlation was obtained. Tetrachoric correlation is applicable 
when both observed “either-or” variables are dichotomous, as explained by Howell 
(2010, p. 303).  
Statistical Measures of Association 
 As described above the type of measure of association i.e. correlation was 
determined based on the scale of the indicators. Gingrich (2004), explained that “methods 
of correlation summarize the relationship between two variables in a single number called 
the correlation coefficient” (p. 795). According to Goodwin and Leech (2006), 
correlation is one of the most commonly used statistical techniques in research. It is 
understood that the most widely used correlation statistic is the Pearson Product-Moment 
correlation coefficient (Pearson r) (Danacica, 2017; Goodwin & Leech, 2006). Moreover, 
Goodwin and Leech (2006) explained:  
 “The Pearson product-moment correlation coefficient describes the size and 
 direction of linear relationship between two continuous variables (generically 
  represented by X and Y), and range from -1.0 (perfect negative relationship) to 
 +1.0 (perfect positive  relationship); if no relationship exists between the two 
 variables, the value of the correlation is zero. The symbol rxy (or r) is used to 
 present the correlation calculated.” (p. 252)  
Pearsons r can also be used to describe the association between two dichotomous 
variables. Rovai, Baker, and Ponton (2013), explained that Pearson r is symmetric, 
meaning that the same coefficient value is obtained regardless of which variable is the 
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independent variable or the dependent variable. While the Pearson r values range from -1 
£ r £ 1; Hinkle, Wiersma, and Jurs (2003) noted that the absolute values of Pearson r can 
be interpreted by the size of the correlation coefficient as shown in Table 27. 
Table 27 
Correlation Coefficient Interpretation 
Size of Correlation Interpretation 
.90 to 1.00 (-.90 to -1.00) Very high positive (negative) correlation 
.70 to .90 (-.70 to -.90) High positive (negative) correlation 
.50 to .70 (-.50 to -.70) Moderate positive (negative) correlation 
.30 to .50 (-.30 to -.50) Low positive (negative) correlation 
.00 to .30 (.00 to -.30) Little if any correlation  
Ordinal Logistic Regression 
 As noted by Mertler and Vannatta (2013), regression is a statistical tool that 
allows researchers to investigate the effect of independent variables [IVs] (predictive 
indicators in this study) on the dependent variable [DV] (p. 298). For example, the effect 
of an employee’s single technical activity (i.e. a predictive indicator) on the employee’s 
predisposition towards malicious insider threat activity (DV) In predictive analysis, 
multiple Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) is applied to measures the effect of two or 
more IVs (predictive indicators in this study) on one dichotomous DV (Lani, 2018). For 
example, the effect of an employee’s technical activities (IV1) and psychometric rating 
(IV2) on the employee’s predisposition towards malicious insider threat activity (DV). As 
explained by Mertler and Vannatta (2010), in standard multiple regression all the IV’s are 
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entered concurrently; therefore, the effect of the IV’s on the DV is evaluated in terms of 
what it adds to the prediction of the DV as specified by regression equation (p. 164).   
Analysis of the Simulated Data Set 
 A Pearson’s correlation matrix was produced of the predictors as an initial test of 
multi-collinearity. Correlations >= .7 were suspected as multi-collinear for purposes of a 
multivariate analysis. A separate correlation matrix with outcome variables will be 
available. Bivariate ordinal logistic regression were run with malicious user as the 
outcome and each predictor. This provided unadjusted odds ratios, indicating the amount 
of risk of being a malicious user as a function of the predictor. For example, an odds ratio 
of 2.5 for the risky logon variable, means that users identified as having risky logon use, 
have 2.5 times the odds of being a malicious actor, than those users who do not have 
risky logon use. The residual probability of being a malicious user was obtained for each 
model, this being a dichotomous variable. Any user with a probability > .5 will be 
considered a malicious user. A two by two cross tab was calculated on the actual 
malicious users, versus the model identified malicious users, to look for rates of false 
positives and false negatives, and other sensitivity analysis.  
 Ordinal Logistic Regression (OLR) was then performed as the non-linear 
predictive model that includes all the technical behaviors, and psychometric indicators as 
IVs, and the employee’s predisposition towards malicious insider threat activity as DV. 
This showed the effect of each predictor after controlling for each predictor in the model. 
The residual probability of being a malicious user was obtained for each model, this 
being a dichotomous variable. Any user with a probability > .5 was considered a 
malicious user. A two by two cross tab on the actual malicious users, versus the model 
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identified malicious users, to look for rates of false positives and false negatives, and 
other sensitivity analysis. The false positive and false negative rates should be improved 
since there are more predictors that are correlated with the outcomes.  
 Bivariate and multivariate analysis were run separately for the at-risk predictors.  
Word Content Filtering 
 The importance of email and Internet use in the workplace has been well 
documented; organizations allow for limited personal Internet use, including social 
media, in an effort to reduce an employee’s negative affect associated with the 
workplace, and the employers desire for productivity (Vitak, Crouse, & LaRose, 2011; 
Garrett & Danziger, 2008). Greitzer et al. (2014) explained that another source of 
psychosocial data is text written by an employee when sending emails using the 
organizational email system or a sampling of employee social media use approved by the 
organization (p. 121). Findings from prior research and case studies suggest the presence 
of personality predispositions in malicious actors, specifically that there is a significant 
association between word use and personality traits (Greitzer et al., 2014, p. 121); as well 
as, according to McCrae (2010) a relationship exists between word use and FFM.  
 As noted earlier, data mining refers to the process of knowledge discovery in data, 
content monitoring and filtering allows organizations to address the issue of data crossing 
organizational network boundaries (Proctor & Mogull, 2006). Tools such as Secure 
Email Gateways and Secure Web Gateways provide a method in which organizations can 
filter inbound and outbound email message or URL requests against organizationally 
defined keyword dictionaries or blacklists and can help protect company assets 
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(Firstbrook & Wynne, 2015; Orans & Firstbrook, 2015). Greitzer et al. (2014) expanded 
on the use of commercial tools and the detection of malicious insider threats saying,   
 With some additional analysis it is possible to use output from network auditing 
 appliances to discover psychosocial factors that suggest increased insider threat 
 risk. Specifically the analysis of text used in email and social media 
 communication may be analyzed to identify associated personality traits or 
 psychosocial risk factors (p. 122).  
For the purposes of this research study, a risky keyword dictionary outlined by the DHS 
National Operations Center (NOC) Media Monitoring Capability (MMC) Desktop 
Reference Binder (Department of Homeland Security, 2011) was used as the foundation 
to analyze an employee’s inbound and outbound email and HTTP activity. An employee 
who was determined to have a risky word identified in the risky keyword dictionary in 
their email or HTTP activity was weighted as having a higher propensity to malicious 
insider threat activity. This rating contributed to the “Total Risk Score” indicator to assist 
in the prediction of malicious cybersecurity insider threats. Finally, in Phase 3, a report 
with conclusions and recommendations was produced, meeting the seventh specific goal 
and addressing RQ7. Table 28 outlined the risky keyword dictionary by threat type and 
risky words for analysis as identified by DHS.  
 
Table 28 
Risky Keyword Dictionary  
Keyword Category Description  Author(s) 
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Domestic Security Assassination, Attack, Domestic security, Drill, 
Exercise, Cops, Law enforcement, Authorities, 
Disaster assistance, Disaster management, DNDO 
(Domestic Nuclear Detection Office), 
preparedness,National Mitigation, Prevention, 
Response,Recovery, Dirty bomb, Domestic nuclear 
detection, Emergency management, Emergency 
response, First  responder, Homeland security, 
Maritime domain awareness (MDA), National 
preparedness, Initiative, Hostage, Explosion  
Department of 
Homeland Security 
(2011) 
 
 
HAZMAT & Nuclear Hazmat, Nuclear, Chemical spill, Suspicious 
package/device, Toxic, National laboratory, Nuclear 
facility, Nuclear threat, Cloud, Plume, Radiation, 
Radioactive, Leak, Biological infection (or event), 
Chemical, Chemical burn, Biological, Epidemic, 
Hazardous, Hazardous material incident, Industrial 
spill, Infection, Powder (white), Gas, Spillover, 
Anthrax, Blister agent, Chemical agent, Exposure, 
Burn, Nerve agent, Ricin, Sarin, North Korea 
Department of 
Homeland Security 
(2011) 
Health Concern & 
H1N1 
Outbreak, Contamination, Exposure, Virus, 
Evacuation, Bacteria, Recall, Ebola, Food Poisoning, 
Foot and Mouth (FMD), H5N1, Avian, Flu, 
Salmonella, Small Pox, Plague, Human to human, 
Human to Animal, Influenza, Center for Disease 
Control (CDC), Drug Administration (FDA), Public 
Health, Toxic, Agro Terror, Tuberculosis (TB), 
Agriculture Listeria Symptoms Mutation Resistant, 
Antiviral, Wave, Pandemic, Infection, Water/air 
borne, Sick, Swine, Pork, Strain, Quarantine, H1N1, 
Vaccine, Tamiflu, Norvo Virus, Epidemic, World 
Health Organization (WHO) (and components), 
Viral, Hemorrhagic Fever, E. Coli 
Department of 
Homeland Security 
(2011) 
Infrastructure Security Infrastructure security, Airport, Airplane (and 
derivatives), Chemical fire, CIKR (Critical 
Infrastructure & Key Resources), AMTRAK, 
Collapse, Computer infrastructure, Communications, 
Infrastructure, Telecommunications, Critical 
infrastructure, National infrastructure, Metro, 
WMATA, Subway, BART, MARTA, Port 
Authority, NBIC (National Biosurveillance 
Integration, Center), Transportation security, Grid, 
Power, Smart, Body scanner, Electric, Failure or 
outage, Black out, Brown out, Port, Dock, Bridge, 
Cancelled, Delays, Service disruption, Power lines  
Department of 
Homeland Security 
(2011) 
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Table 28 
Risky Keyword Dictionary (Cont.) 
Southwest Border 
Violence 
Drug cartel, Violence, Gang, Drug, Narcotics, 
Cocaine, Marijuana, Heroin, Border, Mexico, Cartel, 
Southwest, Juarez, Sinaloa, Tijuana, Torreon, Yuma, 
Tucson, Decapitated, U.S. Consulate, Consular, El 
Paso, Fort Hancock, San Diego, Ciudad Juarez, 
Nogales, Sonora, Colombia, Mara salvatrucha, 
MS13, MS-13, Drug war, Mexican army, 
Methamphetamine, Cartel de Golfo, Gulf Cartel, 
Department of 
Homeland Security 
(2011) 
Terrorism 
 
Terrorism, Al Qaeda, Terror, Attack, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Agro, Environmental 
terrorist, Eco terrorism, Conventional weapon, 
Target, Weapons grade, Dirty bomb, Enriched, 
Nuclear, Chemical weapon, Biological weapon, 
Ammonium nitrate, Improvised explosive device, 
IED (Improvised Explosive Device), Abu Sayyaf, 
Hamas, FARC (Armed Revolutionary Forces 
Colombia), IRA (Irish Republican Army), ETA 
(Euskadi ta Askatasuna), Basque Separatists, 
Hezbollah, Tamil, Tigers, PLF (Palestine Liberation 
Front), PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization), Car  
Department of 
Homeland Security 
(2011) 
Weather Emergency  Emergency, Hurricane, Tornado, Twister, Tsunami, 
Earthquake, Tremor, Flood, Storm, Crest, Temblor, 
Extreme weather, Forest fire, Brush fire, Ice, 
Stranded/Stuck, Help, Hail, Wildfire, Tsunami 
Warning Center, Magnitude, Avalanche, Typhoon,  
Shelter-in-place, Disaster, Snow, Blizzard, Sleet, 
Mud slide, Mudslide, Erosion, Power outage, Brown 
out, Warning, Watch, Lightening, Aid, Relief, 
Closure, Interstate, Burst, Emergency Broadcast 
System 
Department of 
Homeland Security 
(2011) 
 
 
 
Keyword Category Description  Author(s) 
Southwest Border 
Violence 
La Familia, Reynosa, Nuevo Leon, Narcos, Narco 
banners (Spanish equivalents), Los Zetas, Shootout, 
Execution, Gunfight, Trafficking, Kidnap, Calderon, 
Reyosa, Bust, Tamaulipas, Meth Lab, Drug trade, 
Illegal immigrants, Smuggling (smugglers), 
Matamoros, Michoacana, Guzman, Arellano-Felix,  
Department of 
Homeland Security 
(2011) 
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Table 28 
Risky Keyword Dictionary (Cont.) 
Cyber Security 
 
Cyber security, Cybersecurity, cybersecurity, Botnet, 
DDOS (dedicated denial of service), DOS (Denial of 
service),  Malware, Virus, Trojan, Keylogger, Cyber 
Command, 2600, Spammer, Phishing, Rootkit, 
Phreaking, Cain and abel, Brute forcing, Mysql 
injection, Cyber attack, cyber-attack, cyber attack, 
Cyber terror, Hacker, China, Conficker, Worm, 
Scammers, Social media, AA Keylogger, 
Jobhunting, Jobsearch, Closing Project 
Department of 
Homeland Security 
(2011) 
Population and Sample 
With the AI-InCyThR system, synthetic user activity over a 500 day period was 
analyzed for correlations between the expert panel-identified indicators and any 
anomalies outside of the MSB, identifying possible malicious user activity. Expert panel 
responses were recorded in a SurveyMonkey spreadsheet. Anomalies and correlations 
were recorded within the AI-InCyThR system and presented as correlation visualizations. 
According to Mertler and Vannatta (2010), one of the reasons for pre-analysis data 
screening is to ensure the accuracy of the data. As they noted, “the results of any 
statistical analysis are only as good the data analyzed” (p. 25). Mertler and Vannatta 
(2010) further elaborated that data must be checked for accuracy, since inaccurate data 
may cause erroneous conclusions. 
Data Analysis 
 As noted by Seuring and Müller (2008), each round of the Delphi technique must 
be fully documented in order to conduct Delphi technique data analysis. Hasson, Keeney, 
and McKenna (2000), explained that it is recommended for Delphi technique studies to 
show the central tendencies and levels of dispersion for each Delphi round. Levels of 
Keyword Category Description  Author(s) 
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dispersion include standard deviation and the inter-quartile range, while central 
tendencies include means, medians, and mode (Hasson et al., 2000; Skinner et al., 2015). 
By computing SMEs responses for Delphi 1 and Delphi 2, the means, or average of the 
SMEs responses were revealed for each item. As well, in computing the medians, the 
middle value of the SME responses were revealed. Subsequently, the computed modes 
reveal the most common of the SME response for each item outlined in the survey 
instrument, with the standard deviation revealing the level of agreement among the SMEs 
selections. Accordingly, the interquartile range is a measure of variability that is 
produced by dividing the responses into quartiles.  
 The expert panel elicitation and AI-InCyThR system pilot test were the 
foundation to develop a valid and reliable assessment of precursors to malicious insider 
threat activity. Additionally, an empirical study using the AI-InCyThR system was 
conducted using 16 months of simulated user activity. Alias (2015) explained that by 
using an iterative process, increased instrument validity and reliability can be achieved. 
With the use of a literature review and an expert panel, this study sought to address RQ1 
to identify what the most important cybersecurity indicators are, as validated by the 
experts. This study sought to address RQ2 by utilizing the literature review and expert 
panel feedback to establish the indicator categories for the most pertinent indicator 
categorizations. This research also sought to determine the weight for each expert panel 
validated indicator, and what are the expert-identified most significant correlations 
between cybersecurity indicators. This was accomplished through the second-round 
iterative use of the Delphi technique to address RQ3 and RQ4. 
Data Analysis with the Proof-of-Concept Prototype 
 111 
 
 
 This research sought to address RQ5a by identifying the prevalence of false 
positives for each predictor. This was accomplished by producing a crosstab of each 
bivariate technical predictor and the dichotomous malicious user outcome variable. A 
false positive was defined as when the technical predictor is not risky and the malicious 
user variable indicated a malicious user. This research sought to address RQ5b by 
identifying the prevalence of false negatives for each predictor. This was accomplished 
by producing a cross tab of each bivariate technical predictor and the dichotomous 
malicious user outcome variable. A false negative was defined as when the technical 
predictor is risky and the malicious user variable indicated a non-malicious user.  
 In addition, the results of RQ5a and RQ5b were false positive and false negative 
rates obtained from the full logistic regression model that includes all predictors 
simultaneously. A dichotomous predicted malicious user indicator was obtained from the 
predicted probabilities that are output from this logistic regression model and compared 
against the actual malicious user variable in a cross tab. A false positive in this case in 
when the predicted malicious user is negative (i.e. non-malicious user) but the actual 
malicious user indicator is positive (i.e. malicious user). A false negative in this case in 
when the predicted malicious user is positive (i.e. malicious user) but the actual malicious 
user indicator is positive (i.e. non-malicious user). 
 This research study aimed to address RQ6 by determining what simulated user 
activity indicators were identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as 
significant indicators to identify insider threat activity. This was accomplished by 
producing a bivariate and multivariate logistic regression to identify the relationship 
(odds ratio) between an indicator and a malicious user. For example, the bivariate logistic 
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regression gave an odds ratio that indicates how much more likely the risky group is 
likely to be a malicious user, compared to the non-risky group. The multivariate logistic 
regression gets the odds ratio for each predictor adjusting for other predictors in the 
model.  
 The results of RQ7 were the SME identified correlations (DV & each predictor) 
collected in Delphi 2 and outlined in RQ4 compared against the Pearson’s correlations 
(DV & each predictor) empirically-derived from the insider threat data. In order to 
understand the degree to which SMEs on average underestimate/overestimate the 
empirically-derived correlations for each DV/predictor combination, the SME 
correlations for each DV/predictor combination were averaged and compared against the 
DV/predictor correlations derived from the insider threat data set. For purposes of 
discussion, “small”, “medium” and “large” differences between SME- and empirically-
derived correlations were operationalized as follows: small (0 to +/- 0.10), medium (+/- 
0.11 to 0. 40), large (> +/- 0.40). Linear and Non-Linear correlations with a significant 
difference and those with little difference were identified and discussed. The average 
predictor-outcome correlation score was calculated across the SME’s for each predictor-
outcome pair and compared against the actual correlations derived from the insider threat 
data set. 
 
Proof-of-Concept Tool and Simulation  
Simulated Data Sample 
As noted by Barse, Kvarnstrom, and Johnson (2003), synthetic data is defined as 
data that is generated by simulated users in a simulated environment, performing 
 113 
 
 
simulated actions or activities. These simulations may include human behaviors, or be 
altogether an automated process (Barse et al., 2003). When using simulated data, great 
care must be taken to be certain that the simulated data is a true representation of the 
types of activity that would be expected in real-world scenarios (Hill & Malone, 2004) 
This is because, as noted by Hill and Malone (2004), data which is too clean or well-
arranged will present misleading results. According to Hauduc et al. (2010), “the quality 
of simulation results can be significantly affected by errors in the model (typing, 
inconsistencies, gaps, or conceptual errors) and/or in the underlying model description” 
(p. 1). Furthermore, Hill and Malone (2004) indicated that “benchmarking the dataset can 
resolve these issues by ensuring the data is realistic” (p. 968). Benchmarking involves 
comparing the dataset against a series of problems that are both understood and accepted, 
which will improve the simulated data’s credibility (Hill & Malone, 2004).  
The simulated dataset that was used for this study provided test data representing 
500 days of user activity, or roughly a year and a half of simulated user activity, for a 
simulated large organization. Accordingly, the simulated data was categorized and 
referred to as indicators based on the type of simulated user activity and preconditioned 
database table classification. 
Pilot-Test Initial System 
The pilot test of the initial application analyzed three time sets of user activity and 
event correlation per employee;  
1) The initial 60-day period that an employee logged in, this sets the initial user 
 baseline of activity. This time frame was chosen because as noted by Spears and 
 Barki (2010), in the context of regulatory compliance, to adhere to the Sarbanes-
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 Oxley act of 2002, “a control must be implemented for two months before its 
 performance can be audited” (p. 515); 
2) A period-of-interest encompassing the employee’s total period-of-employment. 
 Review of this timeframe allowed for comparison of baseline behavior and any 
 deviations, either positive or negative, in employee activity and behavior.  
3) The timeframe which deviation from baseline activity was observed.   
As explained by Collins, Onwuegbuzie, and Sutton (2006), the goal in every study, 
regardless of research field, “is to obtain data that has one or more of the following 
characteristics: trustworthiness, credibility, dependability, legitimation, validity, 
plausibility, applicability, consistency, neutrality, reliability, objectivity, confirmability, 
and/or transferability” (p. 77). Moreover, Collins et al. (2006), elaborated that 
“instrument fidelity rationale relates to the steps taken by the researcher to maximize the 
appropriateness and/or utility of the instruments used in the study” (p. 77). Thus, the 
main focus of this pilot-test was expert panel instrument fidelity. The following phase of 
the pilot-test evaluated outcome validity. Collins et al. (2006), iterated that outcome 
validity assesses the “meaning of scores and intended and unintended consequences of 
using the instrument” (p. 81). Accordingly, proper testing and an expert panel was 
essential in establishing the fidelity of the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype, as 
well as, validate the indicators. The results and observations of this pilot test were 
evaluated and all adjustments to the indicators of the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept 
prototype were completed.  
Design and Empirical Study: Revised Proof-of-Concept Prototype 
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 Subsequently, once the initial proof-of-concept prototype was revised, an 
empirical study was administered using the already developed and validated proof-of-
concept prototype. During this phase of the developmental research study, analysis of the 
simulated user activity over a 60-day period (Spears & Bakari, 2010) was conducted, and 
the results of this measure documented. Moreover, any recommendations resulting from 
the data analysis were provided; information regarding the simulated user activity 
follows. 
Table 29 
Summary of Research Question (RQ) Triangulation 
Research Question (RQ) Methodology Data Categorization 
RQ1: What are the important 
cybersecurity indicators 
validated by the expert panel 
that can assist in the detection 
of insider threat activity?  
Delphi technique, expert panel 
elicitation 
Extraction of cybersecurity 
indicators from SME’s opinion 
RQ2: What are the expert 
validated cybersecurity 
indicators categories? 
Delphi technique, expert panel 
elicitation 
Extraction of cybersecurity 
indicator categories from SME’s 
opinion 
RQ3: What are the expert-
approved-weights for the 
identified cybersecurity 
indicators? 
Delphi technique, expert panel 
elicitation 
Extraction of cybersecurity 
indicator weights from SME’s 
opinion 
RQ4: What are the expert-
identified most significant 
correlations between 
cybersecurity indicators? 
Delphi technique, expert panel 
elicitation 
Extraction of possible malicious 
activity based on indicator 
correlations as identified by 
SME’s opinion 
RQ5a: What cybersecurity 
indicators were identified in 
experimental settings to have a 
high rate of false positives as 
measured by the AI-InCyThR 
prototype? 
Prototype testing, SMB 
comparison 
Results will be the prevalence of 
false positives for each predictor. 
A false positive is defined as a 
technical predictor indicating the 
user is a malicious user 
(probability from logistic 
regression model > 0.50) when, in 
actuality, the user is not a 
malicious user. 
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Table 29 
Summary of Research Question (RQ) Triangulation (Cont.) 
Research Question (RQ) Methodology Data Categorization 
RQ5b: What cybersecurity 
indicators were identified in 
experimental settings to have a 
high rate of false negatives as 
measured by the AI-InCyThR 
prototype? 
Prototype testing, SMB 
comparison 
Results will be the prevalence of 
false negatives for each predictor. 
A false negative is defined a 
technical predictor indicating the 
user is not a malicious user 
(probability from logistic 
regression model < 0.50) when, in 
actuality, the use is a malicious 
user. 
RQ6: What simulated user 
activity indicators were 
identified by the AI-InCyThR 
proof-of-concept prototype as 
significant indicators to identify 
insider threat activity?  
Prototype output Results will be bivariate and 
multivariate ordinal logistic 
regressions to identify the 
unadjusted and adjusted 
relationships (OR), respectively, 
between the indicators and the 
malicious user DV. 
RQ7: How are the simulated 
user activity correlations that 
were identified by the SME’s     
different than those identified 
by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-
concept prototype as      
significant correlations to 
identify insider threat activity? 
Prototype output and Delphi 
technique, expert panel elicitation 
Results of RQ7 will be the SME 
identified correlations (DV & 
each predictor) collected in 
Delphi 2 and outlined in RQ4 
compared against the Pearson’s 
correlations (DV & each 
predictor) empirically-derived 
from the insider threat data. In 
order to understand the degree to 
which SMEs on average 
underestimate/overestimate the 
empirically-derived correlations 
for each DV/predictor 
combination, the SME 
correlations for each 
DV/predictor combination will be 
averaged and compared against 
the DV/predictor correlations 
derived from the data set. 
 
Reliability and Validity 
As noted by Creswell (2012), the reliability and validity of an instrument should, 
in essence, provide “an accurate assessment of the variables and enable the researcher to 
draw inferences to a sample or population” (p. 180). Furthermore, Campbell (1957) 
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detailed the importance of both internal and external validity, and elaborated that internal 
validity is achieved when the research makes a significant difference in the specific 
study. As indicated by Ellis and Levy (2009), “internal validity refers to the extent to 
which its design and the data that it yields allows the researcher to draw accurate 
conclusions about cause-and-effect and other relationships within the data” (p. 334). 
Therefore, Salkin (2010) contended that the reliability and validity of a measurement 
instrument is of the utmost importance, acting as the first screen against inaccurate 
conclusions on the data being analyzed. Regarding Delphi expert methodology, 
McFadzean, Ezingeard, and Birchall (2011), noted, “the approach ensures that the data 
collection process is both reliable and valid because it exposes the investigation to 
differing, and often divergent, opinions and seeks convergence through structured 
feedback” (p. 108). In their work, Greene, Caracelli, and Graham (1989) stated, “in a 
complementary mixed-method study, qualitative and quantitative methods are used to 
measure overlapping but also different facets of a phenomenon, yielding an enriched, 
elaborated understanding of that phenomenon” (p. 258).  
According to Hill and Malone (2004), using simulated data to develop and study 
diagnostic tools for data analysis is very beneficial. Simulations can be used to suggest an 
appropriate approximate model, as well as to determine how good an approximation of a 
given analytic model is (Ignall, Kolesar, & Walker, 1978). Furthermore, Reilly, Staid, 
Gao, and Guikema (2016) explained that “simulation models are widely used in risk 
analysis to study the effects if uncertainties on outcomes of interest in complex 
problems” (p. 1844).  
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Robinson (1997) explained that a very “significant element of any simulation 
study is verification and validation (V&V) of the simulation model” (p. 53). According to 
Robinson (1997), a thorough V&V lays the groundwork on which confidence in the study 
results can be placed. Davis (1992) noted that verification is the process of assuring that 
the (conceptual) model that has been converted into a computer model meets the 
developer’s conceptual description and specifications with sufficient accuracy. 
Validation, according to Carson (1986), consists of the actions taken to assure that the 
model is fittingly accurate for the functions at hand. 
Reliability 
The AI-InCyThR was developed to measure the correlations between the 
fictitious username and an activity as they relate to the established MSB, creating an 
index of malicious cybersecurity insider threat event precursors. According to Helminen, 
Halonen, Rankinen, Nissinen, and Rauramaa (1995), the reliability of an index is 
determined by reproducibility and consistency. Reliability is important in that it indicates 
the measure of lack of bias, and is indicative of stability and consistency (Sekaran, 2003). 
By definition, reliability establishes that the “individual scores from an instrument should 
be nearly the same or staple on repeated administrations of the instrument, they should be 
free from sources of measurement error, and they should be consistent” (Creswell, 2002, 
p. 180). Thus, the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype assessment was validated 
through testing. As username and event correlations were developed, each correlation 
was given a score. The overall correlation scores were auto-calculated through the AI-
InCyThR algorithm engine.  
Validity 
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Creswell (2002) described validity as the researcher’s ability to gather significant 
and relevant generalizations from the survey scores collected. Straub (1989) argued, “that 
instrument validation at any level can be of considerable help to MIS researchers in 
substantiating their findings” (p. 162). According to Alias (2015), in general, “measures 
are valid if they are relevant and clean measures of what the researcher wants to assess” 
(p. 18). Straub (2015) further elaborated that validity deals with the appropriateness of 
the method to the research question, which involves the validity of the researcher’s 
interpretation of the data (p. 18). Boudreau, Gefen, and Straub (2001) noted that content 
validity is another attribute, which is collected and coded. This validity is generally 
established through literature reviews as well as expert panels. Thus, this study reduced 
the threat to validity by using input indicators validated by an expert panel that follows 
the Delphi technique as noted by Ramim and Lichvar (2014).  
 
Resources 
In accordance with Nova Southeastern University IRB Policies and Procedures, 
IRB approval is required to work with human subjects. Access to the cybersecurity 
industry experts is necessary to follow the Delphi technique expert panel method, as well 
as, contracting a software developer for developing the AI-InCyThR application. The 
software prototype was built in a virtual environment using open source tools and 
operating systems, such as Linux. Fifty $10 gift cards were given out as an incentive and 
reward for expert panel participation in the research study. Following the collection of the 
data, a statistical software program was utilized for data analysis. 
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Summary 
Chapter 3 provided an overview of the methodology for this study. This study was 
classified as “developmental,” and utilized a mixed-method approach both to weigh and 
validate the technical and psychosocial indicators to be used in testing the AI-InCyThR 
proof-of-concept prototype. The AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype was intended to 
be a means of identifying precursors to malicious cybersecurity insider threat attacks by 
alerting cybersecurity engineers and managers when certain user activity has exceeded a 
stated minimum security baseline.  
This chapter also discussed the methods with which to address specific research 
goals and specific research questions. The collection of technical and psychosocial 
indicators was developed using a literature review, in addition to the feedback received 
from an expert panel. Moreover, this chapter examined data reliability and validity, data 
collection procedures, data analysis processes, resources, and the simulated user activity 
data set.  
This chapter outlined a multi-step, three-phased approach towards developing the 
AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype. After establishing the list of technical and 
psychosocial indicators derived from the literature, Phase 1 of Delphi method data 
collection from SMEs proposed and validated the indicators. Step 2 of Phase 1 again 
relied on the SMEs, now to assign weighted value to the already validated indicators. In 
Phase 2, the validated and weighted indicators were applied to the AI-InCyThR proof-of-
concept prototype and correlated to user activity in comparison to the defined minimum-
security baseline, refining the findings and identifying any false positives or false 
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negatives seen in the data. During Phase 3, analysis of the evidence collected and 
correlations were hierarchically bundled for visualization, and analyzed for overall 
detection accuracy.  
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Chapter 4 
Results 
Overview 
The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and validate a proof-
of-concept prototype for a malicious cybersecurity insider threat alerting system that will 
assist in the detection and prediction of malicious insider threat activity using human-
centric technical activities, as well as, individual employee psychometric rating scales. 
The previous chapters have introduced the topic, problem, theoretical foundation, and 
methodology of this study. Chapter 4 will present the results of this study. In Phase 1, the 
results of two Delphi surveys used to validate indicators, indicator categories, and 
indicator weights based on an expert panel of SMEs will be presented. In phase two, 
results of data analysis of a simulated employee activity data set will be presented. Phase 
three consists of continued analysis of the simulated dataset and comparison to SME 
opinion. 
The main research question this study addressed is: What human-centric technical 
activity and psychometric indicators are precursors to malicious end-user activity, 
making those activities rise above a certain threshold to be identified as potential insider 
threats? The specific research questions (RQ) this study addressed are:  
RQ1: What are the important cybersecurity indicators validated by the expert 
panel that can assist in the detection of insider threat activity?  
RQ2: What are the expert-validated cybersecurity indicator categories? 
RQ3: What are the expert-approved weights for the identified cybersecurity 
indicators? 
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RQ4: What are the expert-identified most significant correlations between 
cybersecurity indicators?  
RQ5a: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to 
have a high rate of false positives as measured by the AI-InCyThR prototype? 
RQ5b: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to 
have a high rate of false negatives as measured by the AI-InCyThR prototype? 
RQ6: What simulated user activity indicators were identified by the AI-InCyThR 
proof-of-concept prototype as significant indicators to identify insider threat activity?  
RQ7: How are the simulated user activity correlations that were identified by the 
SMEs different than those identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as 
significant to identify insider threat activity? 
 
Phase 1 - Expert Panel 
 Data collection in Phase 1 occurred from April 2018 to May 2018 using two 
Delphi technique survey instruments to collect data from an expert panel. The expert 
panel consisted of SMEs in the field of cybersecurity and information technology with 
cybersecurity responsibilities.  The goal of this phase was to collect data to validate 
indicators, indicator categories, and assign indicator weights and correlations. To address 
RQ1, SMEs were asked to rank user activity indicators on a seven-point Likert scale 
ranging from (1) not at all important to 7 (extremely important). The top 10 average 
highest ranked indicators were chosen as the SME validated indicators. To address RQ2, 
SMEs were also asked to rank indicator categories in a similar manner. In a second 
Delphi survey, SMEs were asked to identify what they deemed as important correlations 
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between indicators as well as assign a weight to the indicators. Data from this survey was 
used to address RQ3 and RQ4.  
Phase 1, Delphi 1 – Data Collection 
 During Phase 1 of this study, the goal of the SMEs was to identify the most 
important cybersecurity indicators used to detect the malicious cybersecurity insider 
threats. Indicators and indicator categories were derived from literature and presented in 
Chapter 2. The final instrument used for Phase 1 is presented in Appendix C. The SMEs 
consisted of over 336 cybersecurity and IT professionals with cyber security 
responsibilities. Individuals in academia and public and private sectors were sourced 
from LinkedIn social network, all residing in the U.S. SME selection criteria was outlined 
in Chapter 3. To record the SMEs responses, an email (presented in Appendix C) was 
sent to the SMEs. This email contained a link to the Web-based survey tool. A total of 46 
SMEs completed the Phase 1 survey. No additional rounds of data collection were 
necessary as qualitative data did not indicate SME desire to add or remove the indicators 
presented.  
Phase 1 – Pre-Analysis Data Screening  
 Pre-analysis data screening was performed on data collected from the SMEs. Data 
screening is an important step to ensure accuracy in the data collected as well as to 
confirm there are no extreme or missing values (Levy & Ellis, 2006; Mertler & Vannatta, 
2005). The SMEs responses were collected by way of the SurveyMonkey® Web-based 
tool, which ensures completeness by impeding incomplete survey submissions. This 
resulted in none of the surveys submitted being excluded. Through the pre-analysis data 
screening, no outliers were identified or excluded. Thus, all 46 responses collected were 
complete and included in the data analysis procedures.  
Phase 1, Delphi 1 – Expert Panel Characteristics 
 There were 46 SMEs who participated in the Delphi 1 survey. The majority of 
these SMEs were male (n = 32, 70%). The largest proportion of SMEs were in the 35-44 
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age category (n = 20, 43%). Slightly more than a third of the SMEs held an IT MS (n = 
16, 35%). The largest proportion of SMEs were Security Analyst Engineers (n = 11, 
24%). Half of the SMEs worked in either local, state, or federal government (n = 23, 
50%). Of those who did not choose one of the offered industry choices and wrote in their 
answer, industries were: government contractor, non-profit, and technology subject 
matter expert -issues, opportunities and threats active security clearance, each with an 
observed frequency of one. The full frequencies and percentages of the SME 
demographics are presented in Table 30. 
Table 30 
Frequency Table for SME Demographics 
Variable n % 
Gender   
    Female 14 30.43 
    Male 32 69.57 
Age   
    25-34 5 10.87 
    35-44 20 43.48 
    45-54 13 28.26 
    55-64 7 15.22 
    65-74 1 2.17 
Education   
    High School Diploma 1 2.17 
    Bachelor’s degree 9 19.57 
    MBA 7 15.22 
    OJT 6 13.04 
    PhD 4 8.70 
    Professional Doctorate 3 6.52 
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Table 30 
Frequency Table for SME Demographics 
Variable n % 
Role   
    Academia Researcher 7 15.22 
    CIO/CISO/CEO/CFO/COO 5 10.87 
    Cybersecurity Program Management 6 13.04 
    Security Analyst Engineer 11 23.91 
    Security Operations Manager 3 6.52 
    Technical Analyst Engineer 5 10.87 
    Technical Lead IT Professional 9 19.57 
Industry   
    Education 7 15.22 
    Financial Banking 2 4.35 
    Healthcare 3 6.52 
    Local State Federal Government 23 50.00 
    Other please specify 3 6.52 
    Private Industry/Commercial 8 17.39 
Industry—Other (write-in responses)   
    Government contractor 1 2.17 
    Non-profit 1 2.17 
    Technology SME with ACTIVE Security Clearance 1 2.17 
    No Answer 43 93.48 
Note. Due to rounding errors, percentages may not equal 100%. 
 
 
 
Phase 1, Delphi 1 – Data Analysis 
 In Phase 1, Delphi 1, the data collected via the SurveyMonkeyâ survey tool was 
exported to Microsoft Excel for initial analysis and processing. The SME responses to 
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RQ1 and RQ2 were parsed to identify the count for each indicator and indicator category. 
To address RQ1, what are the important cybersecurity indicators validated by the expert 
panel that can assist in the detection of insider threat activity? SMEs were asked to rank 
cybersecurity indicators in order of importance using a seven-point Likert scale ranging 
from (1) not at all important to (7) extremely important. The most important 
cybersecurity indicators validated by the expert panel were identified by ranking the top 
ten items by average score. From most important to least important the top ten most 
important cybersecurity indicators were LG1, LG2, LG3, MC1, HT6, EM8, EM7, EM6, 
EM5, and PS2A. Table 31 presents means and standard deviations of the importance of 
these indicators as well as a description of each indicator.  
Table 31 
Means and Standard Deviations of Importance of Indicators 
Indicator 
Number 
Indicator Description Importance 
  M SD 
LG1 Employee logs on to different PC’s without proper 
authorization 
6.2 0.88 
LG3 Employee logs on after hours more than 30% of the 
tenure days without proper authorization 
6.1 1.01 
LG2 Employee logs on after-hours more than 30% of the 
time (9 out or 30 days) without proper authorization 
6.0 1.26 
EM8 Employee sends an external email with risky words 
identified in the organizational word content filtering 
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
6.0 1.19 
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Table 31 
Means and Standard Deviations of Importance of Indicators (Cont.) 
Indicator 
Number 
Indicator Description Importance 
  M SD 
HT6 Employee visits an eternal HTTP site with risky words 
identified in the organizational word content filtering 
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
5.8 1.05 
EM7 Employee receives an external email with risky word 
identified in the organizational word content filtering 
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
5.7 1.38 
EM5 Employee sends an internal email with risky words 
identified in the organizational word content filtering 
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
5.5 1.46 
PS2A Low score on conscientiousness: The employee is 
impulsive, careless, disorganized 
5.5 1.52 
EM6 Employee receives an internal email with risky words 
identified in the organizational word content filtering 
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days).  
5.4 1.49 
MC1 Employee connects a removable media device to an 
organizational PC 
5.3 1.46 
 
To address RQ2. what are the expert-validated cybersecurity indicator categories? 
SMEs were asked to rank the importance of indicator categories on a scale of (1) not 
important to (7) very important. Table 32 presents the mean importance rating of the top 
10 most highly rated indicator categories. Indicator categories identified as most 
important included technical (unauthorized logon activity, removable media device file 
activity, and removable media device connection activity, HTTP/online activity, email 
activity) and psychometric (neuroticism, conscientiousness, openness, agreeableness, 
extroversion). The most important category rated was technical: unauthorized logon 
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activity. The lowest ranked most important category was psychometric: extroversion. 
Although each of the indicators from these categories were considered important, the 
majority of indicators individually identified as important were regarding email activity 
and logon activity. 
Table 32 
Means and Standard Deviations of Importance of Indicator Categories 
Indicator Category  Importance 
  M SD 
Technical Unauthorized Logon 
Activity 
6.4 0.91 
Technical Removable Media Device 
File Activity (Open, Write, 
Copy, Delete) Activity 
5.6 1.29 
Technical Removable Media Device 
Connection Activity 
5.4 1.26 
Psychometric Neuroticism 5.1 1.21 
Technical HTTP/Online Activity 4.9 1.39 
Technical Email Activity 4.8 1.33 
Psychometric:  Conscientiousness 4.7 1.48 
Psychometric:  Openness 4.4 1.45 
Psychometric:  Agreeableness 4.4 1.34 
Psychometric:  Extroversion 4.2 1.37 
 
Phase 1, Delphi 2 – Data Collection  
 Over a two-week period, the Phase 1, Delphi 2 survey instrument was sent to the 
336 previously identified SMEs and collected 26 responses for an 8% response rate. The 
SMEs were asked to assign a weight to the indicators as well as identify what they 
deemed as important correlations between indicators. Data from this survey was used to 
address RQ3 and RQ4. 
Phase 1, Delphi 2 – Pre-Analysis    
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 Pre-analysis data screening did not identify any qualitative SME responses that 
suggested that indicators needed to be added or removed. The survey was set up to now 
allow incomplete responses. As such, no incomplete responses were collected. 
Phase 1, Delphi 2 – Data Analysis 
 As previously mentioned, the most important cybersecurity indicators validated 
by the expert panel were identified by ranking the top ten items by average score. From 
most important to least important the top ten most important cybersecurity indicators 
were LG1, LG2, LG3, MC1, HT6, EM8, EM7, EM6, EM5, and PS2A. To address RQ3, 
what are the expert-approved weights for the identified cybersecurity indicators? SMEs 
were asked to assign the top 10 indicators weights based on a scale of 1 to 100. The most 
highly weighted indicator, on average, was LG3 (M = 81.2; SD = 17.3). The lowest 
weighted indicator was EM7 (M = 59.5, SD = 2.78). Table 33 presents the means and 
standard deviations of these indicator weights. 
Table 33 
Means and Standard Deviations of Importance of Indicator Weights 
Indicator 
Number 
Indicator Description Weight 
  M SD 
LG3 Employee logs on after hours more than 30% of the 
tenure days without proper authorization 
81.2 17.3 
PS2A Low score on conscientiousness: The employee is 
impulsive, careless, disorganized 
78.6 21.7 
LG1 Employee logs on to different PC’s without proper 
authorization 
78.3 16.2 
EM6 Employee receives an internal email with risky words 
identified in the organizational word content filtering 
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
77.1 21.3 
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Table 33 
Means and Standard Deviations of Importance of Indicator Weights (Cont.) 
Indicator 
Number 
Indicator Description Weight 
  M SD 
MC1  Employee connects a removable media device to an 
organizational PC 
75.7 20.9 
LG2 Employee logs on after-hours more than 30% of the 
time (9 out or 30 days) without proper authorization 
73.0 18.4 
EM8 Employee sends an external email with risky words 
identified in the organizational word content filtering 
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
70.0 24.5 
HT6 Employee visits an eternal HTTP site with risky words 
identified in the organizational word content filtering 
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
67.9 24.2 
EM5 Employee sends an internal email with risky words 
identified in the organizational word content filtering 
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
61.6 26.5 
EM7 Employee receives an external email with risky word 
identified in the organizational word content filtering 
technology more than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
59.5 27.8 
 
To address RQ4, what are the expert-identified most significant correlations 
between cybersecurity indicators? SMEs were asked to choose important correlations 
between indicators. The top 10 most frequently identified pairings were retained as 
significant correlations. Pairings with frequencies less than three were excluded. These 
results are presented in Table 34.  
For correlation number 1, the most frequently identified pairing was between HT5 
and HT4. For correlation number 2, the most frequently identified pairing was between 
EM8 and EM7. For correlation number 3, the most frequently identified pairing was 
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between HT3 and HT5. For correlation number 4, the most frequently identified pairing 
was between PS4A and LG3. For correlation number 5, the most frequently identified 
pairing was between EM8 and EM5. For correlation number 6, the most frequently 
identified pairing was between HT2 and HT3. For correlation number 7, the most 
frequently identified pairing was between LG2 and LG3. For correlation number 8, the 
most frequently identified pairing was between MF3 and HT3. For correlation number 9, 
the most frequently identified pairing was between PS5A and PS5. For correlation 
number 10, the most frequently identified pairing was between PS5B and EM8.  
Table 34 
SME-Identified Correlations 
Correlation # Indicator 1 Indicator 2 Frequency Identified 
1 HT5 HT4 5 
2 EM8 EM7 4 
3 HT3 HT5 4 
4 PS4A LG3 4 
5 EM8 EM5 3 
6 HT2 HT3 3 
7 LG2 LG3 3 
8 MF3 HT2 3 
9 PS5A PS5 3 
10 PS5B EM8 3 
 
Phases Two and Three-Analysis of Simulated User Activity 
  Data analysis for phases two and three occurred from June 2018 to October 2018 
using a simulated user activity dataset. The goal of this phase was to analyze data 
representing simulated user activity that may or may not be malicious. To address RQ5a 
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and RQ5b, cross-tabulations were created between the indicator categories identified by 
the SMEs as well as identified by the system to determine the number of false positives 
and false negatives. To address RQ6, bivariate binary logistic regressions were used to 
determine what the system as identified as significant predictors of malicious activity, as 
well as, which of the SME-validated indicators were significantly predictive of malicious 
activity. To address RQ7, the SME rankings of indicator importance were compared to 
results of binary logistic regressions.  
Phases Two and Three– Data Collection 
  As noted by Lindauer et al. (2013), while insider threat research is of paramount 
importance, one of the greatest challenges in this field of research is obtaining suitable 
data for research, testing, and development. This is due to the fact that insiders are 
employees of the organization; in order to collect user activity data, organizations must 
monitor, record, and analyze the behaviors and actions of their own employees. This type 
of real time employee monitoring raises confidentiality and privacy concerns, making it 
preferable for researchers to use synthetic data (Glasser & Lindauer, 2013).  
 The simulated user activity dataset analyzed for this study was obtained from 
Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, CERT National Insider 
Threat Center. The simulated data represents an aggregated “collection of logs from host-
based sensors distributed across all the computer workstations within a large business or 
government organization over a 500-day period” (Glasser & Lindauer, 2013, p. 1). 
Phases Two and Three – Pre-Analysis Data Screening 
Pre-analysis data screening was used to determine that the data set consisted of 
115 million lines of simulated user activity. Simulated user activities ranged from 
logon/logoff behavior, email patterns, HTTP visits, external media/USB usage, file 
copies or changes, attempted restricted file access, demographics, and psychometric scale 
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ratings. All but one of the indicator categories presented to the SMEs produced 
reasonable odds ratios and were used in the data analysis of this study. The indicator 
Decoy File category presented two indicators DF1 and DF2 as seen in Table 33. For DF1, 
the simulated dataset lacked the employee to PC relationship needed to analyze this 
indicator. DF2 produced a high false positive rate indicating that 90.07% of PC’s 
produced this activity. As a result, these indicators were dropped from the study and were 
replaces with EM6 and MC1, the indicators with the next highest mean in the SME 
identified order of importance.  After data screening, the final dataset consisted of 4118 
simulated users, with 118 of those users known malicious insider threat actors.  
Table 35 
Decoy File Indicators  
Indicator 
Number 
Indicator Description Frequency 
  0 1 
    
DF1 An employee accesses a decoy file or honeypot without 
proper authorization 
NA NA 
DF2 A PC accesses a decoy file or honeypot without proper 
authorization 
409 3708 
 
Phase Two and Three—Data Analysis 
Research Questions 5a and 5b 
RQ5a: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to 
have a high rate of false positives as measured by the AI-InCyThR prototype? 
RQ5b: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to 
have a high rate of false negatives as measured by the AI-InCyThR prototype? 
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To address this research question, crosstabulations of the categories of each 
indicator variable (categories: yes, performed activity; no, did not perform activity) 
identified by the system and the variable malicious user (yes, flagged as actual malicious 
user; no, not actual malicious user) were generated. Then, the percentages of users who 
were malicious users and did perform the indicator activity were compared to the 
percentages of users who were malicious users and did not perform the activity. Table 34 
presents the results of these crosstabulations. 
For LG4, almost all malicious users did not perform this activity (99.19%). 
Similarly, only 2.70% of non-malicious users performed this activity. For MC4, almost 
all non-malicious users did not perform this activity (97.58%). A fair amount of non-
malicious users did perform this activity (19.03%). For MF4, all malicious users did not 
perform this activity (100%). Similarly, only 2.60% of non-malicious users performed 
this activity. For EM2, almost all non-malicious users did not perform this activity 
(99.19%). Of the non-malicious users, 5.03% performed this activity. For EM9, the 
majority of non-malicious users did not perform this activity (96.77%), and the majority 
of non-malicious users did perform the activity (82.29%). For HT7, the majority of 
malicious users did not perform this activity (96.77%), and a small amount of non-
malicious users did perform this activity (15.25%). For PS1B, three-quarters of malicious 
users did not perform this activity, while just under a third of non-malicious users did 
perform this activity (29.03%). For PS3B, a majority of malicious users did not perform 
this activity (76.61%), and 26.60% of non-malicious users performed this activity. For 
PS4B, 71.77% of malicious users did not perform this activity, while 25.64% of non-
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malicious users did perform this activity. For PS5B, 73.39% of malicious users did not 
perform this activity, while 27.97% of non-malicious users did perform this activity.  
For the system identified indicators, the majority of indicators had a high rate of 
false negatives (ranging from 71.77% to 100%). EM9 had the highest rate of false 
positives. LG4 and MF4 had the lowest rate of false positives.  
Table 36 
Crosstabulation Between System-Identified Indicator Activity and Malicious User 
Indicator Malicious User 
 No (n, sample %; column 
%) 
Yes (n, sample %; 
column %) 
LG4   
No  3885 (94.36%; 97.305) 123 (2.99%; 99.19%) 
Yes 108 (2.62%; 2.70%) 1 (0.02%; 0.81%) 
MC4   
No  3233 (78.53%; 80.97%) 121 (2.94%; 97.58%) 
Yes 760 (18.46%; 19.03%) 3 (0.07% ; 2.42%) 
MF4   
No  3889 (94.46%; 97.40%) 124 (3.01%; 100%) 
Yes 104 (2.53%; 2.60%) 0 (0.00%; 0.00%) 
EM2   
No  3792 (92.11%; 94.97%) 123 (2.99%; 99.19%) 
Yes 201 (4.88%; 5.03%) 1 (0.02%; 0.81%) 
EM9   
No  707 (17.17%; 17.71%) 120 (2.91%; 96.77%) 
Yes 3286 (79.82%; 82.29%)  4 (0.10%; 
3.23%) 
HT7   
No  3384 (82.20%; 84.75%) 120 (2.91%; 96.77%) 
Yes 609 (14.79; 15.25%) 4 (0.10%; 3.23%) 
PS1B   
No  2834 (68.84%; 70.97%) 93 (2.26%; 75.00%) 
Yes 1159 (28.15; 29.03%) 31 (0.75%; 25.00%) 
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Table 36 
Crosstabulation Between System-Identified Indicator Activity and Malicious User (Cont.) 
Indicator Malicious User 
 No (n, sample %; column 
%) 
Yes (n, sample %; 
column %) 
PS3B   
No  2923 (71.00; 73.20%) 95 (2.31%; 76.61%) 
Yes 1070 (25.99%; 26.80%) 29 (0.70%; 23.39%) 
PS4B   
No  2969 (72.12%; 74.36%) 89 (2.16%; 71.77%) 
Yes 1024 (24.87%; 25.64%) 35 (0.85%; 28.23) 
PS5B   
No  2876 (69.86%; 72.03%) 91 (2.21%; 73.39%) 
Yes 1117 (27.13%; 27.97%) 33 (0.80%; 26.61%) 
 
Next, crosstabulations of the categories of each indicator variable identified by the 
SMEs and the variable malicious user were generated.  Table 37 presents the frequencies 
and percentages associated with these crosstabulations. For LG1, the majority of 
malicious users did not perform the activity (71.77%). Of the non-malicious users, 
29.18% did perform this activity. For LG2, the majority of malicious users did perform 
the activity (84.68%). Less than a quarter of non-malicious users performed this activity 
(22.11%). For LG3, the majority of malicious users did not perform the activity 
(52.42%). Only 2.48% of non-malicious users performed this activity.   
For MC1, almost all malicious users did not perform the activity (96.77%). Less 
than a quarter of non-malicious users did perform this activity (19.61%). For HT6, the 
majority of malicious users did not perform the activity (97.58%). No non-malicious user 
performed this activity (0.00%). For EM8, the majority of malicious users did not 
perform the activity (98.39%). A sizeable amount of non-malicious users performed this 
activity (41.97%). For EM7, the majority of malicious users did not perform the activity 
 138 
 
 
(97.58%). The majority of non-malicious performed this activity (64.01%). For EM6, 
almost all malicious users did not perform the activity (99.19%). Slightly less than half of 
non-malicious users performed this activity (48.79%). For EM5, almost all malicious 
users did not perform the activity (99.19%). Almost a third of non-malicious users 
performed this activity (30.15%). For PS2A, the majority of malicious users did not 
perform the activity (70.16%). Less than a third of non-malicious users performed this 
activity (27.62%).  
Out of the ten indicators, only LG2 correctly identified the malicious user the 
majority of the time (84.68%). The indicator that correctly identified the malicious user 
the next highest majority of the time was LG3, at 47.58%. Almost all other indicators had 
a very high percentage of false negatives. EM8, EM7, and EM6 had the highest 
percentages of false positives, with 41.96-64.01% of non-malicious users having 
performed the activity.  
Table 37 
Crosstabulation Between SME-Identified Indicator Activity and Malicious User 
Indicator Malicious User 
 No (n, sample %; column 
%) 
Yes (n, sample %; column 
%) 
LG1   
No  2828 (68.69%; 70.82%) 89 (2.16%; 71.77%)) 
Yes 1165 (28.30%; 29.18%) 35 (2.92%; 28.23%) 
LG2   
No  3110 (75.54%;77.89%) 19 (0.46%; 15.32%) 
Yes 883 (21.45%; 22.11%) 105 (2.55%; 84.68%) 
LG3   
No  3894 (94.58%; 97.52%) 65 (1.58%; 52.42%) 
Yes 99 (2.40%; 2.48%) 59 (1.43%; 47.58%) 
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Table 37 
Crosstabulation Between SME-Identified Indicator Activity and Malicious User (Cont.) 
Indicator Malicious User 
 No (n, sample %; column 
%) 
Yes (n, sample %; column 
%) 
MC1   
No  3210 (77.97%; 80.39%) 120 (2.91%; 96.77%) 
Yes 783 (19.02%; 19.61%) 4 (0.10%; 3.23%) 
HT6   
No  3993 (96.99%; 100%) 121 (2.94%; 97.58%) 
Yes 0 (0.00%; 0.00%) 3 (0.07%; 2.42%) 
EM8   
No  2317 (56.28%; 58.03%) 122 (2.96%; 98.39%) 
Yes 1676 (40.71%; 41.97%) 2 (0.05%; 1.61%) 
EM7   
No  1437 (34.90%; 35.99%) 121 (2.94%; 97.58%) 
Yes 2556 (62.08%; 64.01%) 3 (0.07%; 2.42%) 
EM6   
No  2045 (49.67%; 51.21%) 123 (2.99%; 99.19%) 
Yes 1948 (47.32%; 48.79%) 1 (0.02%; 0.81%) 
EM5   
No  2789 (67.74%; 69.85%) 123 (2.99%; 99.19%) 
Yes 1204 (29.24%; 30.15%) 1 (0.02%; 0.81%) 
PS2A   
No  2890 (70.20%; 72.38%) 87 (2.11%; 70.16%) 
Yes 1103 (26.79%; 27.62%) 37 (0.90%; 29.84%) 
  
Research Question 6 
RQ6: What simulated user activity indicators were identified by the AI-InCyThR 
proof-of-concept prototype as significant indicators to identify insider threat activity?  
To address this research question, a series of bivariate binary logistic regressions 
were performed. The binary dependent variable for each regression was malicious user (1 
= yes, flagged as actual malicious user, 0 = no, not actual malicious user). The predictor 
variables were user activity indicators (1 = yes, performed activity, 0 = no, did not 
perform activity) identified by the system, as well indicators identified by the SMEs. 
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Then, a multivariate model was specified which included all indicators identified by the 
SMEs in one model.  
The bivariate models involving indicators identified by the system are 
summarized in Table 38.  EM9 was a significant predictor of being a malicious user, OR 
= 0.01, p < .001. The odds of being a malicious user are 0.01 times lower for users who 
perform this activity when compared to users who do not perform this activity.  HT7 was 
a significant predictor of being a malicious user, OR = 0.19, p = .001. The odds of being 
a malicious user were 0.19 times lower for users who performed this activity when 
compared to those who do not perform this activity. No other indicator was a significant 
predictor.  
Table 38 
Results of Bivariate Binary Logistic Regression with System-Identified Indicators 
Predicting Likelihood of Malicious User 
Indicator B SE OR p 
MC4 -1.23 1.01 0.29 .223 
MF4 -14.05 625.2 < .001 .982 
EM2 -1.87 1.01 .015 .063 
EM9 -4.94 0.51 0.01 < .001*** 
HT7 -1.69 0.51 0.19 .001** 
PS1B -0.20 0.21 0.82 .331 
PS3B -0.18 0.22 0.83 .399 
PS4B 0.13 0.21 1.14 .518 
PS5B -0.07 0.21 0.93 .739 
* p < 0.05, ** p.< 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
The bivariate models involving indicators identified by the SMEs are summarized 
in Table 39. All indicators were significantly predictive of likelihood of being a malicious 
user to various amounts except for LG1, HT6, and PS2A. HT6 showed greatly inflated 
estimates, indicating that results should be treated with caution. Performance of Lg2 and 
LG3 were predictive of increased chances of being a malicious user, while performance 
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of the other significant predictors were indicative of a decreased chance of being a 
malicious user.  
Table 39 
Results of Bivariate Binary Logistic Regression with SME-Identified Indicators 
Predicting Likelihood of Malicious User 
Indicator B SE OR p 
LG1 -0.05 0.21 0.96 .819 
LG2 2.97 0.25 19.46 < .001*** 
LG3 3.57 0.21 35.70 < .001*** 
MC1 -1.99 0.51 0.14 < .001*** 
HT6 34.23 2718231 > 999.99 1.00 
EM8 -3.79 0.71 0.02 < .001*** 
EM7 -4.27 0.58 0.01 < .001*** 
EM6 -4.76 1.00 0.01 < .001*** 
EM5 -3.97 1.00 0.02 < .001*** 
PS2A 0.11 0.20 1.11 .587 
* p < 0.05, ** p.< 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
A multivariate model was then specified with each of the SME-identified 
indicators. First, multicollinearity between the predictor variables was assessed using 
tetrachoric correlations. Correlations were considered strong if they were .80 or above 
and significant (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2014). HT6 had a strong correlation with almost all 
predictors. There was a strong correlation between LG1 and LG2 (0.84, p < .001). There 
was a strong correlation between LG2 and LG3 (0.99, p < .001) and HT6 (1.00, p = 
.003). As such, HT6 and LG2 were removed from the model because there was 
collinearity with other indicators in the model.   
The overall regression model was significant, !2(9) = 688.73, p < .001. This 
indicates that at least one of the indicators significantly predicts the likelihood of a user 
being classified as malicious. As such, the individual indicators were examined. The 
results of the binary logistic regression are summarized in Table 38.  
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LG1 was a significant predictor of malicious users, odds ratio (OR) = 2.74, p 
<.001. This indicates that the odds of being a malicious user are 2.74 times higher if the 
user performs this activity when compared to users who do not perform this activity. LG3 
was a significant predictor of malicious users, OR = 58.97, p < .001. The odds of being a 
malicious user are 58.97 times higher if the user performs this activity. MC1 was a 
significant predictor of malicious users, OR = 0.10, p < .001. This indicates that those 
who performed this activity had 0.10 times lower odds of being a malicious user. EM8 
was a significant predictor of malicious users, OR = 0.06, p = .001. Those who performed 
this activity had 0.06 lower odds of being a malicious user. EM7 was a significant 
predictor of malicious users, OR = 0.01, p < .001. Those who performed this activity had 
0.01 times lower odds of being a malicious user. EM6 was a significant predictor of 
malicious users, OR = 0.02, p < .001. Those who performed this activity had 0.02 times 
lower odds of being a malicious user. EM5 and PS2A did not significantly predict 
changes in the likelihood of being a malicious user.  
Table 40 
Multivariate Binary Logistic Regression with Indicators Predicting Likelihood of 
Malicious User 
Indicator B SE OR p 
Intercept -2.53 0.18 - < .001*** 
LG1 1.01 0.27 2.74 < .001*** 
LG3 4.08 0.34 58.97 < .001*** 
MC1 -2.30 0.59 0.10 < .001*** 
EM8 -2.83 0.81 0.06 < .001*** 
EM7 -4.76 0.69 0.01 < .001*** 
EM6 -3.82 1.07 0.02 < .001*** 
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Table 40 
Multivariate Binary Logistic Regression with Indicators Predicting Likelihood of 
Malicious User (Cont.) 
Indicator B SE OR p 
EM5 -1.97 1.02 0.14 .054 
PS2A 0.19 0.26 1.21 .454 
* p < 0.05, ** p.< 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Research Question 7 
RQ7: How are the simulated user activity correlations that were identified by the 
SMEs different than those identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as 
significant to identify insider threat activity? 
To address this research question, the average importance of each SME-identified 
indicator was compared towards their actual significance and OR as reported by bivariate 
logistic regressions (see Table 37 for the bivariate logistic regressions). Table 39 presents 
the SME rankings and the ORs and actual significance.  
On average, SMEs ranked LG1 the highest in importance. However, when 
assessed statistically, this was not an actual significant predictor of malicious users. LG3 
was ranked the second highest in importance. When assessed statistically, this was a 
significant predictor with a high OR. LG2 was ranked third. When assessed statistically, 
this was a significant predictor with a high OR that was below the OR of LG3. EM8 was 
ranked fourth. This was a significant predictor with a very small OR, indicating that the 
activity predicts lower odds of being a malicious user. HT6 showed inflated estimates, 
indicating that results were not reliable, and thus was not reported here. EM 7 was ranked 
sixth. This was a significant predictor with an OR similar to EM8, indicating lower odds 
of being a malicious user. EM5 was ranked seventh. This was a significant predictor with 
a OR similar to EM8 and EM7, indicating lower odds of being a malicious user. PS2A 
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was ranked eighth. This was not a significant predictor. EM6 was ranked ninth, this was a 
significant predictor with a small OR, indicating lower odds of being a malicious user. 
Finally, MC1 was ranked 10th most important. This was a significant predictor with a low 
OR, indicating lower odds of being a malicious user.  
Table 41 
Indicator SME-Identified Average Importance, OR, and Significance of Indicators 
Indicator 
Number 
Indicator Description Importance OR p 
  M SD   
LG1 Employee logs on to different 
PC’s without proper authorization 6.2 0.88 0.96 .819 
LG3 Employee logs on after hours 
more than 30% of the tenure days 
without proper authorization 
6.1 1.01 35.70 < .001*** 
LG2 Employee logs on after-hours 
more than 30% of the time (9 out 
or 30 days) without proper 
authorization 
6.0 1.26 19.46 < .001*** 
EM8 Employee sends an external email 
with risky words identified in the 
organizational word content 
filtering technology more than 
30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
6.0 1.19 0.02 < .001*** 
HT6† Employee visits an eternal HTTP 
site with risky words identified in 
the organizational word content 
filtering technology more than 
30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
5.8 1.05 - - 
EM7 Employee receives an external 
email with risky word identified 
in the organizational word 
content filtering technology more 
than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
5.7 1.38 0.01 < .001*** 
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Table 41 
Indicator SME-Identified Average Importance, OR, and Significance of Indicators 
(Cont.) 
Indicator 
Number 
Indicator Description Importance OR p 
  M SD   
      
EM5 Employee sends an internal email 
with risky words identified in the 
organizational word content 
filtering technology more than 
30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days) 
5.5 1.46 0.02 <.001*** 
PS2A Low score on conscientiousness: 
The employee is impulsive, 
careless, disorganized 
5.5 1.52 1.11 .587 
EM6 Employee receives an internal 
email with risky words identified 
in the organizational word 
content filtering technology more 
than 30% of the time (9 out or 30 
days).  
5.4 1.49 0.01 < .001*** 
MC1 Employee connects a removable 
media device to an organizational 
PC 
5.3 1.46 0.14 < .001*** 
†Estimates for this indicator not reliable and are thus not reported, * p < 0.05, ** p.< 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Summary 
For Research Question 1, SMEs identified the following ten indicators as being 
the most important: LG1, LG2, LG3, MC1, HT6, EM8, EM7, EM6, EM5, and PS2A. For 
Research Question 2, the validated indicator categories were technical (unauthorized 
logon activity, removable media device file activity [open, write, copy, delete] activity, 
removable media device connection activity, HTTP/online activity, email activity) and 
psychometric (conscientiousness, openness, neuroticism, agreeableness, extroversion). 
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For Research Question 4, the most frequently identified top-ranked correlation was 
between HT5 and HT4.  
For Research Question 5, all but LG2 had high percentages of false negatives in 
the SME-identified indicators. EM8, EM7, and EM6 had the highest percentages of false 
positives in the SME-identified indicators. For the system identified indicators, EM9 had 
the highest rate of false positives. LG4 and MF4 had the lowest rate of false positives. 
For Research Question 6, when considered in bivariate models, the EM9 was the only 
system-identified indicator that was significantly predictive of odds of being a malicious 
user. Performance of this indicator activity was associated with lower odds of being a 
malicious user. When considered in bivariate models, the following SME-identified 
indicators were significantly predictive of higher odds of being a malicious user: LG2, 
LG3, and EM6. The following SME-identified indicators were significantly predictive of 
lower odds of being a malicious user: MC1, EM8, EM6, and EM5. For Research 
Question 7, the SME-identified most important rankings were confirmed by bivariate 
logistic regression results for LG3 and LG2 but were not confirmed for most other 
indicators.  
The following chapter will discuss these results in more detail. The strengths and 
limitations of the study will be examined. Recommendations for future research will be 
given. 
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Chapter 5 
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
Conclusions 
 Over a 12 month period, the estimated average cost of an insider threat attack is 
$8.76 million (Ponemon, 2018).  Insider threat attack continues to be one of today’s most 
challenging cybersecurity issues that is not well addressed by commonly implemented 
cybersecurity measures (Homoliak, Toffalini, Guarnizo, & Elovici, 2018). Therefore, the 
main goal of this proposed research study was to design, develop, and validate a proof-of-
concept prototype for a malicious cybersecurity insider threat alerting system that will 
assist in the detection and prediction of malicious insider threat activity using human-
centric technical activities, as well as, individual employee psychometric rating scales. 
This process was conducted by developing the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype 
using SME validated technical and psychometric cybersecurity indicators. This study 
achieved the seven goals by using a three-phased approach. First, using the Delphi 
method, an expert panel of SMEs validated the most important technical and 
psychometric cybersecurity indicators that should be used in the detection of malicious 
cybersecurity insider threat, as well as, rank the cybersecurity indicator categories. 
Second, using the Delphi method, the previously validated indicator categories were 
assigned weights and order of importance by the SMEs, and the SMEs identified their 
preferred top 10 indicator correlations. Finally, the previously validated and weighted 
indicators were operationalized, and the AI-InCYThR proof-of-concept prototype was 
used to measure the accuracy of the top 10 SMEs identified cybersecurity indicators.  
Discussion 
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 Principally, the results of the study validated the top 10 cybersecurity indicators 
important in the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threat: LG1, LG2, LG3, 
MC1, HT6, EM8, EM7, EM6, EM5, and PS2. These results indicate that cybersecurity 
practitioners should begin to focus on the detection of anomalies within these areas of 
user activity and personality factors. The results also indicated that LG1 was a significant 
predictor of malicious users, where the odds of being a malicious user are 2.74 times 
higher if the user performs this activity when compared to users who do not perform this 
activity. The results of this study identified that the most important correlation between 
user activities are those related to user Internet usage as determined by SMEs 
identification of  when an employee downloads a file from an external HTTP site (HT4), 
and when an employee downloads a file from an external HTTP site more than 3 times in 
one day (HT5). This suggests that cybersecurity practitioners should focus on, and tune 
their monitoring solutions to identify logon policy violations and any violations of the 
acceptable Internet usage and file download policy within the organization.  
 Overall, AI-InCyThR was not implied to be effective in comparison to the SMEs 
overall importance ranking of the cybersecurity indicators used in the detection of 
malicious cybersecurity insider threats. However, each of the validated indicators were 
found to be effective in the detection of malicious insider threat activity. Observed 
effectiveness was implied for the following items: indicator correlations, indicators 
presented, and relevance of the indicator to malicious insider threat detection. Observed 
effectiveness was not implied for the following items: organization of the indicators 
presented, complexity of the indicators presented, ability to effectively identify potential 
malicious insider threat, ability to make actionable decisions based on the data presented. 
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A possibly inconsequential limitation of this study is the use of simulated data. Another 
possible limitation of this study was the analysis of key words and the fine tuning of the 
key words within the AI-InCyThR system. In the real world, cybersecurity practitioners 
have the ability to easily fine tune their monitoring solutions based on organizational 
policy and real-time threats as they arise.  
 
Implications 
  The implications of this research study in relation to the existing body of 
knowledge are the contributions to IS and InfoSec. This study developed and validated a 
set of cybersecurity indicators for the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threat 
activities.  One of the major challenges in cybersecurity is the human-centric factor. 
Because of human nature, some employees won’t adhere to acceptable use policies, 
contributing to cybercrime in ways such as opening attachments containing malware, or 
using easy to guess passwords, in addition to, an employee leaving and either steals 
information or compromises systems (Grossbart, 2018).  
 This study identified SME validated technical and psychometric cybersecurity 
indicators, how the indicators correlate with each other, as well as, validated indicator 
effectiveness in the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threats. This study 
provides organizations with a set of technical and psychometric indicators that are 
perceived as effective in the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threat activities. 
This set of cybersecurity indicators could assist organizations in the detection and 
mitigation of malicious cybersecurity insider threat activities.  
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Recommendations and Future Research   
 This study was a developmental research and delineated the research approach to 
employing the Delphi technique to validate and measure cybersecurity indicators, as well 
as, construct a proof-of-concept prototype to apply the cybersecurity indicators to be used 
by organizations in the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threat. The approach 
illustrated in this research study can be implemented by other fields of study to propose 
and validate indicators for use in other specialties. Furthermore, this approach can be 
conveyable to other fields of study were a proof-of-concept prototype needs to be 
developed.  
 This research study provides many opportunities for future research studies to be 
conducted. First, the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype can be used with real data, 
where a more robust analysis can be conducted and the technical and psychometric 
indicators can be more closely examined. Second, the proof-of-concept prototype is SAS 
code based. Future studies can develop other alternatives to perform the data mining 
procedures, or create an API that would facilitate the use of the tool. Third, further 
research can be done with word content filtering and artificial intelligence for the use of 
word context and sentence structure. While an attempt was made to take HTTP visit 
content and email content into consideration as an insider threat risk factor, many issues 
arose causing an extreme level of false positives, resulting in key word identification and 
content filtering being dropped as a risk factor. Forth, while the Big Five trait model has 
been widely used in IS research, other studies suggest that it does not completely account 
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for individual differences in personality and human behavior specifically traits around 
anti-social behavior and the Dark Triad personality traits (Withers, Parrish, Terrell, & 
Ellis, 2017). Future research can dive deeper into socially averse personality types and 
their relationship to deviant computer use.  
 
Summary 
 The research problem addressed by this study is the imminent challenge to 
mitigating cybersecurity insider threats from employees or contractors who may bring 
harm to the organization by misusing information systems, computer networks, or data 
(Sood et al., 2015). Insider threat attacks are more in number and more costly than 
external attacks (Ambre & Shekokar, 2015, p. 436). Information security is not just about 
the implementation of specific technologies to monitor information systems, but also the 
people and processes that rely on these systems (Bowen et al., 2011). Organizations are 
sitting on repositories of security relevant data that is not being fully capitalized upon by 
security practitioners with current information security policies and tools (Early & Stott 
III, 2015). This study facilitated an increase in the body of knowledge by providing 
validated indicators and a method to connect and correlate the indicators; in a manner that 
can shift organizational practices from reactive to proactive security by providing 
organizations a set of indicators to begin to focus their monitoring efforts. This study 
addressed a valid problem with practical significance (Terrell, 2015).  
 The main goal of this research study was to design, develop, and validate a proof-
of-concept prototype for a malicious cybersecurity insider threat alerting system that will 
assist in the detection and prediction of malicious insider threat activity using human-
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centric technical activities, as well as, individual employee psychometric rating scales. 
Building on the works of Agrafiotis, Legg, Goldsmith, and  Creese (2014), Costa et al., 
(2014), Greitzer, Dalton, Kangas, Noonan, and Hohimer (2012), Nostro, Ceccarelli, 
Bondavalli, and Brancati (2014), Warkentin and Willison (2009), as well as, Greitzer et 
al., (2009), this work was classified as developmental research. Furthermore, it answers 
the call to develop a proof-of-concept prototype to assist in the detection of malicious 
insider threat activity. To achieve the main goal, this research set seven specific goals to 
address seven specific research questions, using a three-phased approach.  
 During Phase 1, an exploratory study was conducted using a group of 
cybersecurity SMEs from the LinkedIn professional network to address the following 
questions: 
RQ1: What are the important cybersecurity indicators validated by the expert 
panel that can assist in the detection of insider threat activity?  
RQ2: What are the expert-validated cybersecurity indicator categories? 
First, this study performed an extensive review of literature to establish a list of 
appropriate cybersecurity technical and psychometric indicators. Next, via anonymous 
online survey, the Delphi method was used with 46 SMEs to propose and validate a set of 
indicators that can assist in the detection of insider threat activity. The result of the survey 
identified the top 10 cybersecurity indicators from both the technical and psychometric 
indicator categories. These results addressed RQ1. Following, the same anonymous 
online survey asked the SMEs to validate cybersecurity indicator categories. Therefore 
addressing RQ2.  
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 In continuing Phase 1, once the SMEs had validated the top 10 cybersecurity 
indicators and cybersecurity indicator categories, another anonymous online survey was 
administered to same group of SMEs, with 26 SMEs responding, to address the following 
research questions: 
RQ3: What are the expert-approved weights for the identified cybersecurity 
indicators? 
RQ4: What are the expert-identified most significant correlations between 
cybersecurity indicators? 
The SMEs were presented their top 10 identified cybersecurity indicators and asked to 
weight the indicators, as to assign order of importance. The cybersecurity indicator 
weights provided by the SMEs were averaged and accepted as weights for the indicators. 
The indicator with the highest weight represented employees logging on after hours more 
than 30% of the time, while the indicator with the lowest weight represented employees 
receiving emails from an external source, where the body of the email contained a risky 
word more than 30% of the time. Therefore, addressing RQ3. Similarly, the same 
anonymous online survey asked to choose the most significant correlations between 
cybersecurity indicators. The top 10 most frequently identified pairings were retained as 
significant correlations. Pairings with frequencies less than three were excluded. These 
results addressed RQ4.  
 Phase 2 of this research study consisted of the operationalization of the 
cybersecurity indicators using SAS analytics software, as well as, performing a pre-
analysis screening of the dataset. Once the cybersecurity indicators were operationalized, 
analysis of the dataset was performed to identify each simulated user’s activity in relation 
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to the operationalized indicators. Lastly, once the simulated users activity had been 
identified, a flat file was create to perform the statistical analysis.  Phase 2, of this study 
asked following research questions: 
RQ5a: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to 
have a high rate of false positives as measured by the AI-InCyThR 
prototype? 
RQ5b: What cybersecurity indicators were identified in experimental settings to 
have a high rate of false negatives as measured by the AI-InCyThR 
prototype? 
RQ6: What simulated user activity indicators were identified by the AI-InCyThR 
proof-of-concept prototype as significant indicators to identify insider 
threat activity?  
 To address research questions 5a, cross tabulations were performed for both the 
system identified indicators and the SME identified indicators. For the system identified 
indicators, EM9 had the highest percentage of false positives with 82.29%. For the 
SME’s identified indicators, EM7 had the highest percentage of false positives with 
64.01%. Therefore, addressing RQ5a.   
 In addressing research question 5b, the majority of system identified indicators 
had a high rate of false negatives, ranging from 71.77% to 100%. Out of the 10 SMEs 
identified indicators, LG2 had the lowest false negative rate of 15.32%. EM6, and EM5, 
had the highest false negative rate with 99.19%. It was observed that the rest of the SMEs 
identified indicators had a high rate of false negatives, ranging from 52.42% to 98.39%. 
Therefore, addressing RQ5b.  
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 In addressing research question 6, a series of bivariate binary logistic regressions 
were performed on both the system identified indicators and the SMEs identified 
indicators to determine the indictors that were significant predictors of malicious users. 
For the system selected indicators, the bivariate models exhibited EM9 was a significant 
predictor of being a malicious user, OR = 0.01, p < .001. The odds of being a malicious 
user are 0.01 times lower for users who perform this activity when compared to users 
who do not perform this activity. The bivariate models also exhibited HT7 was a 
significant predictor of being a malicious user, OR = 0.19, p = .001. The odds of being a 
malicious user were 0.19 times lower for users who performed this activity when 
compared to those who do not perform this activity. Additionally, the models exhibited 
no other significant predictors of malicious users. For the SMEs identified indicators, all 
the indicators were significantly predictive of increased likelihood of being a malicious 
user, except for LG1, HT6, and PS2A. Additionally, only LG2 and LG3 had a significant 
positive relationship to malicious use, whereas, MC1, EM8, EM7, EM6, EM5, had a 
significant negative relationship with malicious use.  The results of HT6 showed greatly 
inflated estimates and should be treated with caution. In regard to HT6, data analysis 
proved that only 3 users performed this activity. This seemed questionable and the 
analysis was run a second time which provided the same result. Therefore, addressing 
RQ6.  
 In Phase 3, the SME identified indicators were compared towards their actual 
significance and OR as reported by bivariate logistic regression to address RQ7.  
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 RQ7: How are the simulated user activity correlations that were identified by the 
SMEs different than those identified by the AI-InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as 
significant to identify insider threat activity? 
 The result indicated that only LG3 and LG2 validated the SMEs high rating of 
importance as evident by high odds ratios. This in comparison to the SMEs high rating, 
and low odd ratios for the other indicators, indicating that the directionality of the 
relationship as generated by the AI-InCyThR system is opposite of what the SMEs rated. 
Therefore, addressing RQ7. 
 This study made several contributions to Information Systems and Information 
Security body of knowledge by developing a SME validated set of cybersecurity 
indicators and an effective method for the detection of anomalous activities when 
mitigating malicious cybersecurity insider threats. Specifically, indicators LG3 and LG2, 
exhibited being strong predictors of malicious activity, and were consistent with the 
SMEs rating of strong importance. Of the other system identified indicators, they were 
either not statistically significant (MC4, MF4, EM2, PS1B, PS3B, PS4B, PS5B, LG1, & 
PS2A) or significant in the negative direction (EM9, HT7, MC1, EM8, EM7, EM6, & 
EM5), meaning that employees without the indicators were more likely to be a malicious 
users, than employees with the indicators (contrary to original expectation).  
 Additionally, the study resulted in establishing validated weights for the 
cybersecurity indicators. Moreover, the study provided empirical evidence regarding 
cybersecurity indicators and indicator categories important in cybersecurity monitoring 
and response decision-making, and the mitigation of malicious cybersecurity insider 
threat. Given the complexity of the insider threat phenomenon, the results presented in 
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this study will provide organizations with empirical evidence that can be leveraged to 
improve the organizations cybersecurity posture, in an effort to lower the probability of 
financial, information, and intellectual property losses.  
In conclusion, organizations can use the validated cybersecurity indicators of 
LG3, LG2, to assist in the detection of malicious cybersecurity insider threat activity. AI-
InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype addressed the challenge of detecting complex 
malicious cybersecurity insider threats activity in an unconventional manner by 
validating indicators and indicator correlations. Additionally, organizations can the AI-
InCyThR proof-of-concept prototype as a model for addressing the issues faced when 
fine tuning cybersecurity monitoring tools and solutions to identify malicious 
cybersecurity insider threat activity. 
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Appendix B 
Expert Recruitment Email 
Dear Cybersecurity Expert, 
 
We seek your help in providing expert validation for an upcoming doctoral research 
study. I am a PhD candidate in Information Systems, focused on Cybersecurity, at the 
College of Engineering and Computing, Nova Southeastern University. My research 
study seeks to develop a proof-of-concept prototype tool that will determine technical and 
psychometric indicators as precursors to a malicious cybersecurity insider threat attack. 
These indicators include email activity, http activity, file access, and psychometric 
classification. To develop the proof-of-concept prototype tool, I need assistance from 
experts who have knowledge in cybersecurity for three phases of data collection. Phase 1 
of my research requires assistance from experts to validate and assign weights to 
technical and psychosocial indicators that may be used by tools such as Security Event 
and Information Management (SIEM) systems or Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).  
An online survey will be used to determine the content of the Phase 1 indicator catalogue. 
All participants are subject matter experts in this area.  
By participating in this study, you agree and understand that your responses are 
voluntary. Measures will be taken to ensure that responses are anonymous and cannot be 
traced to any individual. You may stop participating in the study at any time. In the event 
that you no longer wish to participate in the study, your responses will not be recorded. 
By participating in this study, you certify that you are over the age of 18 years. If you are 
willing to participate, please click on the link below for access and completion by 
[DATE]: [LINK]  
Thank you in advance for your consideration. I appreciate your assistance and 
contribution to this research study.  
If you wish to receive the findings of the study, please contact me via email and I will 
provide you with the information about the academic research publication(s) resulting 
from this study.  
Regards,  
Angel Hueca, PhD Candidate 
E-mail: ah1676@nova.edu 
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Expert Panel Survey Instrument - Delphi 2
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